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Abstract
In many decision problems, agents base their actions on a simple objective
index, a single number that summarizes the available information about ob-
jects of choice independently of their particular preferences. The first chapter
proposes an axiomatic approach for deriving an index which is objective and,
nevertheless, can serve as a guide for decision making for decision makers with
different preferences. Unique indices are derived for five decision making set-
tings: the Aumann and Serrano (2008) index of riskiness (additive gambles),
a novel generalized Sharpe ratio (for a standard portfolio allocation problem),
Schreiber’s (2013) index of relative riskiness (multiplicative gambles), a novel
index of delay embedded in investment cashflows (for a standard capital
budgeting problem), and the index of appeal of information transactions
(Cabrales et al., 2014). All indices share several attractive properties in
addition to satisfying the axioms. The approach may be applicable in other
settings in which indices are needed.
The second chapter uses conditions from previous literature on complete
orders to generate partial orders in two settings: information acquisition and
segregation. In the setting of information acquisition, I show that the partial
iii
order prior independent investment dominance (Cabrales et al., 2013) refines
Blackwell’s partial order in the strict sense. In the segregation setting, I show
that without the requirement of completeness, all of the axioms suggested in
Frankel and Volij (2011) are satisfied simultaneously by a partial order which
refines the standard partial order (Lasso de la Vega and Volij, 2014).
In the third and fourth chapters, I turn to examine matching markets. Al-
though no stable matching mechanism can induce truth-telling as a dominant
strategy for all participants (Roth, 1982), recent studies have presented
conditions under which truthful reporting by all agents is close to optimal
(Immorlica and Mahdian, 2005; Kojima and Pathak, 2009; Lee, 2011). The
third chapter demonstrates that in large, balanced, uniform markets using the
Men-Proposing Deferred Acceptance Algorithm, each woman’s best response
to truthful behavior by all other agents is to truncate her list substantially.
In fact, the optimal degree of truncation for such a woman goes to 100%
of her list as the market size grows large. Comparative statics for optimal
truncation strategies in general one-to-one markets are also provide: reduction
in risk aversion and reduced correlation across preferences each lead agents
to truncate more. So while several recent papers focused on the limits of
strategic manipulation, the results serve as a reminder that without pre-
conditions ensuring truthful reporting, there exists a potential for significant
manipulation even in settings where agents have little information.
Recent findings of Ashlagi et al. (2013) demonstrate that in unbalanced
random markets, the change in expected payoffs is small when one reverses
which side of the market “proposes,” suggesting there is little potential gain
from manipulation. Inspired by these findings, the fourth chapter studies the
iv
implications of imbalance on strategic behavior in the incomplete information
setting. I show that the “long” side has significantly reduced incentives for
manipulation in this setting, but that the same doesn’t always apply to the
“short” side. I also show that risk aversion and correlation in preferences
affect the extent of optimal manipulation as in the balanced case.
v
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Chapter 1
Consistent Indices
1.1 Introduction
In many decision problems, agents base their actions on a simple objective
index, a single number that summarizes the available information about
objects of choice and does not depend on the agent’s particular preferences.1
Agents might choose to do this due to difficulties in attaining and interpreting
information, or due to an overabundance of useful information. For example,
the Sharpe ratio (Sharpe, 1966), the ratio between the expected net return
and its standard deviation, is frequently used as a performance measure for
portfolios (Welch, 2008; Kadan and Liu, 2014).
This paper proposes an axiomatic approach for deriving an index that
is objective and, nevertheless, can serve as a guide for decision making for
decision makers with different preferences. The approach is unifying and may
be used in a variety of decision making settings. I present five applications:
1As shown by Luca (2011), for the case of online restaurant star ratings.
1
for a setting of additive gambles, which like lottery tickets change the baseline
wealth of the owner independently of its level (an index of riskiness); for a
standard portfolio allocation problem (a generalized Sharpe ratio); for a setting
of multiplicative gambles, which change the wealth of the owner proportionally
to its baseline level (an index of relative riskiness); for a standard capital
budgeting problem (an index of the delay embedded in investment cashflows);
and for a setting of information acquisition by investors in an Arrovian
(Arrow, 1972) environment (an index of appeal of information transactions).
In each of the settings I study, a unique index emerges that is theoretically
appealing and often improves upon commonly used indices. The approach
may be applicable in other settings in which indices are needed.2
In my setting, agents choose whether to accept or reject a transaction (a
gamble, a cashflow, etc.). The starting point of this paper is a given decision
problem and the requirement that (at least) small decisions can be made
based on the index. This is the content of the local consistency axiom. The
axiom states, roughly, that all agents can make acceptance and rejection
decisions for small, “local,” transactions using the index and a cut-off value
(which is the only parameter that depends on their preferences), without
knowing other details about the transaction, so that the outcomes of their
decisions will mirror the outcomes they would achieve by optimizing when
possessing detailed knowledge about the transaction.
Even though transactions are complex and multidimensional, I show that
a numeric, single dimensional, index can summarize all the decision-relevant
2A particular setting which seems promising in this regard is the measurement of
inequality, which has many similarities to the setting of risk (Atkinson, 1970).
2
information for small transactions. I thus view local consistency as a minimal
requirement for an index to be a useful guide for decision making, and, as I
show, it is indeed satisfied by many well-known indices in various decision
making problems. However, while this property is desirable, I show that
many indices that have it also have normatively undesirable properties.3
The Sharpe ratio, for example, has such property outside the domain of
normal distributions. As shown in Example 1.10, the Sharpe ratio is not, in
general, monotonic with respect to first order stochastic dominance outside
that domain (Hodges, 1998).4
A second criterion for assessing the validity of an index, global consistency,
is therefore suggested. Global consistency extends local consistency by making
restrictions over large transactions, but it is actually quite a weak restriction.
Nevertheless, the combination of local and global consistency turns out to
be powerful. In the various decision making problems which are discussed
below, it pins down a unique order over transactions that has several desirable
properties in addition to local and global consistency.5 Since I use results
from the setting of additive gambles in my treatment of other decision making
3As stated here, the result follows trivially given the existence of one locally consistent
index, as one could change the values of large transactions without changing those of small,
local, ones. The exact statement makes further technical requirements which disqualify
such indices.
4This undesirable property is related to the fact that this index depends only on the
first two moments of the distribution. These moments are sufficient statistic for a normal
distribution, and therefore basing an index on them solely may be reasonable if returns
are assumed (or known) to be normally distributed. This assumption, however, is often
rejected in empirical tests in settings where the Sharpe ratio is used in practice (e.g. Fama,
1965; Agarwal and Naik, 2000; Kat and Brooks, 2001). Moreover, a large body of literature
documents the importance of higher order moments for investment decisions (e.g. Kraus
and Litzenberger, 1976; Kane, 1982; Harvey and Siddique, 2000; Barro, 2006, 2007; Gabaix,
2008).
5To be precise, additional mild conditions are required as well.
3
environments, I begin by reviewing this setting and cover it in detail in order
to illustrate the general concepts.
The approach I take is different from the standard decision theoretic
approach. I start with a given objective index – a function that assigns to each
transaction some number, independently of any agent-specific characteristics.
In the case of additive gambles, a higher number is associated with a higher
level of riskiness. As different functions induce different orders, for a given
index Q, I refer to the Q-riskiness of a gamble. Only then I define the
aversion to Q-riskiness. I define the relation locally at least as averse to
Q-riskiness as follows: agent u with wealth w is locally at least as averse to
Q-riskiness as agent v with wealth w′ if, for all gambles with small support
(defined precisely in Section 1.3),6 when u at w accepts any small gamble
with a certain level of Q-riskiness, v at w′ accepts all small gambles which are
significantly less Q-risky. This definition assumes a certain kind of consistency
between the index and the aversion to the property it evaluates, as it implies
that agents that are less Q-riskiness averse would accept Q-riskier gambles.
This approach is the dual of the standard approach, since instead of starting
with an ordering over preferences and asserting that risk is “what risk-averters
hate” (Machina and Rothschild, 2008), I start with an ordering over the
objects of choice (an index of riskiness Q) and derive from it judgments on
preferences (Q-riskiness aversion).
6The need to restrict attention to small supports is nicely illustrated by a discussion
Samuelson (1963) describes having with with Stanislaw Ulam. Samuelson (1963) quotes
Ulam as saying “I define a coward as someone who will not bet when you offer him
two-to-one odds and let him choose his side,” to which he replied “You mean will not
make a sufficiently small bet (so that the change in the marginal utility of money will not
contaminate his choice).”
4
In Section 1.3, I show that if Q is a locally consistent index which satisfies
an additional mild condition, then the relation “at least as averse to Q-
riskiness” induces the same order as the classic coefficient of absolute risk
aversion (ARA, Pratt, 1964; Arrow, 1965, 1971). This property is shown
to be satisfied by several well-known indices. However, it is also satisfied by
many other indices, including ones that are not monotonic with respect to
first order stochastic dominance (Hanoch and Levy, 1969; Hadar and Russell,
1969; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970).
As local consistency is insufficient for pinning down normatively accept-
able indices, in Section 1.4 I propose a second criterion — the generalized
Samuelson property. An index of riskiness has this property when no agent
accepts a large gamble of a certain degree of riskiness if he rejects small
ones of the same degree of riskiness at any wealth level, and no agent rejects
a large gamble of a certain degree of riskiness if he accepts small ones of
the same degree of riskiness at any wealth level. I also show that no agent
whose risk tolerance (the inverse of the coefficient of absolute risk aversion)
is always higher than the AS riskiness of g will reject g, and no agent whose
risk tolerance is always lower will accept it. Given an empirical range of
the degrees of risk aversion in a population, the model provides advice to
individuals and policy makers based on the index. It also allows researchers a
simple way to estimate bounds on the degree of risk aversion in the population
from observations of acceptance and rejection of different gambles.
In Section 1.5, I show that the generalized Samuelson property can
be replaced by a weaker condition that involves pairs of agents — global
consistency. I say that one agent is globally at least as averse to Q-riskiness
5
as another agent, if he is locally at least as averse to Q-riskiness at any two
arbitrary wealth levels. In the additive gambles setting, global consistency
requires that if two agents can be compared using this partial order, then
the more Q-riskiness averse agent rejects gambles which are riskier than ones
rejected by the other agent. Note that the partial order on preferences which
is used to make this requirement of consistency is defined using the index
Q, and not based on preexisting notions of risk aversion. Global consistency
is a weak requirement, in the sense that it imposes no restriction for the
(common) case of a pair of agents who cannot be compared using this partial
order. However, I show that with additional mild conditions, the Aumann
and Serrano (2008) index of riskiness, which is monotonic with respect to
stochastic dominance, is the unique index that satisfies local consistency and
global consistency.
Section 1.6 addresses the ranking of performance of a market portfolio
in the presence of a risk-free asset. One well known index of performance is
the Sharpe ratio (Sharpe, 1966), the ratio between the expected net return
and its standard deviation. Using the approach from Section 1.5 I derive the
generalized Sharpe ratio, where the role of the standard deviation is taken by
the Aumann-Serrano (AS) index. This index of performance coincides with
the Sharpe ratio on the domain of normal distributions but differs from it in
general.7 Unlike the Sharpe ratio, it is monotonic with respect to stochastic
dominance, even when the risky return is not normally distributed, and it
satisfies other desirable properties.
Section 1.7 covers the setting of multiplicative gambles. The results are
7The index is increasing in odd distribution moments and decreasing in even ones.
6
quite analogous to those of the additive gambles setting. The role of ARA
is replaced by the coefficient of relative risk aversion (RRA). I show that
with mild conditions, the index of relative riskiness of Schreiber (2013) is the
unique index which satisfies local consistency and global consistency (or the
generalized Samuelson property).
Section 1.8 considers a capital budgeting setting. Agents are proposed
investment cashflows, opportunities of investment for several periods with
return at later times. I label indices for this setting as indices of delay.
Paralleling results in previous sections, I show that local consistency, combined
with additional mild conditions, ensures that the local aversion to delay, as
defined by an index, is ordinally equivalent to the instantaneous discount rate.
Adding the requirement of global consistency (or the generalized Samuelson
property) is then shown to pin down a novel index for the delay embedded in
investment cashflows. The index is continuous and monotonic with respect
to time dominance (Bøhren and Hansen, 1980; Ekern, 1981), a partial order
on cashflows in the spirit of stochastic dominance.
Section 1.9 treats the setting of information acquisition by investors facing
a standard investment problem (Arrow, 1972). I show that the local taste for
informativeness, as defined by the index, coincides with the inverse of ARA for
any index which satisfies local consistency and another mild condition. These
include Cabrales et al. (2013) and Cabrales et al. (2014), but also indices
which have a normatively undesirable property: they are not monotonic
with respect to Blackwell’s (1953) partial order.8 I then show that the index
8One information structure dominates the other in the sense of Blackwell if it is
preferred to the other by all decision makers for all decision making problems.
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of Cabrales et al. (2014) is the unique index which satisfies the additional
requirement of global consistency.
1.1.1 Relation to the Literature
Apart from serving as input in decision making processes, indices are also used
to limit the discretion of agents by regulators (Artzner, 1999) or when decision
rights are being delegated (Turvey, 1963). For example, a mutual fund man-
ager may be required to invest in bonds that are rated AAA. Similarly, credit
decisions are frequently based on a credit rating, a number that is supposed
to summarize relevant financial information about an individual. Indices are
also used in empirical studies in order to evaluate complex, multidimensional,
attributes. Examples include the cost of living (Diewert, 1998), segregation
(Echenique and Fryer Jr., 2007), academic influence (Palacios-Huerta and
Volij, 2004; Perry and Reny, 2013), market concentration (Herfindahl, 1950),
the upstreamness of production and trade flows (Antràs et al., 2012), contract
intensity in production (Nunn, 2007), centrality in a network (Bonacich,
1987), inequality (Yitzhaki, 1983; Atkinson, 1983), poverty (Atkinson, 1987),
risk and performance (Sharpe, 1966; Artzner et al., 1999), political influence
(Shapley and Shubik, 1954; Banzhaf III, 1964), and corruption perceptions
(Lambsdorff, 2007).
Although indices are used extensively in economic research and in practice,
in many cases the index is not carefully derived from theory. Even in cases
where they make theoretical sense in a specific setting, they are often used in
larger domains. For example, risk has been evaluated using numerous indices
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including the standard deviation of returns, the Sharpe ratio, value at risk
(VaR), variance over expected return and the coherent measures of Artzner
et al. (1999).9 Some of these indices, like the Sharpe ratio, suffer from a
severe normative drawback: they are not monotonic with respect to first
order stochastic dominance outside specific domains.10 That is, increasing
a gamble’s value in every state of the world does not necessarily lead the
index to deem it less risky. Different indices have other undesirable properties.
For example, some indices are not continuous, which makes them hard to
estimate empirically. Some indices, like VaR, are independent of outcomes in
the tails. Finally, and key to this paper, some of the indices are not locally
consistent,11 so they may not be used to guide decisions. My approach is to
consider fairly general settings and concentrate on consistency.
This paper contributes to the growing literature, pioneered by Aumann
and Serrano (2008), which identifies objective indices for specific decision
making problems. For additive gambles, Aumann and Serrano present an
objective index of riskiness, based on a small set of axioms, including centrally
a “duality axiom,” which requires a certain kind of consistency. Roughly
speaking, it asserts that (uniformly) less risk-averse individuals accept riskier
gambles.12 Importantly, their definition of risk aversion takes the traditional
view, and does not refer to risk as defined by the index. Foster and Hart
9Even though all of the above indices are meant to measure “risk,” they were derived
with different decision making problems in mind: some take the point of view of a regulator,
and others of an investor; some assume the existence of a risk-free asset and others do not;
some allow agents to adjust their level of investment, and others assume indivisible assets.
10See Example 1.10.
11See Example 1.1.
12Agent i uniformly no less risk-averse than agent j if whenever i accepts a gamble at
some wealth, j accepts that gamble at any wealth.
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(FH, 2009) present a different index of riskiness with an operational inter-
pretation.13 Their index identifies for every gamble the critical wealth level
below which it becomes “risky” to accept the gamble.14 Schreiber (2013)
uses insights from this literature to develop an index of relative riskiness for
multiplicative gambles. Cabrales et al. (2013) and Cabrales et al. (2014) treat
the setting of information acquisition and the appeal of different information
transactions for investors.
My approach provides a unifying framework for the decision making
problems mentioned above, and it can also be applied to new settings. It
provides the first axiomatization for the index of delay and for the generalized
Sharpe ratio. All of the indices share several desirable properties, such as
monotonicity (e.g., with respect to stochastic dominance) and continuity.
The generalized Sharpe ratio, one of the two novel indices presented here, is
monotonic with respect to stochastic dominance in the presence of a risk-free
asset (Levy and Kroll, 1978), the analogue of stochastic dominance, of the
first and second degree. The index of delay is monotonic with respect to time
dominance (Bøhren and Hansen, 1980; Ekern, 1981), the analogous partial
order on cashflows.
The index of delay is closely related to a well-known measure of delay which
is used in practice: the internal rate of return (IRR). I discuss this relation
as well as the close connection of the index to the AS index of riskiness. Like
the generalized Sharpe ratio, this index treats a decision making environment
13Homm and Pigorsch (2012b) provide an operational interpretation of the Au-
mann–Serrano index of riskiness.
14Hart (2011) later demonstrated that both indices also arise from a comparison of
acceptance and rejection of gambles.
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which has not yet been treated by the recent literature on indices for decision
problems. These applications therefore underscore a strength of the proposed
approach: indices emerge from the same requirements in different decision
making environments.
This paper also contributes to the literature that attempts to extend
the partial order of Blackwell by restricting the class of decision problems
and agents under consideration (e.g. Persico, 2000; Athey and Levin, 2001;
Jewitt, 2007). Both Cabrales et al. (2014) and Cabrales et al. (2013) treat an
investment decision making environment with a known, common and fixed
prior. The order induced by their indices depends on this prior; there exists
pairs of information transactions which are ranked differently depending on
the prior selected. But an analyst cannot always observe the relevant prior.
Subsection 1.9.5 asks whether the index I derive has prior-free implications for
the way information transactions are ranked, which go beyond monotonicity
in Blackwell’s order and in price. The answer is shown to be positive: there
exist pairs of information structures such that neither dominates the other
in the sense of Blackwell, and when priced identically, one is ranked higher
than the other by the index of appeal of information transactions for any
prior distribution. A similar result is shown by Shorrer (2015) for the index
of Cabrales et al. (2013).
1.2 Preliminaries
In this section I provide some notation which will be required for the next
sections.
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A gamble g is a real-valued random variable with positive expectation
and some negative values (i.e., E[g] > 0 and Pr{g < 0} > 0); for simplicity,
I assume that g takes finitely many values. G is the collection of all such
gambles. For any gamble g ∈ G, L(g) and M(g) are respectively the maximal
loss and gain from the gamble that occur with positive probability. Formally,
L(g) ∶= max supp(−g) and M(g) ∶= max supp(g).G is the class of gambles with support contained in an -ball around zero:
G ∶= {g ∈ G ∶ max{M(g), L(g)} ≤ } .
[x1,p1;x2, p2...;xn, pn] represents a gamble which takes values x1, x2, ..., xn
with respective probabilities of p1, p2, ..., pn.15
An index of riskiness is a function Q ∶ G → R+ which associates each
gamble with a positive real. Note that an index of riskiness is objective, in
the sense that its value depends only on the gamble and not on any agent-
specific attribute. An index of riskiness Q is homogeneous (of degree k) if
Q(tg) = tk ⋅Q(g) for all t > 0 and all gambles g ∈ G.
QAS(g), the Aumann-Serrano index of riskiness of gamble g, is implicitly
defined by the equation
E [exp(− g
QAS(g))] = 1.
QFH(g), the Foster-Hart measure of riskiness of g,16 is implicitly defined by
the equation
15This notation will not be used when it is important to distinguish between random
variables and distributions.
16I also refer to QFH as an index of riskiness.
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E [log(1 + g
QFH(g))] = 0.
Note that both QAS and QFH are homogeneous of degree 1. Additionally,
these indices are monotone with respect to first and second order stochastic
dominance;17 namely, if g is stochastically dominated by g′ then QAS(g) >
QAS(g′) and also QFH(g) > QFH(g′) (Aumann and Serrano, 2008; Foster
and Hart, 2009).
Value at Risk (VaR) is a family of indices commonly used in the financial
industry (Artzner, 1999; Aumann and Serrano, 2008). VaR indices depend on
a parameter called the confidence level. For example, the VaR of a gamble at
the 95 percent confidence level is the largest loss that occurs with probability
greater than 5 percent.
In this paper, a utility function is a von Neumann–Morgenstern utility
function for money. I assume that utility functions are strictly increasing,
strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable unless otherwise men-
tioned. The Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion (ARA), ρ, of u
at wealth w is defined
ρu(w) ∶= −u′′(w)
u′(w) .
The Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion (RRA), %, of u at wealth
w is defined
%u(w) ∶= −wu′′(w)
u′(w) .
17A gamble g first order stochastically dominates h iff for every weakly increasing (not
necessarily concave) utility function u and every w ∈ R, E [u (w + g)] ≥ E [u (w + h)], with
strict inequality for at least one such function. A gamble g second order stochastically
dominates h iff for every weakly concave utility function u and every w ∈ R, E [u (w + g)] ≥
E [u (w + h)], with strict inequality for at least one such function.
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Note that ρu(⋅) and %u(⋅) are utility specific attributes and that both ρ and
% yield a complete order on utility-wealth pairs. That is, the risk aversion, as
measured by ρ (or %), of any two agents with two given wealth levels can be
compared.
A gamble g is accepted by u at wealth w if E [u(w + g)] > u(w), and is
rejected otherwise. Given an index of riskiness Q, a utility function u, a
wealth level w and  > 0:
Definition. RQ(u,w) ∶= sup{Q(g)∣ g ∈ G and g is accepted by u at w}
Definition. SQ(u,w) ∶= inf {Q(g)∣ g ∈ G and g is rejected by u at w}
RQ(u,w) is the Q-riskiness of the riskiest accepted gamble according
to Q, restricting the support of the gambles to an -ball. SQ(u,w) is the
Q-riskiness of the safest rejected gamble according to Q, again restricting
the support of the gambles to an -ball.
Definition. u at w is (locally) at least as averse to Q-riskiness as v at w′ if
for every δ > 0 there exists  > 0 such that SQ(v,w′) ≥ RQ(u,w) − δ.
The interpretation of u at w being at least as averse to Q-riskiness as v
at w′ is that, at least for small gambles, if u at w accepts any small gamble
with a certain level of Q-riskiness, v at w′ accepts all small gambles which
are significantly (by at least δ) less Q-risky. Alternatively, if v at w′ rejects
any small gamble with a certain level of Q-riskiness, u at w rejects all small
gambles which are significantly (by at least δ) Q-riskier.
The following definitions will also prove useful:
Definition. RQ(u,w) ∶= lim
→0+RQ(u,w)
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Definition. SQ(u,w) ∶= lim
→0+SQ(u,w).18
Roughly speaking, RQ(u,w) is the Q-riskiness of the Q-riskiest “local
gamble” that u accepts at w, and SQ(u,w) is the Q-riskiness of the Q-safest
“local gamble” that is rejected by u at w. The inverse of RQ and SQ is a
natural measure of the aversion to Q-riskiness.19 The reason is that RQ
is high for utility-wealth pairs in which Q-risky gambles are accepted, so
a reasonable Q-riskiness aversion measure should imply that the aversion
to Q-riskiness at such utility-wealth is low. Similarly, SQ is low at a given
utility-wealth pair when Q-safe gambles are rejected, so the measure of local
aversion to Q-riskiness must be high in this case.
The coefficient of local aversion to Q-riskiness of u at w is therefore
defined as
AQ(u,w) ∶= 1
RQ(u,w) ,
noting that unless otherwise mentioned, all of the results would hold for
1
SQ(u,w) as well. As is shown below, this definition makes it possible to discuss
the ordinal equivalence of the coefficient of local aversion to Q-riskiness, which
depends both on agents behavior and on the properties of the index Q, with
orders such as ARA or RRA, which depend on the preferences exclusively,
and are independent of the index.
18The existence of the limit in the wide sense is guaranteed by the fact that the suprema
(infima) in the definitions of R (S) are taken on nested supports.
19For our purposes, 0 =∞−1and ∞ = 0−1.
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1.3 Local Aversion to Q-Riskiness
Since no restrictions on Q were made (other then possibly homogeneity), at
this point coefficients of local aversion to Q-riskiness might look like a class
of arbitrary orderings over (u,w) pairs. However, I claim that its members
are connected to the standard concepts of local risk aversion. One reason is
that they induce orderings which refine the following natural partial order
(Yaari, 1969): u at w is locally no less risk averse than v at w′ (written(u,w) ⋗ (v,w′)) if and only if there exists  > 0 such that for every g ∈ G, if
u accepts g at w then so does v at w′. An order O refines the natural partial
order if for all g and h, g ⋗ h Ô⇒ gOh.
Lemma 1.1. For every index of riskiness Q, the order induced by AQ refines
the natural partial order.
Proof. Assume that (u,w) ⋗ (v,w′). Then there exists ′ > 0 such that for
every g ∈ G′ if u accepts g at w then so does v at w′. As in the definition of
RQ we have  → 0+, disregarding all  ≥ ′ will not change the result. Note
that for every  < ′
{Q(g)∣ g ∈ G and g is accepted by u at w} ⊆
{Q(g)∣ g ∈ G and g is accepted by v at w′} .
This means that for every  < ′, R(u,w) ≤ R(v,w′) as the suprema in
the definition of RQ(v,w′) are taken on a superset of the corresponding sets
in the definition of RQ(u,w). The result follows as weak inequalities are
preserved in the limit.
16
Next, I show that the coefficient of local aversion to AS (FH) riskiness
gives rise to a complete order which coincides with the one implied by the
Arrow-Pratt ARA coefficient.
Lemma 1.2. For every utility function u and every w, RQAS (u,w) =
SQAS (u,w) and AQAS(u,w) = ρu(w).
Proof. First, observe that if u and v are two utility functions and there exists
an interval I ⊆ R such that ρu(x) ≥ ρv(x) for every x ∈ I, then for every
wealth level w and lottery g such that w+g ⊂ I, if g is rejected by v at w it is
also rejected by u for the same wealth level. Put differently, if g is accepted
by u at w it is also accepted by v at the same wealth level. The reason is
that the condition implies that in this domain, u is a concave transformation
of v (Pratt, 1964), hence by Jensen’s inequality u(w) ≤ E [u (w + g)] implies
that v(w) ≤ E [v (w + g)].
Keeping in mind that u′(x) > 0, we have that ρu(x) is continuous. Specif-
ically,
∀ δ > 0 ∃  > 0 s.t x ∈ (w − ,w + )⇒ ∣ρu(x) − ρu(w)∣ < δ. (1.3.0.1)
Recall that a CARA utility function with ARA coefficient of α rejects all
gambles with AS riskiness greater than 1α and accepts all gambles with AS
riskiness smaller than 1α (Aumann and Serrano, 2008). For any δ < ρu(w),
given an -environment of w in which ρu ∈ (ρu(w) − δ, ρu(w) + δ), taking the
CARA functions with ARA of ρu(w) + δ and ρu(w) − δ, and applying the
first observation (where I is (w − ,w + )) completes the proof.
Lemma 1.2 essentially shows that every utility function may be approxi-
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mated locally using CARA functions, which are well-behaved with respect to
the AS index. Given the ARA of u at a given wealth level, I take two CARA
utility functions, one with slightly higher ARA, and the other with slightly
lower ARA. For small environments around the given wealth level, ρu is
almost constant, so the two CARA functions “sandwich” the utility function
in terms of ARA. This implies that for small gambles, one CARA function
accepts more gambles than u, and the other less gambles, in the sense of
set inclusion. Since CARA functions accept and reject exactly according to
an AS riskiness cutoff, and since cutoffs are close for similar ARA values, it
follows that the coefficient of local aversion to AS-riskiness is pinned down
completely.
Lemma 1.3. For every utility function u and every w, RQFH (u,w) =
SQFH (u,w) and AQFH(u,w) = ρu(w).
Proof. According to Statement 4 in Foster and Hart (2009):
−L(g) ≤ QAS(g) −QFH(g) ≤M(g). (1.3.0.2)
Therefore, if g ∈ G then:
∣QAS(g) −QFH(g)∣ ≤ . (1.3.0.3)
From Inequality 1.3.0.3 one can deduce that RQFH(u,w) = RQAS(u,w) and
SQFH(u,w) = SQAS(u,w). Lemma 1.2 completes the proof.
The result of Lemma 1.3 is not surprising in light of Lemma 1.2, as
Foster and Hart (2009) already noted that the Taylor expansions around 0 of
the functions that define QFH and QAS differ only from the third term on.
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Roughly speaking, this means that for gambles with small supports QAS and
QFH are close.
Theorem 1.1 summarizes the results of Lemmata 1.1-1.3.
Theorem 1.1. (i) For any index of riskiness Q, AQ refines the natural
partial order. (ii) For every utility function u and every w, AQAS(u,w) =
AQFH(u,w) = ρu(w). Furthermore, RQAS (u,w) = SQAS (u,w) andRQFH (u,w) =
SQFH (u,w).
Corollary 1.1. For Q ∈ {QAS ,QFH} u at w is at least as averse to Q-
riskiness as v at w′ iff ρu(w) ≥ ρv(w′).
Note that part (i) of Theorem 1.1 states that the order induced by AQ
refines the weak, no-less risk averse, partial order, and not the strict one.
The strict version of this statement is not correct as the following example
demonstrates. The example also shows that it is not the case that for all
popular risk indices the coefficient of local aversion is equal to ρ or refines
the order it induces, and that the same is true for the relation at least as
averse to Q-riskiness.
Example 1.1. For any confidence level α ∈ (0,1), for all agents and wealth
levels, the coefficient of local aversion to Q (⋅) ∶= exp{VaRα(⋅)} is equal to 1,
and any agent at any wealth level is at least as averse to Q-riskiness as any
other agent.20
It is noteworthy that the example would go through with the exponent
of any coherent risk measure (Artzner et al., 1999). The fact that these
20The exponent is only used to assure that the index is positive. It has no ordinal effect.
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indices are not well suited for the task of comparing agents’ preferences is not
surprising. These indices are motivated by the problem of setting a minimal
reserve requirements for investors in a given position (Artzner, 1999), and so
they take the point of view of a regulator, not the investor.
Up until this point, I showed that the local aversion to AS and FH riskiness
induces the same order as the ARA coefficient, the standard measure of local
risk aversion, and that the coefficient of local aversion to AS and FH riskiness
is in fact equal to the ARA coefficient. This means that one can start with
a small set of axioms, namely Aumann and Serrano’s (2008) or Foster and
Hart’s (2013), and define a complete order of riskiness over gambles. Then,
the coefficient of local aversion of agents to riskiness can be derived, and
it will be equal to the well-known Arrow-Pratt coefficient. The relation at
least as averse to AS (FH)-riskiness will also induce the same order. Hence,
both AS and FH satisfy the desirable property that less risk averse agents
according to ARA accept riskier gambles according to AS or FH.
Theorem 1.1 and Corollary 1.1 might be interpreted as evidence that AS
and FH were “well-chosen” in some sense. However, I will show in Theorem 1.2
that while AS and FH satisfy the desirable properties mentioned above, there
are other indices which satisfy the same properties. Moreover, some of
these indices are not “reasonable” in the sense that they are not monotone
with respect to first order stochastic dominance, in clear violation of the
requirement that an index of riskiness should judge as riskier the alternative
risk-averse individuals less prefer. Theorem 1.3 further identifies sufficient
conditions on Q under which the coefficient of local aversion to Q-riskiness
and the relation at least as averse to Q-riskiness yield the same order as the
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Arrow-Pratt (local) absolute risk aversion. Before stating these results, I
must introduce a few key properties.
Axiom (Homogeneity). Q is homogeneous of degree k for some k > 0.
The homogeneity axiom has both cardinal and ordinal content. For the
case k = 1, its cardinal interpretation is that doubling the stakes doubles
the riskiness. The ordinal content is that doubling the stakes increases the
riskiness. When taking the point of view of an agent, not a regulator setting
a minimal reserve requirement, the cardinal part is not necessarily desirable.
In what follows, I assume it for its simplicity and since homogeneity of degree
1 appears in the original axiomatic characterization of the AS index, but later
I remove this axiom.
Axiom (Local consistency). ∀u ∀w ∃λ > 0 ∀δ > 0 ∃ > 0 RQ(u,w) − δ <
λ < SQ(u,w) + δ.
Local consistency says that small gambles that are significantly Q-safer
than some cut-off level are always accepted, and that ones significantly
riskier than the cutoff are always rejected. Lemma A.2 in the appendix
shows that whenever homogeneity is satisfied, local consistency implies that
0 < SQ(u,w) = RQ(u,w) < ∞. This means, that for “small” gambles Q is
sufficient information to determine an agent’s optimal behavior. In other
words, the decisions of agents are consistent with the index, on small domains.
Definition (Reflexivity). The relation at least as averse to Q-riskiness is
reflexive if for all u and w, u at w is at least as averse to Q-riskiness as u at
w.
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Proposition. If Q satisfies local consistency, then the relation locally at least
as averse to Q-riskiness is reflexive.
Definition (Ordinally equivalent). Given an index of riskiness Q, AQ is ordi-
nally equivalent to the coefficient of absolute risk aversion ρ, if ∀u, v ∀w,w′
AQ(u,w) > AQ(v,w′) ⇐⇒ ρu(w) > ρv(w′).
Theorem 1.2. (i) There exists a continuum of locally consistent, homoge-
neous of degree 1, riskiness indices for which the coefficient of local aversion
equals the Arrow-Pratt coefficient.21 (ii) Moreover, some of these indices are
not monotone with respect to first order stochastic dominance.
(i) is proved in the appendix using the observation that for every a > 0 any
combination of the form Qa(⋅) ∶= QFH(⋅) + a ⋅ ∣QFH(⋅) −QAS(⋅)∣ is an index
of riskiness for which the coefficient of local aversion equals the coefficient of
local aversion to QFH . The reason this holds is that for small supports, the
second element in the definition is vanishingly small by Inequality 1.3.0.3,
and so Qa and QFH should be close. The following example demonstrates
(ii).
Example 1.2. TakeQ1(⋅) ∶= QFH(⋅)+∣QFH(⋅) −QAS(⋅)∣ and g = [1, e1+e ;−1, 11+e].
QAS(g) = 1 and QFH(g) ≈ 1.26, hence Q1(g) < 1.6. Now take g′ = [1,1 −
;−1, ]. For small values of , QAS(g′) ≈ 0 but QFH(g′) > 1, so Q1(g′) > 1.6.
Therefore, while g′ first order stochastically dominates g, Q1 (g) < Q1 (g′).
21Omitting the homogeneity of degree 1 requirement would yield a trivial statement as,
for example, an arbitrary change of the values of QAS for gambles taking values larger than
some M > 0 will result in a valid index. The requirement that that the local aversion to
the index coincides with the Arrow-Pratt coefficient, and not just with the order it implies,
is a normalization that rules out, for example, the use of positive multiples of QAS .
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Theorem 1.3. If Q satisfies local consistency and homogeneity of degree
k > 0, then AQ is ordinally equivalent to ρ, and the relation at least as averse
to Q-riskiness induces the same order as ρ.22
The proof is in the appendix. It extends the reasoning of Lemma 1.1.
Remark. Both axioms in Theorem 1.3 are essential: As the following examples
demonstrate, omitting either admits indices for which the coefficient of local
aversion is not ordinally equivalent to ρ, and the relation at least as averse
to Q-riskiness does not induce the same order as ρ.
Example 1.3. Q (⋅) ≡ 5 satisfies local consistency, but it does not satisfy
homogeneity of degree k > 0. The local aversion to this index induces the
trivial order and AQ ≡ 15 .
Example 1.4. Q(⋅) = E [⋅] is homogeneous of degree 1, but it violates local
consistency. The local aversion to this index induces the trivial order and
AQ ≡∞.
Later in the paper, homogeneity will sometimes no longer be required.
It will be replaced by a requirement of continuity and monotonicity with
respect to first order stochastic dominance (or mean preserving spreads). For
completeness, I present an example of a locally consistent index which satisfies
continuity and monotonicity with respect to first and second order stochastic
dominance but does not possess the ordinal content of homogeneity.
Definition (Continuity). An index of riskiness Q is continuous if Q(g) =
22To be precise, this statement means that u at w is at least as averse to Q-riskiness as
v at w′ if and only if ρu(w) ≥ ρv(w′).
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lim
n→∞Q (gn) whenever gn are uniformly bounded gambles which converge to g
in probability.
Example 1.5. Q(⋅) = exp{QAS(⋅) −E [⋅]} inherits its positivity from the
exponent, it is continuous and monotonic with respect to first order stochastic
dominance as both QAS(⋅) and −E [⋅] are. It is monotonic with respect to
second order stochastic dominance as QAS(⋅) is increasing in mean-preserving
spreads and E does not vary with mean-preserving spreads (weakly increasing).
Q satisfies local consistency as for small supports it is almost equal to
exp{QAS(⋅)}, which is locally consistent. Finally, for g such that QAS(g) <
E [g] and λ > 1, Q(λg) < Q(g). For small  > 0, gambles of the form
g = [−, 12 ; 1, 12] satisfy the required inequality.
1.4 The Aversion to AS-Riskiness and the Demand
for Gambles
Samuelson (1960) shows that “if you would always refuse to take favorable
odds on a single toss, you must rationally refuse to participate in any (finite)
sequence of such tosses” (Samuelson, 1963). But Samuelson (1963) also warns
against undue extrapolation of his theorem saying “It does not say that one
must always refuse a sequence if one refuses a single venture: if, at higher
income levels the single losses become acceptable, and at lower levels the
penalty of losses does not become infinite, there might well be a long sequence
that it is optimal.” The following proposition shows that AS has properties
which generalize the property discussed by Samuelson.
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Proposition 1.1. A gamble g with QAS(g) = c is rejected by u at w only if
there exist some w′ ∈ [w −L(g),w +M(g)] such that small gambles with QAS
of c are rejected at w′. A gamble g with QAS(g) = c is accepted by u at w
only if there exist some w′ ∈ [w − L(g),w +M(g)] such that small gambles
with QAS of c are accepted at w′.
Proof. Omitted.
Corollary 1.2. If QAS(g) > sup
w
{A−1
QAS
(u,w)} = sup
w
{ρ−1u (w)} then u rejects
g at any wealth level. If QAS(g) < inf
w
{A−1
QAS
(u,w)} = inf
w
{ρ−1u (w)} then u
accepts g at any wealth level.
The corollary suggests a partition of the class of gambles into three: “risky”
gambles, which the agent never accepts, “safe” gambles which are always
accepted, and gambles whose acceptance is subject to wealth effects. Knowing
the distribution of preferences in a given population, the intersection of the
relevant “risky” and “safe” segments yields a partition which is mutually
agreed upon. Such a partition could be used as a simple tool for evaluating
policies, as I will show in Section 1.6. It may also be used as a simple tool for
providing bounds on risk attitudes, as illustrated in the following example.
Example 1.6. Say that a population of agents are observed making accep-
tance and rejection decisions on gambles. Say that A is the set of gambles
rejected by some agent, and B is the set of gambles accepted by some agent.
Then if, for some g ∈ B and for all u, QAS(g) > sup
w
{ρ−1u (w)}, a contradiction
would be implied. So, for some u, max
g∈B QAS(g) ≤ supw {ρ−1u (w)} . Similarly
min
g∈AQAS(g) ≥ infw {ρ−1v (w)} for some v.
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The next result shows a property of the index which is in the spirit of
Samuelson’s argument, and in fact implies Samuelson’s theorem. It shows
that the sets of “risky” and “safe” gambles are closed under compounding of
independent gambles.
Definition (Compound gamble property). An index Q has the compound
gamble property if for every compound gamble of the form f = g+1Ah, where
1 is an indicator, A is an event such that g is constant on A (g∣A ≡ x for some
x) and h is independent of A, max{Q(g),Q(h)} ≥ Q(f) ≥ min{Q(g),Q(h)}.
Proposition 1.2. QAS satisfies the compound gamble property. Thus, if
g, h ∈ G are independent, and min{QAS(g),QAS(h)} > sup
w
{ρ−1u (w)}, then a
compound gamble of g and h will also satisfy the inequality. Additionally, if
g, h ∈ G are independent, and max{QAS(g),QAS(h)} < inf
w
{ρ−1u (w)}, then a
compound gamble of g and h will also satisfy the inequality.
Proof. See appendix.
Theorem 1.3 identifies conditions under which the coefficient of local
aversion to Q-riskiness and the relation at least as averse to Q-riskiness induce
the same order as the Arrow-Pratt ARA. But according to Theorem 1.2 and
Example 1.5 this property is not enough to characterize a “reasonable” index
of riskiness. These findings call for additional requirements from an index of
riskiness. I propose a generalized Samuelson property and show that with
reflexivity (local consistency), monotonicity and continuity it pins down
uniquely the AS index.
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Axiom (Generalized Samuelson property). ∀u, w′ S∞Q (u,w′) ≥ infw SQ(u,w)
and R∞Q (u,w′) ≤ sup
w
RQ(u,w).
The axiom says that no agent accepts a large gamble of a certain degree of
riskiness if he rejects small ones of the same degree of riskiness at any wealth
level, and no agent rejects a large gamble of a certain degree of riskiness if he
accepts small ones of the same degree of riskiness at any wealth level.
Theorem 1.4. (QAS)k is the unique index of riskiness that satisfies local
consistency, global consistency and homogeneity of degree k > 0, up to a
multiplication by a positive number.
Proof. See appendix.
As was discussed previously, the cardinal content of the homogeneity
axiom is not necessarily appealing for general indices of riskiness. In what
follows, this axiom will be removed and replaced with less demanding con-
ditions: monotonicity with respect to first order stochastic dominance and
continuity. The combination of the generalized Samuelson property, mono-
tonicity, continuity and reflexivity of the relation locally at least as averse to
Q-riskiness implies local consistency, and so the local consistency requirement
could be replaced with the weaker requirement of reflexivity.
Theorem 1.5. If Q satisfies the generalized Samuelson property, reflexivity,
monotonicity with respect to first order stochastic dominance and continuity,
then Q is ordinally equivalent to QAS.
Proof. See appendix.
27
Claim 1.1. The monotonicity requirement in the theorem could be replaced
by each of the following conditions:
(a) Monotonicity with respect to mean-preserving spreads
(b) Satisfying the ordinal content of homogeneity
(c) Monotonicity with respect to increases in the lowest value of the
gamble, leaving the rest of the values unchanged
In such case, monotonicity with respect to first order stochastic dominance
will be a result, not an assumption.
Corollary 1.3. The FH index of riskiness does not satisfy the generalized
Samuelson property.
Example 1.7. g ∶= [1, 12 ;−12 , 12] has QFH (g) = 1. When compounding 3 i.i.d
gambles with this distribution, the largest loss that happens with positive
probability is -1.5. This implies that the FH-riskiness of the compound
gamble must be at least 1.5.
1.5 Global Consistency
The generalized Samuelson property implies that if for two agents, u and v,
inf
w′ SQ(v,w′) ≥ supw RQ(u,w), then S∞Q (v,w0) ≥ R∞Q (u,w1) at any two wealth
levels w0, and w1. In this section, I propose global consistency – a weaker
restriction on pairs of agents. The following definition is required in order to
state the condition.
Definition (Globally more averse to Q-riskiness). Let Q be an index of
riskiness. u is globally at least as averse to Q-riskiness as v is (written
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u ≿Q v) if, for every w and w′, u at w is at least as averse to Q-riskiness as
v at w′. u is globally more averse to Q-riskiness than v (written u ≻Q v) if
u ≿Q v and not v ≿Q u.23
Axiom (Global consistency). For every pair of utilities u and v, for every w
and every g and h in G, if u ≻Q v, u accepts g at w, and Q(g) > Q(h), then
v accepts h at w.
Claim 1.2. Global consistency is implied by the generalized Samuelson prop-
erty.
The axiom of global consistency is a weak requirement, in the sense that
it imposes no restriction for pairs of utilities which cannot be compared using
the partial order globally more averse to Q-riskiness. It is inspired by the
duality axiom of AS. For small gambles, it follows immediately from local
consistency. In fact, local consistency could have been stated in a very similar
way, had it been assumed that the relation at least as averse to Q-riskiness is
reflexive. It would state that if u at w is at least as averse to Q-riskiness as v
at w′ is, then there exists λ > 0 such that for all δ > 0 there exists  > 0 with
RQ(u,w) − δ < λ < SQ(v,w′) + δ. Roughly, it states that if the risk averse
agent accepts a small gamble with a certain level of riskiness, the less risk
averse agent will accept small gambles which are Q-safer. The content of the
axiom of global consistency comes from the fact that it places no restriction
on the support of gambles, so that when two agents that can be compared
by the partial order “globally more averse to Q-riskiness,” the axiom requires
23The above definition is different from the AS definition of uniformly more risk-averse.
It is derived directly from the index Q and the utility function u. However, if the relation at
least as averse to Q-riskiness induces the same order as ρ the two definitions are equivalent.
29
that the less averse agent accepts Q-riskier gambles, and the requirement
applies not only for small gambles.
Theorem 1.6. (QAS)k is the unique index of riskiness that satisfies local
consistency, global consistency and homogeneity of degree k > 0, up to a
multiplication by a positive number.
Proof. Let Q be homogeneous of degree 1. From Theorem 1.3, AQ is ordinally
equivalent to ρ, and the relation at least as averse to Q-riskiness induces the
same order as ρ. The AS duality axiom states that if u is uniformly more
averse to risk than v, u accepts g at w, and Q(g) > Q(h), then v accepts h at
w. That the relation at least as averse to Q-riskiness induces the same order
as ρ means that u is globally more averse to Q-riskiness than v if and only if
u is uniformly more risk averse than v. With global consistency, this implies
the duality axiom. But the only indices that satisfy homogeneity of degree 1
and the duality axiom are positive multiples of QAS (Aumann and Serrano,
2008). If Q is homogeneous of degree 0 < k ≠ 1, Q′ = (Q) 1k is homogeneous of
degree 1, and still satisfies the other properties,24 so Q′ must equal C ⋅QAS
for some C > 0, and so Q is equal to Ck ⋅ (QAS)k. Finally, Theorems 1.1 and
1.3 and the discussion above imply that for all k > 0, (QAS)k satisfies the
axioms,25 and the same holds for its positive multiples.
Corollary 1.4. QFH , the FH index of riskiness, does not satisfy global
consistency.
24To verify this, note that f(x) = x 1k is continuous, and Q and Q′ are ordinally
equivalent.
25In fact, this was shown only for the case k = 1, but it is clear that the other cases are
implied by this case.
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Example 1.8. Consider a gamble g = [1, e1+e ;−1, 11+e], QAS(g) = 1 and
QFH(g) ≈ 1.26, and a gamble g′ = [2,1 − ;−2, ]. For small values of ,
QAS(g′) ≈ 0 but QFH(g′) > 2. Hence QAS(g) > QAS(g′) yet QFH(g) <
QFH(g′). Since the local aversion to FH-riskiness is equal to the local
aversion to AS-riskiness by Theorem 1.1, any two CARA utility functions
with different ARA between 1
QAS(g) and 1QAS(g′) together with the two gambles
violate global consistency.
In what follows, the homogeneity axiom will be removed and replaced with
less demanding conditions: monotonicity with respect to first order stochastic
dominance and continuity. Example 1.9 will show that these axioms will
not suffice for assuring that the coefficient of local aversion to Q-riskiness is
non-degenerate, or even to ensure that the index is monotonic with respect
to second order stochastic dominance, and so I will require a slightly stronger
version of global consistency. On the other hand, the combination of strong
global consistency, monotonicity, continuity and reflexivity of the relation
locally at least as averse to Q-riskiness implies local consistency, and so the
local consistency requirement could be replaced with the weaker requirement
of reflexivity.
Example 1.9. Let Q(⋅) = exp{−E [⋅]}. It is positive, continuous, monotonic
with respect to first order stochastic dominance and locally consistent. Addi-
tionally, every u is globally at least as averse to Q-riskiness as any v. Hence,
no agent is globally more averse to Q-riskiness than another, and so global
consistency is satisfied. The coefficient of local aversion to Q-riskiness is
equal to 1 identically. Finally, mean preserving spreads do not change the
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value of the index.
Axiom (Strong global consistency). For every pair of utilities u and v, for
every w and every g and h in G, if u ≿Q v, u accepts g at w, and Q(g) > Q(h),
then v accepts h at w.
The difference between the two axioms is that the weak version uses ≻Q
while the strong one uses ≿Q. The strong version, therefore, requires more,
as it has a bite for more pairs of utilities. Note that this axiom is violated
by the index from Example 1.9. To see this, observe that any two agents u
and v satisfy both u ≿Q v and v ≿Q u, so Q must be degenerate in order to
satisfy the axiom, but it is not.
Claim 1.3. Strong global consistency is implied by the generalized Samuelson
property.
Theorem 1.7. If Q is a continuous index of riskiness that satisfies mono-
tonicity with respect to first order stochastic dominance and strong global
consistency, and the relation at least as averse to Q-riskiness is reflexive, then
Q is ordinally equivalent to QAS.
Proof. See appendix.
Corollary 1.5. If Q is a continuous index of riskiness that satisfies mono-
tonicity with respect to first order stochastic dominance and strong global
consistency and the relation at least as averse to Q-riskiness is reflexive, then
Q satisfies local consistency and AQ is ordinally equivalent to ρ.
Claim 1.4. The monotonicity requirement in the theorem could be replaced
by each of the following conditions:
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(a) Monotonicity with respect to mean-preserving spreads
(b) Satisfying the ordinal content of homogeneity
(c) Monotonicity with respect to increases in the lowest value of the
gamble, leaving the rest of the values unchanged
In such case, monotonicity with respect to first order stochastic dominance
will be a result, not an assumption.26
1.6 A Generalized Sharpe Ratio
This section considers an investor facing the problem of asset allocation
between a risk-free asset, with return rf and a market portfolio.27 Fixing rf ,
a market return r is a real-valued random variable such that r − rf ∈ G. In
particular, the net return, r − rf has a positive expected value and a positive
probability to be negative. For each value of rf , let Rrf , or simply R when
there is no risk of confusion, denote the class of all such market returns. An
index of performance is a collection of functions Qrf ∶Rrf → R+, one for each
possible value of the risk-free rate.
One well known index of performance is the Sharpe ratio, the ratio between
the expected net return and its standard deviation.28 This measure of “risk
adjusted returns,” or “reward-to-variability” (Sharpe, 1966), is frequently used
as a performance measure for portfolios (Welch, 2008; Kadan and Liu, 2014).
Formally, it is defined by:
26The continuity assumption could also be relaxed, for example, by requiring continuity
in payoffs for fixed probabilities.
27rf may be negative but must be greater than −1.
28Note that σ (r − rf) ≠ 0 from the assumption that r − rf ∈ G.
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Shrf (r) = E [r − rf ]
σ (r − rf) .
The validity of this measure relies critically on several assumptions on the
distribution of returns as well as on agents’ preferences (Meyer, 1987). In
particular, for general distributions, the Sharpe ratio is not monotonic with
respect to first order stochastic dominance: portfolio r1 may have returns that
are always higher than portfolio r2 and yet it will be ranked lower according
to the index. This normatively undesirable property of the Sharpe ratio is
illustrated by the following example, which is based on an example from
Aumann and Serrano (2008):
Example 1.10. Let r1 = [−1, .02; 1, .98], r2 = [−1, .02; 1, .49; 2, .49] and rf =
0.
E [r1 − rf ] = .96, σ(r1 − rf) = .28,
hence,
Shrf (r1) = .96.28 ≈ 3.43.
But,
E [r2 − rf ] = 1.45, σ(r2 − rf) = 7√3
20
,
hence,
Shrf (r2) = 1.45 × 20
7
√
3
≈ 2.39.
The result will continue to hold if we add some small  > 0 to all of the payoffs
of r2.
This undesirable property of the Sharpe ratio is related to the fact that it
depends only on the first two moments of the distribution. These moments
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are sufficient statistic for a normal distribution, and therefore basing an
index on them solely may be reasonable under the assumption of normally
distributed returns. This assumption is, however, often rejected in settings
where the Sharpe ratio is often used (e.g. Fama, 1965; Agarwal and Naik,
2000; Kat and Brooks, 2001). Moreover, a large body of literature documents
the importance of higher order moments for investment decisions (e.g. Kraus
and Litzenberger, 1976; Kane, 1982; Harvey and Siddique, 2000; Barro, 2006,
2007; Gabaix, 2008).
Recognizing these limitations of the Sharpe ratio as a measure of perfor-
mance, Kadan and Liu (2014) propose a reinterpretation of the inverse of
the AS index of riskiness as a performance measure and show that it may
be more favorable than the Sharpe ratio in an empirical setting. Homm and
Pigorsch (2012a) propose a different index, which was mentioned originally
in AS: the expected net return divided by the AS riskiness. The index is not
derived from first principles but is motivated by a “reward-to-risk” reasoning,
where the AS riskiness takes the place of σ in the Sharpe ratio. This section
asks which of these indices, if any, does the consistency-motivated approach
suggest?
The findings of this section support the latter alternative, which coincides
with the Sharpe ratio on the domain of normally distributed returns. The
index possesses other desirable properties, importantly monotonicity with
respect to stochastic dominance and with respect to stochastic dominance
in the presence of a risk-free asset (Levy and Kroll, 1978),29 of the first and
29r1 first (second) order stochastically dominates r2 in the presence of a risk-free asset
rf if for every α ≥ 0 there exists β ≥ 0 such that αr2 + (1 − α) rf is first (second) order
stochastically dominated by βr1 + (1 − β) rf .
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second degree.
1.6.1 Preliminaries
Definition. A market transaction is a pair, (q, r) ∈ R+ ×R. Denote by T
the class of all market transactions.
Say that an agent with utility function u and initial wealth w accepts a
market transaction if
E [u ((w − q)(1 + rf) + q(1 + r))] > u(w(1 + rf)),
and rejects it otherwise.
I assume that it is only the net return that matters for the index. That is,
by shifting rf and all the possible values of r by a constant, the performance
does not change. This is a standard assumption which makes it possible to
compare market returns under different risk-free rates. All the results will
continue to hold without this assumption, fixing rf .
Axiom (Translation invariance). ∀λ > 0, ∀rf > −1, ∀r ∈Rrf Qrf+λ(r+λ) =
Qrf (r).30
The next axiom could be interpreted as saying that if the price of a unit
of the market portfolio decreases but it continues to yield the same proceeds,
then the market performs better. This intuitive notion is the ordinal content
of the axiom T of Artzner et al. (1999).
Axiom (Monotonicity). ∀rf > −1, ∀r ∈ Rrf , ∀λ > 0, if rf + λ ∈ Rrf then
Qrf (r + λ) > Qrf (r).
30If r is in Rrf then r + λ is in Rrf+λ.
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With translation invariance, monotonicity is equivalent to the requirement
that the same market return should be considered as better performing in
the face of a lower risk-free rate.
To motivate the next axiom, assume for a moment that the risk-free
rate is 0, and that agents are free to allocate their resources between the
market and a risk-free asset. A reasonable requirement is that an index of
performance be homogeneous of degree 0, since any portfolio that could be
achieved with market return r could be mimicked when the return is λg for
any λ > 0 by scaling the amount of investment by 1λ . This reasoning clearly
extends to the net return, r − rf , for any rf and r.
Axiom (Homogeneity). ∀λ > 0, ∀rf > −1, ∀r ∈Rrf , Qrf (λ ⋅(r−rf)+rf) =
Qrf (r).
The Sharpe ratio is an example for a performance index that satisfies this
property. Unlike in the other settings presented in this paper, the homogeneity
axiom here is ordinal and has no cardinal implications.
Claim 1.5. A continuous index which satisfies translation invariance and
monotonicity but fails to satisfy homogeneity of degree 0 is not monotonic
with respect to stochastic dominance in the presence of a risk-free asset.31
Proof. For some λ > 0, say Qrf (λ ⋅ (r − rf) + rf) > Qrf (r). From translation
invariance, Q0(λ ⋅ (r − rf)) > Q0(r − rf). From continuity, it will also be the
case that Q0(λ ⋅ (r − rf)) > Q0(r − rf + ) for some small  > 0. But r − rf + 
first order stochastically dominates λ ⋅ (r − rf) in the presence of a risk-free
31A precise definition of continuity appears later in this section.
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asset with 0 rate of return, as discussed in the argument motivating the
homogeneity axiom.
Corollary 1.6. The index of performance used by Kadan and Liu (2014)
violates monotonicity with respect to stochastic dominance in the presence of
a risk-free asset.
Example 1.11. Let r be a market return with E [r] = 1 and let rf = 0. The
index proposed by Kadan and Liu (2014) equals to 1
QAS(r) > 0. Their index
for 12r, under the same conditions, is
2
QAS(r) . From the continuity of their
index, this implies that for small  > 0, 12r −  performs better than r in the
Kadan-Liu sense.
For c ≥ 0 and rf > −1, define Rrfc ∶= {r ∈Rrf ∣ E [r] = rf + c}, the class of
market returns with expected net return of c. If Q satisfies homogeneity, it
is completely characterized by the restriction of Qrf to Rrf+1. If Q further
satisfies translation invariance, then there is no loss of generality in writing
Q(r − rf) ∶= Q0(r − rf) = Qrf (r). This means that it is sufficient to consider
the case that rf = 0 and to characterize Q ∶ R1 → R+. From this point on,
unless specifically mentioned, attention will be restricted to this case.
Denote the class of “local” market transactions by
T ∶= {(q, r) ∈ T ∣ max{qr} −min{qr} < , r ∈R1} .32
Definition. Given a performance index Q, say that u at w is locally at least
as inclined to invest in Q−performers as v at w′ if there exists q¯, such that
32The requirement that r ∈R1 will be important in this setting due to the assumption
of homogeneity of degree 0, since for any r with expected positive net returns, q > 0, and
any agent, there exists a small enough λ > 0 such that (q, λ ⋅ r) will be accepted.
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for all for all q¯ > q > 0 and δ > 0 there exists  > 0 with
0 ≤ sup(q,r)∈T {Q (r) ∣ (q, r) is rejected by u at w}
≤ inf(q,r)∈T {Q (r) ∣ (q, r) is accepted by v at w′} + δ.
The interpretation is as follows: for transactions with expected net return
of q > 0, if v at w′ is willing to invest in some local transaction, then u at w
is willing to invest in any local transaction that performs significantly (by δ)
better according to Q.
Next, I require that the relation locally at least as inclined to invest in
Q-performers is reflexive.
Axiom (Reflexivity). For all u and w, u at w is locally at least as inclined
to invest in Q-performers as u at w.
Definition. u is globally inclined to invest in Q−performers at least as v if
for all w, w′, u is locally inclined to invest in Q−performers at wealth w at
least as v at wealth w′.
Axiom (Strong global consistency). For every w ∈ R, q > 0, for every u and
v, and every r, r′ ∈R1, if u is inclined to invest in Q-performers at least as v,
v accepts (q, r) at w, and Q(r′) > Q(r), then u accepts (q, r′) at w.
The axiom roughly says that if an agent that cares less aboutQ-performance
is willing to invests q in a market, it must be the case that an agent who
cares more about Q-performance would be willing to invest the same amount
when the market performs better.
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1.6.2 Results
Definition. The generalized Sharpe ratio is defined as
PASrf (r) ∶= PAS(r − rf) = E [r − rf ]QAS (r − rf) .
Continuity. An index Q is continuous if for all rf > −1, Qrf (rn)→ Qrf (r)
whenever {rn} and r are uniformly bounded market returns, and {rn}
converges to r in probability.
Theorem 1.8. Q is a continuous index of performance that satisfies global
consistency, reflexivity, translation invariance, monotonicity and homogeneity
iff it is a continuous increasing transformation of PAS (⋅).
Proof. See appendix.
Remark. On the domain of normally distributed market returns, PAS is
ordinally equivalent to the Sharpe ratio.
Remark. PAS is increasing is increasing in odd distribution moments, and
decreasing in even distribution moments.
Proposition 1.3. PAS is monotonic with respect to stochastic dominance
in the presence of risk-free asset.
Proof. If r1 dominates r2 in the presence of rf , then there exist α,β > 0
such that αr1 + (1 − α) rf stochastically dominates βr2 + (1 − β) rf . There
is no loss of generality in assuming that rf = 0 and E [r1] = E [r2]. With
this assumption, the above implies αr1 stochastically dominate βr2. The
monotonicity of QAS thus implies that QAS(αr1) < QAS(βr2), and stochastic
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dominance implies E [αr1] ≥ E [βr2] . Altogether, these results imply
PAS0 (r1) = E [r1]QAS(r1) = E [αr1]QAS(αr1) > E [βr2]QAS(βr2) = E [r2]QAS(r2) = PAS0 (r2)
as required.
Corollary 1.7. Q is a continuous index of performance that satisfies global
consistency, reflexivity, translation invariance, and monotonicity with respect
to stochastic dominance in the presence of risk-free asset iff it is a continuous
increasing transformation of PAS (⋅).
Proof. Follows from Claim 1.5 and Theorem 1.8.
1.6.3 The Demand for Market Transactions
The next proposition provides a partition of market transactions into three:
“attractive,” “unattractive” and ones about which the decision depends on
wealth effects.
Proposition 1.4. If q
PAS(g) > sup
w
{ρ−1u (w}), then u rejects (q, g) at any
wealth level. If q
PAS(g) < infw {ρ−1u (w)}, then u accepts g at any wealth level.
Next, I show that diversification makes transactions more desirable and
that a property analogous to compound gambles holds.
Proposition 1.5. Fix rf . If g, h ∈Rrfrf+1 are such that (q, g) and (q, h) are
accepted by u at any wealth level, then u accepts (q,αg + (1 − α)h) for all
α ∈ (0,1) at any wealth level.
Proof. From proposition 1.4 as PAS (αg + (1 − α)h) ≥ min{PAS (g) , PAS(h)},
by the properties of QAS .
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Proposition 1.6. Fix rf , and let g, h ∈Rrfrf+1 be such that (q, g) and (q, h)
are accepted by u at any wealth level, then if g and h are independent then u
accepts (2q, 12g + 12h) at any wealth level.
Proof. From proposition 1.4 as PAS (12g + 12h) ≥ 2 ⋅min{PAS (g) , PAS(h)},
by the properties of QAS .
This proposition implies the analogue to Samuelson’s theorem for the
case where a risk-free asset exists.
Example. (The demand for market portfolios). Cabrales et al. (2014) use
the estimates of risk aversion from Dohmen et al. (2011) to deduce that
for relevant wealth levels a large fraction of the developed world population
(importantly, not the very poor or the very rich) could be characterized by
1.8 ⋅ 10−6 < ρu < 5 ⋅ 10−4 . Kadan and Liu (2014) use historical monthly return
data from the American market and estimate E [r − rf ] by .406 and 1RAS
by .038 suggesting an estimated value of .406.038 ≈ 10.69 for PAS . Based on
these estimates, a policy maker may inform individuals that if they do not
invest in the market they will (probably) be better-off by purchasing a well
diversified portfolio with expected return of q where q10.69 < (5 ⋅ 10−4)−1 = 2000,
or, approximately, q < 20000. Finally, using the estimate for expected net
return, this bound suggests that an exposure of less then 20,000.406 ≈ $50000 to
a well diversified portfolio of American shares is better than holding just
risk-free assets. An upper bound can also be suggested: investing more than(1.8⋅10−6)−1⋅10.69
.406 ≈ $13.8 million is dominated by opting out of the market.33
33For the upper bound I make the standard assumption that utilities present (weakly)
decreasing absolute risk aversion.
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Example. In the same setting, consider a policy maker who considers levying
a tax on risky investment. Using the above estimates for risk aversion, and
recalculating PAS for the after tax return, the policy maker can derive an
upper bound over possible tax revenues.
1.7 A Consistent Index of Relative Riskiness
This section presents an application for the setting of multiplicative gambles.
Define U ∶= {u ∶ R+ → R∣%u(w) > 1∀w > 0}, the set of (twice continuously
differentiable) utility functions with relative risk aversion higher than that
of the logarithmic utility function. Additionally, let H ∶= {g ∈ G∣QFH(g) < 1}
be the set of gambles with FH riskiness smaller than 1. The following is a
result of FH:
Fact 1.1. QFH(g) < 1⇐⇒∏
i
(1 + gi)pi > 1 ⇐⇒ E [log(1 + g)] > 0.
In what follows I will consider multiplicative gambles, so that now u accepts
g at w if u(w + gw) > u(w), and rejects g otherwise.34 The interpretation of
QFH(g) < 1 is that gambles of the form wg are accepted by a logarithmic
utility function at wealth w. Repeatedly accepting independent gambles with
QFH(g) > 1 would lead to bankruptcy with probability 1.
Adjusting the previous axioms to the current setting yields the following
axioms for an index of (relative) riskiness Q ∶H → R+:
Axiom (Scaling). ∀α > 0 ∀g ∈H, Q ((1 + g)α − 1) = α ⋅Q(g).35
34g can be interpreted as the return on some risky asset.
35Importantly, note that for every α > 0 if g ∈H then (1 + g)α − 1 ∈H by fact 1.1.
43
Similar to the homogeneity axiom, the scaling axiom embodies a cardinal
interpretation.
Definition (Ordinally equivalent). Given an index of riskiness Q, AQ is
ordinally equivalent to the coefficient of relative risk aversion % if ∀u, v ∈U ∀w,w′ > 0, AQ(u,w) > AQ(v,w′) ⇐⇒ %u(w) > %v(w′).36
Theorem 1.9. If local consistency and scaling hold, then AQ is ordinally
equivalent to %, and the relation at least as averse to Q-riskiness induces the
same order as %.
Proof. omitted.
Axiom (Global consistency). For every u and v in U , for every w > 0 and
every g and h in H, if u ≻Q v, u accepts g at w, and Q(g) > Q(h), then v
accepts h at w.
Lemma 1.4. For any g ∈ H there is a unique positive number S(g) such
that E [(1 + g)− 1S(g) ] = 1.
Proof. See appendix.
Definition. The index of relative riskiness S of gamble g ∈H is implicitly
defined by the equation E [(1 + g)− 1S(g) ] = 1.
Theorem 1.10. S is the unique index of riskiness that satisfies local con-
sistency, global consistency and scaling, up to a multiplication by a positive
number.
36Whenever the adaptation of a definition from the previous sections is clear, I omit it
for brevity.
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Proof. See appendix.
As before, scaling is not always a desirable property. In what follows I
omit this requirement.
Axiom (Strong global consistency). For every u and v in U , for every w > 0
and every g and h in H, if u ≿Q v, u accepts g at w, and Q(g) > Q(h), then
v accepts h at w.
Theorem 1.11. If Q is a continuous index of relative-riskiness that satisfies
monotonicity with respect to first order stochastic dominance and strong global
consistency, and the relation at least as averse to Q-riskiness is reflexive, then
Q is ordinally equivalent to S.
Proof. See appendix.
Corollary 1.8. If Q is a continuous index of relative-riskiness that satisfies
monotonicity with respect to first order stochastic dominance and strong global
consistency, and the relation at least as averse to Q-riskiness is reflexive, then
Q satisfies local consistency and AQ is ordinally equivalent to %.
Remark. The monotonicity and continuity requirements could be replaced by
other conditions as in Claim 1.4.
Proposition 1.7. A gamble g with S(g) = c is rejected by u at w only if
there exist some w′ such that small gambles with S-riskiness of c are rejected.
A gamble g with S(g) = c is accepted by u at w only if there exist some w′
such that small gambles with S-riskiness of c are accepted.
Proof. omitted.
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Corollary 1.9. If S(g) > sup
w>0 {A−1S (u,w)} = supw>0 {%−1u (w)} then u rejects g
at any wealth level. If S(g) < inf
w>0{A−1S (u,w)} = infw>0{%−1u (w)} then u accepts
g at any wealth level.
Proof. omitted.
Definition (Compound gamble property). An index Q has the compound
gamble property if for every compound gamble of the form f = (1 + g)(1 +
1Ah) − 1, where 1 is an indicator, A is an event such that g is constant on A
(g∣A ≡ x for some x) and h is independent of A, max{Q(g),Q(h)} ≥ Q(f) ≥
min{Q(g),Q(h)}.
Proposition 1.8. S satisfies the compound gamble property. Thus, if g, h ∈H are independent, and min{S(g), S(h)} > sup
w
{%−1u (w)} , then a compound
gamble of g and h will also satisfy the inequality. Additionally, if g, h ∈H are
independent, and max{S(g), S(h)} < inf
w
{%−1u (w)} , then a compound gamble
of g and h will also satisfy the inequality.
Proof. omitted.
Axiom (Generalized Samuelson property). ∀u,w > 0 S∞Q (u,w) ≥ infw>0SQ(u,w)
and R∞Q (u,w) ≤ sup
w>0RQ(u,w)
Theorem 1.12. S is the unique index of riskiness that satisfies the generalized
Samuelson property, local consistency and scaling, up to a multiplication by a
positive number.
Proof. omitted.
46
Theorem 1.13. If Q satisfies the generalized Samuelson property, reflexivity,
monotonicity with respect to first order stochastic dominance and continuity
then Q is ordinally equivalent to S.
Proof. omitted.
1.8 Consistent Index of Delay
Similar to gambles, comparing cashflows which pay (require) different sums
of money over several points in time is not a simple undertaking. Some pairs
of cashflows may be compared using the partial order of time-dominance
(Bøhren and Hansen, 1980; Ekern, 1981), which is the analogue of stochastic
dominance in this setting. A cashflow c is first-order time dominated by c′ if
at any point in time the sum of money generated by c up to this point is lower
then the sum that was generated by c′.37 Bøhren and Hansen (1980) show
that if c is first-order time dominated by c′ then every agent with positive
time preferences prefers c′ to c. Positive time preferences mean that the agent
prefers a dollar at time s to a dollar at time s +∆ for all ∆ > 0. They also
show that if c is second-order time dominated by c′ then every agent with a
decreasing and convex discounting function prefers c′ to c.38
Time dominance is, however, a partial order. In this section, I use
the consistency-motivated approach to derive a novel index for the delay
embedded in an investment cashflow. The index I derive is new to the
37The sum may be negative, representing a required investment.
38As the definition of second-order time domination requires some notation, I choose
to omit it, noting that it is analogous to second order stochastic dominance from the risk
setting.
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literature but it is related to the well-known internal rate of return. The
index possesses several desirable properties similar to those of the AS index
of riskiness. In particular, it is monotone with respect to time dominance.
1.8.1 Preliminaries
An investment cashflow is a sequence of outflows (investment) followed by
inflows (return), and a sequence of times when they are conducted. Denote
by c = (xn, tn)Nn=1 such a cashflow.39 When xn is positive the cashflow pays
out xn at time tn, and when it is negative, an investment of ∣xn∣ is required
at tn. Assume, without loss of generality, that t1 < t2 < ... < tN . Further,
assume that x1 < 0 and ∑xn > 0, so that some investment is required, and the
(undiscounted) return is greater than the investment. This property implies
that an agent that does not discount the future will accept any investment
cashflow, while a sufficiently impatient agent will reject it. Let C denote
the collection of such cashflows, and Ct, be the collection of cashflows with
t1 ≤ t ≤ tN , and tN − t1 < .
An index of delay is a function T ∶ C → R+ from the collection of cashflows
to the positive reals. A cashflow c is said to be more T -delayed then c′ if
T (c) > T (c′).
I consider a capital budgeting setting in which agent i discounts using a
smooth schedule of positive instantaneous discount rates, ri(t).40,41 Similar
to ρ in the risk setting, r induces a complete order on all agent and time-point
39To keep notation simple, I avoid making the dependence of N on c explicit.
40An alternative interpretation may be a social planner with such time preferences
(Foster and Mitra, 2003).
41For a discussion of this condition, see Bøhren and Hansen (1980) and references
provided there.
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pairs.42 The net present value (NPV) of an investment cashflow c = (xn, tn)Nn=1
for the agent i at time t is
NPV (c, i, t) ∶=∑
n
e
−tn∫
t
ri(s)ds
xn.
If NPV (c, i, t) > 0 for some t, this inequality holds for any t. Agent i accept
cashflow c (at time t) if NPV (c, i, t) > 0 and rejects it otherwise. c could be
thought of as a suggested shift to a baseline cashflow.
The following two definitions are crucial for applying the consistency
motivated approach from the previous sections in order to present axioms for
an index of delay. Given an index of delay T , an agent i, a time t, and  > 0:
Definition. RT (i, t) ∶= sup{T (c)∣ c ∈ Ct, and c is accepted by i}
Definition. ST (i, t) ∶= inf {T (c)∣ c ∈ Ct, and c is rejected by i}
RT (i, t) is the T -delay of the most delayed cashflow according to T that
i is willing to accept, restricting the support of the cashflows to an -ball
around t. ST (i, t) is the T -delay of the least delayed cashflow according to
T which i rejects, again restricting the support of the cashflows to an -ball
around t.
Definition. i at t is at least as averse to T -delay as j at t′ if for every δ > 0
there exists  > 0 such that SQ(j, t′) ≥ RQ(i, t) − δ.
The interpretation of i at t being at least as averse to T -delay as j at t′ is
that, at least for cashflows with a short horizon, if i accepts any short-horizon
cashflow concentrated around t with a certain level of T -delay, j accepts all
42Importantly, r is not a common interest rates path as in Debreu (1972).
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short-horizon cashflows which are significantly (by at least δ) less delayed
according to T and are concentrated around t′. Alternatively, if j rejects any
short-horizon cashflow that is concentrated around t′ and has a certain level
of T -delay, i rejects all short horizon cashflows which are significantly (by at
least δ) more T -delayed and are concentrated around t.
The following definitions will also prove useful:
Definition. RT (i, t) ∶= lim
→0+RT (i, t)
Definition. ST (i, t) ∶= lim
→0+ST (i, t)
Roughly speaking, RT (i, t) is the T -delay of the most T -delayed short-
horizon cashflow that is concentrated around t and accepted by i, and
ST (i, t) is the T -delay of the least T -delayed short-horizon cashflow that is
concentrated around t and rejected by i at t. As before, the coefficient of
local aversion to T -delay of i at t is therefore defined as
AT (i, t) ∶= 1
RT (i, t) ,
noting that all of the results would hold for 1ST (i,t) as well.
1.8.2 The Index
The following axioms are an adaptation of the axioms used in Theorem 1.3
for the current setting. They are used for presenting the analogue of this
theorem, as well as the analogue of Theorem 1.2. Theorem 1.14 provides
conditions under which there is only one order of local aversion to delay and
it corresponds to the instantaneous discount rate.
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Axiom (Translation invariance). T ((xn, tn + λ))Nn=1) = T ((xn, tn)Nn=1) for
any cashflow and any λ > 0.
Translation invariance of T means that T -delay is a time expression, like
“in a week” or “a year before,” and it does not depend on the start date. In
contrast, the interpretation of expressions such as “this Tuesday” depends
critically on whether they are said on Friday or Monday. This will be the
only “new” requirement in the current setting; all other axioms are adaptions
of the axioms from the risk settings to the current one.
Axiom (Homogeneity (of degree k in dates)). For any cashflow with t1 = 0,
for any λ > 0, T ((xn, λ ⋅ tn)Nn=1) = λk ⋅ T ((xn, tn)Nn=1) for some k > 0.
Homogeneity of degree 1 in dates, when combined with translation invari-
ance, represents the notion that if each payment in the cashflow is conducted
twice as late relative to the first period of investment, then the entire cashflow
is twice as delayed relative to that time. This is a strong cardinal assumption
and I later discuss its removal.
Axiom (Local consistency). ∀i ∀t ∃λ > 0 ∀δ > 0 ∃ > 0 RT (i, t) − δ < λ <
ST (i, t) + δ.
Local consistency says that cashflows which are “local” with respect to t
that are significantly less T -delayed than some cut-off level are always accepted
by i, and that ones significantly more T -delayed than the cutoff are always
accepted. Lemma A.13 in the appendix shows that whenever homogeneity
is satisfied, local consistency implies that 0 < ST (i, t) = RT (i, t) < ∞. This
means, that for “local” cashflows T is sufficient information to determine
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an agent’s optimal behavior. In other words, the decisions of agents are
consistent with the index, on small domains.
Definition (Reflexivity). The relation at least as averse to T -delay is reflexive
if for all i and t, i at t is at least as averse to T -delay as i at t.
Proposition 1.9. If T satisfies local consistency, then the relation locally at
least as averse to T -delay is reflexive.
Definition (Ordinally equivalent). Given an index of delay T , AT is ordinally
equivalent to the instantaneous discount rate r if ∀i, j, ∀t, t′ AT (i, t) >
AT (j, t′) ⇐⇒ ri(t) > rj(t′).
Theorem 1.14. If T satisfies local consistency, homogeneity and translation
invariance, then AT is ordinally equivalent to r, and the relation at least as
averse to T -delay induces the same order as r.
Proof. See appendix.
Remark. All axioms in Theorem 1.14 are essential: As the following examples
demonstrate, omitting any admits indices to which the coefficient of local
aversion is not ordinally equivalent to r, and the relation at least as averse
to T -delay does not induce the same order as r.
Example 1.12. T ≡ 5 satisfies local consistency and translation invariance,
but it does not satisfy homogeneity of degree k > 0. The local aversion to
this index induces the trivial order and AT ≡ 15 .
Example 1.13. T ∶= t2 − t1 satisfies homogeneity and translation invariance,
as λt2 − λ ⋅ 0 = λ (t2 − 0) and t2 − t1 = (t2 + λ) − (t1 + λ). Local consistency is,
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however, violated. The local aversion to this index induces the trivial order
and AT ≡∞.
Example 1.14 will demonstrate that without translation invariance the
inference is not necessarily correct. The following two definitions prove useful
for the example as well as for the statement and proof of Theorem 1.16.
Definition. The internal rate of return (IRR) of an investment cashflow
c = (xn, tn)Nn=1, written α(c), is the unique positive solution to the equation∑
n
e−αtnxn = 0.
Existence and uniqueness follow from Lemma A.12 which generalizes the
result of Norstrøm (1972) who had shown that investment cashflows have a
unique positive IRR in the discrete setting. For general cashflows, multiple
solutions to the equation defining the internal rate of return may exit.43
Definition. For a cashflow c, D(c) ∶= 1α(c) is the inverse of the IRR of the
cashflow.
Example 1.14. Consider the index of delay
T (c) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
D(c) if t1 < 3 or 5 < tN
(t1 − 2) ⋅D(c) if 3 ≤ t1 ≤ 4
(6 − t1) ⋅D(c) if 4 ≤ t1 ≤ 5.
It is homogeneous since it coincides with D on the relevant domain. It is
locally consistent since D is, a fact which will be proved later, and since for
43In addition, phenomena with the flavor of reswitching might arise (Levhari and
Samuelson, 1966), as discussed in Footnote 45.
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any t, in small environments of t the index is approximately equal to C ⋅D(⋅)
for some C = C(t). Now, consider an agent, i, with a constant discount rate
ri(t) ≡ r. For t = 4, the coefficient of T -delay aversion of the agent is not
equal to the coefficient of T -delay aversion for the same agent at at t = 1.
But ri (⋅) is constant by construction. It is also the case that i at t = 4 is not
at least as averse to T -delay as i at t = 1.
Theorem 1.15. (i) There exists a continuum of translation invariant, locally
consistent, homogeneous of degree 1 indices of delay to which the local aversion
equals to r. (ii) Moreover, some of these indices are not monotone with respect
to first order time dominance.44
Proof. See appendix.
Definition (Globally more T -delay averse). i is Globally at least as T -delay
averse as j (denoted j ≾
T
i) if for every t and t′, i at t is at least as averse
to T -delay as j at t′. i is globally more T -delay averse than j (denoted by
j ≺T i) if j ≾T i and not i ≾T j.
This definition generates a partial order over agents, based on their
preferences and on the index of delay. As before, global consistency is an
important part of the approach.
Axiom (Global consistency). If j ≺T i, T (c) < T (c′), and i accepts c′, then
j accepts c.45
44T satisfies monotonicity with respect to first order time dominance if T (c) < T (c′)
whenever c time dominates c′.
45The use of acceptance and rejection allows me to avoid the reswitching problem of the
famous Cambridge capital controversy (See Cohen and Harcourt (2003) for an extensive
review). In contrast to choices between two cashflows, which, in general, may not be
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Theorem 1.16. Dk (⋅) is the unique index of delay that satisfies local con-
sistency, global consistency, homogeneity of degree k > 0 and translation
invariance, up to a multiplication by a positive number.
Proof. See appendix.
The homogeneity axiom is not necessarily appealing in the current set-
ting. In what follows, it will be removed and replaced with less demanding
conditions: monotonicity with respect to first order time dominance and
continuity. As in previous sections, Example 1.15 below shows that these
conditions are not enough to pin down desirable indices. Hence, I will require
a slightly stronger version of global consistency but, as before, will replace
the local consistency requirement with the weaker requirement of reflexivity.
Definition (Continuity). An index of delay is continuous if T (cn)Ð→ T (c)
whenever {c} ∪ {cn} ⊂ C, random variables with distribution ⎛⎝ ∣xni ∣∑
i∣xi>0∣xni ∣ , t
n
i
⎞⎠
and
⎛⎝ ∣xni ∣∑
i∣xi≤0∣xni ∣ , t
n
i
⎞⎠ converge in probability to ⎛⎝ ∣xi∣∑
i∣xi>0∣xi∣ , ti
⎞⎠ and ⎛⎝ ∣xi∣∑
i∣xi≤0∣xi∣ , ti
⎞⎠
respectively if all random variables are uniformly bounded and ∑xni converges
to ∑xi.
Example 1.15. Consider the index
T (c) ∶= 1 + ∑
j∣xj>0
∣xj ∣ tj∑
i∣xi>0 ∣xi∣ − ∑j∣xj≤0
∣xj ∣ tj∑
i∣xi≤0 ∣xi∣ .
It is well-defined and positive as the first summation is a weighted average of
greater numbers and both summations are non-degenerate, by the definition
monotonic in the discount rate, acceptance and rejection decisions of investment cashflows
are monotonic in these rates. This is shown in Lemma A.12 in the appendix.
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of investment cashflow. It is translation invariant since adding t to all
ti’s increases both summations by t. Continuity follows directly from the
definition. Homogeneity of degree 0 in payoffs holds as well, since weights
are not changed when all xi’s are multiplied by a positive number. Local
consistency holds since both summations converge to t, when considering
smaller and smaller environments of t, and so RT ≡ ST ≡ 1. Hence, the
coefficient of local aversion to T -delay is identically equal to 1, and every i
is globally at least as averse to T -delay as any j. Thus, the relation more
averse to T -delay is empty and global consistency is automatically satisfied.
Axiom (Strong global consistency). If j ≾T i, T (c) < T (c′), and i accepts c′,
then j accepts c.
Theorem 1.17. If T is a continuous index of delay that satisfies monotonicity
with respect to first order time dominance, translation invariance and strong
global consistency, and the relation at least as averse to T -delay is reflexive,
then T is ordinally equivalent to D.
Proof. See appendix.
Corollary 1.10. If T is a continuous index of delay that satisfies mono-
tonicity with respect to first order time dominance, translation invariance
and strong global consistency, then T is locally consistent and AT is ordinally
equivalent to r.
Remark. The monotonicity requirement in the theorem could be replaced by
each of the following conditions:
(a) Satisfying the ordinal content of homogeneity
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(b) Monotonicity with respect to delaying the first investment period,
leaving the rest of the periods unchanged
In such case, monotonicity with respect to first order time dominance will
be a result, not an assumption.46
Remark. The partial order globally at least as D-delay averse is refined by
the partial orders of delay aversion of Horowitz (1992) and Benoît and Ok
(2007).
1.8.3 D-Delay Aversion and the Demand for Investment Cash-
flows
Proposition 1.10. A cashflow c = (xn, tn)Nn=1 with D(c) = b is rejected by i
only if there exist some t ∈ [t1, tN ] such that small cashflows with D of b are
rejected. A cashflow c = (xn, tn)Nn=1 with D(c) = b is accepted by i only if there
exist some t ∈ [t1, tN ] such that small cashflows with D of b are accepted.
Proof. See appendix.
Corollary 1.11. If D(c) > sup
t
{A−1D (i, t)} = sup
t
{r−1i (t)} then i rejects any
translation of c. If D(c) < inf
t
{A−1D (i, t)} = inft {r−1i (t)} then i accepts any
translation of c.
Similar to results in previous sections, the corollary suggests a partition
of the class of cashflows into three: ones which the agent never accepts, ones
which are always accepted, and ones whose acceptance or rejection may not
be determined.
46The continuity assumption could also be relaxed.
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Definition (Compound cashflow property). An index T has the compound
cashflow property if for every compound cashflow of the form f = c + c′,47
where c,c′ and f are investment cashflows max{T (c), T (c′)} ≥ T (f) ≥
min{T (c), T (c′)}.
Proposition 1.11. D satisfies the compound cashflow property. Thus, if
c, c′, c+c′ ∈ C and min{D(c),D(c′)} > sup
t
{r−1i (t)} , then c+c′ also satisfies
the inequality; and if c, c′, c + c′ ∈ C and max{D(c),D(c′)} < inf
t
{r−1i (t)}
then c + c′ also satisfies the inequality.
Proof. See appendix.
Axiom (Generalized Samuelson property). ∀i S∞T (i) ≥ inft ST (i, t) and R∞T (i) ≤
sup
t
RT (i, t).
Theorem 1.18. Dk (⋅) is the unique index of delay that satisfies the gener-
alized Samuelson property, local consistency, homogeneity of degree k > 0 and
translation invariance, up to a multiplication by a positive number.
Proof. Omitted.
Theorem 1.19. If T satisfies the generalized Samuelson property, translation
invariance, reflexivity, monotonicity with respect to first order time dominance
and continuity then T is ordinally equivalent to D.
Proof. Omitted.
47The interpretation of c + c′ is that all of the payoffs which are dictated by each of the
cashflows takes place at the times they dictate. If both require a payoff at the same time
point, the payoffs are added up.
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1.8.4 Other Properties of D and a Comparison with QAS
This section discusses some properties of the index of delay D and demon-
strates the close connection it has with the AS index of riskiness. The IRR is
a counterpart of the rate of return over cost suggested by Fisher (1930) as a
criterion for project selection almost a century ago. Later, some economists
dismissed this criterion, arguing that the NPV was superior in comparing
pairs of cashflows. Yet, others mentioned that this criterion has the benefit
of objectivity, in that it does not require the value judgment of setting the
future discount rates (Turvey, 1963). For example, Stalin and Nixon would
agree on the IRR of an investment even though they might disagree on its
NPV.48
Just like the AS-riskiness of a gamble depends “on its distribution only—and
not on any other parameters, such as the utility function of the decision maker
or his wealth” (Aumann and Serrano, 2008), D depends solely on the cashflow,
and not on any agent specific properties. In this sense, D is an objective
measure of delay. In particular, D is independent of the date when the
cashflow is considered. That is, the D-delay embedded in an investments
cashflow is independent of the time when it is considered.
D is homogeneous of degree 0 in payoffs and unit free. This means,
for example, that the D-delay of two cashflows denominated in different
currencies may be compared without knowledge of the exchange rate. This
stands in contrast to the AS index of riskiness which is homogeneous of degree
48This resembles the point made by Hart (2011) that in general there are many pairs of
agents and pairs of gambles such that each agent accepts a different gamble and rejects
the other – our axioms only compare very specific pairs of agents.
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1 in payoffs, but does not depend on timing. The property is analogous to the
property of QAS , according to which “diluted” gambles inherit the riskiness of
the original gamble. For p ∈ (0,1) a p-dilution of the gamble g takes the value
of the gamble with probability p and 0 with probability 1 − p, independently
of the gamble. The reason why this analogy is correct is that in the current
setting, times are the parallel of payoffs from the risk setting, while payoffs
are the parallel of probabilities, as demonstrated by the remark at the end of
this section.
Another property that D and QAS share is monotonicity. QAS is mono-
tonic with respect to first and second order stochastic dominance. The
analogous property for cashflows is time-dominance (Bøhren and Hansen,
1980; Ekern, 1981). Proposition 3 of Bøhren and Hansen (1980) implies that
D is monotonic with respect to time-dominance of any order.
There are other similarities between the measurement of delay and risk.
Value at Risk (VaR) is a family of indices commonly used in the financial
industry (Aumann and Serrano, 2008). VaR indices depend on a parameter
called the confidence level. For example, the VaR of a gamble at the 95
percent confidence level is the largest loss that occurs with probability greater
than 5 percent. Unlike the AS index, VaR is unaffected by tail events or
rare-disasters, extremely negative outcomes that occur with low probability.
In the context of project selection, Turvey (1963) mentions that “the Pay-off
Period, the number of years which it will take until the undiscounted sum
of the gains realized from the investment equals its capital cost,” was used
by practitioners in the West and in Russia. He adds that “[p]ractical men
in industries with long-lived assets have perforce been made aware of the
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deficiencies of this criterion and have sought to bring in the time element.”
The pay-off period criterion, unlike the index of delay, suffers from deficiencies
similar to those of VaR. For example, shifting early or late payoffs does not
change its value. In fact, recalling that times in the current setting are the
parallel of payoffs in the risk setting, the lesson learned by the investors in
long-lived assets should apply to investors in risky assets with distant tail
events.
QAS is much more sensitive to the loss side of gambles than it is to gains.
Analogously D is more sensitive to early flows than it is to later ones. This
follows from the properties of the exponential function in the definition of
the IRR. Additionally, both D and QAS are continuous in their respective
spaces.
Finally, to clarify the analogies I made between probabilities and payoffs,
and between payoffs and times, I present a reinterpretation of the AS index
of riskiness in terms of the delay embedded in a (non-investment) cashflow.
Remark. Given a gamble g ∶= (gj , pj), a cashflow which requires an investment
of one dollar at t = 0 and pays-out pj at time gj has a unique positive IRR
whose inverse equal to QAS(g).49
To see this, recall that for a cashflow c = (xn, tn)Nn=1 the (unique) positive
IRR is the (unique) positive solution to the equation ∑
n
e−αtnxn = 0, when it
exists. Noting that at t = 0, e−αt = 1 and that the above cashflow requires
an investment of one dollar at t = 0, the corresponding equation could be
49This is not the unique IRR as 0 is also a solution of the defining equation.
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written as −1 +∑
n
e−αgnpn = 0,
which could be expressed as
E [e−αg] = 1.
But QAS(g) is the inverse of the unique positive α which solves the equation.
For general cashflows, multiple solutions to the equation defining the
internal rate of return may exit. Interestingly, both Arrow and Pratt took
interest in finding simple conditions that would rule out this possibility (Arrow
and Levhari, 1969; Pratt and Hammond, 1979). A corollary of the previous
remark is that cashflows of the above form have a unique positive IRR.
1.9 A Consistent Index of the Appeal of Informa-
tion Transactions
Similar to the previous settings, generating a sensible complete ranking of
information structures is an illusive undertaking. In some settings, certain
information may be vital, while in others it will not be very important. The
implication is that it is not possible to rank all information structures so that
higher ranked structures are preferred to lower ranked ones by all agents at
every decision making problem. Some pairs of information structures may,
however, be compared in this manner. Blackwell’s (1953) seminal paper
shows that one information structure is preferred to another by all agents in
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all settings if and only if the latter is a garbling of the prior,50 that is, if one
is a noisy version of the other. But this order is partial and cannot be used
to compare many pairs of information structures.
The difficulty in generating a complete ranking which is independent of
agents’ preferences is discussed by Willinger (1989) in his paper which studies
the relation between risk aversion and the value of information. Willinger
(1989) discusses his choice of using the expected value of information (EVI)
or “asking price” which was defined by LaValle (1968). The EVI measures a
certain decision maker’s willingness to pay for certain information, and so,
“... the difficulty of defining a controversial continuous variable representing
the ‘amount of information’ can be avoided.”
Cabrales et al. (2013) tackle this difficulty using an approach in the spirit
of Hart (2011). They restrict attention to a decision problem of information
acquisition by investors in a model a la Arrow (1972) and define an order
which they name uniform investment dominance, which turns out to be a
complete order over all information structures. In a separate paper, these
authors take an approach in the spirit of AS, and axiomatically derive a
different index for the appeal of information transactions (Cabrales et al.,
2014). Both approaches lead to orders which refine the order suggested by
Blackwell (1953), however, they depend on the (unique, fixed, common) prior
of the decision makers which are considered.
In this section, I study a problem of information acquisition by investors
using the same techniques as in previous sections. I show that the coefficient
of local taste for Q-informativeness is equal to the inverse of ARA when Q is
50A simple proof is provided in Leshno and Spector (1992).
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one of these two prominent indices, and that the unique index which satisfies
local consistency, global consistency, and a homogeneity axiom is the index
of appeal of information transactions (Cabrales et al., 2014). As always, an
ordinal version of this result, which does not assume homogeneity, is provided.
The section ends with a discussion of the prior-free implications of the index
of appeal of information transactions (which is prior-dependent).
1.9.1 Preliminaries
This section follows closely Cabrales et al. (2014). I consider agents with
concave and twice continuously differentiable utility functions who have some
initial wealth and face uncertainty about the state of nature. There are K ∈ N
states of nature, {1, ...,K},51 over which the agents have the prior p ∈ ∆ (K)
which is assumed to have a full support.
The set of investment opportunities B∗ = {b ∈ RK ∣ ∑
k∈Kpkbk ≤ 0}, consists
of all no arbitrage assets. In particular it includes the option of inaction.
The reference to the members of B∗ as no arbitrage investment opportunities
attributes to pk an additional interpretation as the price of an Arrow-Debreu
security that pays 1 if the state k is realized and nothing otherwise. Hence, p
plays a dual role in this setting. When an agent with initial wealth w chooses
investment b ∈ B∗ and state k is realized, his wealth becomes w + bk.
Before choosing his investment, the agent has an opportunity to engage
in an information transaction a = (µ,α), where µ > 0 is the cost of the
transactions, and α is the information structure representing the information
51With a slight abuse of notation, I also denote {1, ...,K} by K. The meaning of K
should be clear from the context.
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that a entails. To be more precise, α is given by a finite set of signals Sα
and probability distributions αk ∈ ∆ (Sα) for every k ∈K. When the state of
nature is k, the probability that the signal s is observed equals αk(s). Thus,
the information structure may be represented by a stochastic matrix Mα,
with K rows and ∣Sα∣ columns, and the total probability of the signals is
given by the vector pα ∶= p ⋅Mα. For simplicity, assume that pα(s) > 0 for all
s, so that each signal is observed with positive probability. Further, denote
by qsk the probability the agent assigns to state k conditional on observing
the signal s, using Bayes’ law. Note that although my notation does not
indicate it, (qsk)Kk=1 = qs ∈ ∆ (K) depends on α and the prior p.
The transaction a is said to be excluding if for every s there exists some k
such that qsk = 0. This means that for every signal the agent receives, he knows
that some states will not be realized (allowing him to generate arbitrarily
large profits with certainty). Throughout, I will assume that information
transactions are not excluding.
Agents are assumed to optimally choose an investment opportunity in B∗
given their belief, q. Therefore, the expected utility of an agent with utility
u, initial wealth w and beliefs q is
V (u,w, q) ∶= sup
b∈B∗∑k qku (w + bk) .
In case that the agent acquires no information, his beliefs are given by the
prior p. Since the agent is risk averse, in such case his optimal choice is
inaction. Hence,
V (u,w, p) = u(w).
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Accordingly, an agent accepts an information transaction if
∑
s
pα(s)V (u,w − µ, qs) > V (u,w, p) = u(w)
and rejects it otherwise.
Denote by A the class of information transactions described above. Addi-
tionally, denote by A the sub-class of these information transactions such
that ∥p − qs∥∞ <  for all s. An index of appeal of information transactions
is a function from the class of information transactions to the positive reals
Q ∶ A → R+. The index of appeal A suggested by Cabrales et al. (2014) is
defined by
A(a) = − 1
µ
log(∑
s
pα(s) exp (−d (p∣∣qs))) ,
where
d (p∣∣q) =∑
k
pk log
pk
qk
is the Kulback-Leibler divergence (Kullback and Leibler, 1951).
Cabrales et al. (2013) suggest the entropy reduction as a measure of
informativeness of an information structure for investors. It is defined by
Ie(α) =H(p) −∑
s
pα(s) ⋅H(qs),
where,
H(q) = −∑
k∈K qk log(qk).
In the current context, consider the index Je, the cost adjusted entropy
reduction defined by
Je(µ,α) = Ie(α)
µ
.
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To apply the techniques from the previous sections, some more definitions
are required. Given an index of informativeness Q, a utility function u, a
wealth level w and  > 0:
Definition. RQ(u,w) ∶= inf {Q(a)∣a ∈ A and a is accepted by u at w}
Definition. SQ(u,w) ∶= sup{Q(a)∣a ∈ A and a is rejected by u at w}
RQ(u,w) is the Q-informativeness of the least informative accepted trans-
action according to Q, which is in A. SQ(u,w) is the Q-informativeness of
the most informative rejected transaction according to Q, again restricting
the support of the transactions to A.
u at w has at least as much taste for Q-informativeness as v at w′ if for
every δ > 0 there exists  > 0 such that SQ(u,w) ≤ RQ(v,w′) + δ.
The interpretation of u at w having at least as much taste for Q-
informativeness as v at w′ is that, at least for small transactions, if v at w′
accepts any small transactions with a certain level of Q-informativeness, u at
w accepts all small transactions which are significantly (by at least δ) more
Q-informative. The following definitions will also prove useful:
Definition. RQ(u,w) ∶= lim
→0+RQ(u,w)
Definition. SQ(u,w) ∶= lim
→0+SQ(u,w)
SQ(u,w) is the Q-appeal of the most Q-appealing transaction that is
rejected, and never provides a lot of information, in the sense that the
posterior and the prior are close.52 Finally, define the coefficient of local
52Note that in this setting the index is not independent of the prior p, even when the
dependence is not made explicit by the notation I use.
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taste for Q-informativeness of an agent u with wealth w as the inverse of
SQ(u,w).
1.9.2 The Index
Theorem 1.20 is the analogue of Theorem 1.1 in the current context. It shows
that the coefficient of local taste for Q-informativeness coincides with the
inverse of ρ for the two indices of informativeness discussed above.53
Theorem 1.20. (i) For every u and w, RA (u,w) = SA (u,w) = ρu(w). (ii)
For every u and w, RJe (u,w) = SJe (u,w) = ρu(w).
Proof. See appendix.
Corollary 1.12. For Q ∈ {A,Je} u at w has at least as much taste for
Q-informativeness as v at w′ iff ρu(w) ≤ ρv(w′).
The following two theorems are the analogues of Theorems 1.2 and 1.3.
Axiom (Homogeneity). There exists k > 0 such that for every information
transaction a = (µ,α) and every λ > 0, Q (λ ⋅ µ,α) = 1
λk
⋅Q(a).
The homogeneity axiom states that Q is homogeneous of degree −k in
transaction prices. This axiom entails the cardinal content of the index. It is
particularly interesting if k = 1. In this case, the units of the index could be
interpreted as information per dollar.
Axiom (Local consistency). ∀u ∀w ∃λ > 0 ∀δ > 0 ∃ > 0 RQ(u,w) + δ >
λ > SQ(u,w) − δ.
53The relations between risk aversion and the taste for information have been discussed
extensively in the literature (e.g. Willinger, 1989).
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Definition (Reflexivity). The relation has at least as much taste for Q-
informativeness is reflexive if for all u and w, u at w has at least as much
taste for Q-informativeness as u at w.
Proposition 1.12. If Q satisfies local consistency, then the relation has at
least as much taste for Q-informativeness is reflexive.
Theorem 1.21. Fix k > 0. If Q satisfies local consistency and homogeneity
of degree −k in prices, then the coefficient of local taste for Q-informativeness
is ordinally equivalent to ρ−1, and the relation has at least as much taste for
Q-informativeness induces the same order as ρ−1.
Proof. See appendix.
Remark. Both axioms in Theorem 1.21 are essential: As the following exam-
ples demonstrate, omitting either admits indices to which the local taste is
not ordinally equivalent to ρ−1.
Example 1.16. Q ≡ 5 satisfies local consistency, but it does not satisfy
homogeneity of degree k < 0. The coefficient of local taste for this index
induces the trivial order.
Example 1.17. Q ∶= 1µ satisfies homogeneity, but violates local consistency.
The coefficient of local taste for this index induces the trivial order.
Theorem 1.22. (i) Given k > 0, there exists a continuum of locally consistent
homogeneous of degree −k indices of appeal for which the coefficient of local
taste equals to the inverse of ρ. (ii) Moreover, some of these indices are not
monotone with respect to Blackwell dominance.54
54Q is monotone with respect to Blackwell dominance if for any cost µ > 0 and all
information structures α, β, if α Blackwell dominates β then Q(µ,α) > Q(µ,β).
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Proof. See appendix.
Definition (Q-informativeness globally more attractive). For an index Q,
say that Q-informativeness is globally at least as attractive for u as it is for
v (written v ≾Q u) if for all w, w′, u at w has at least as much taste for
Q-informativeness as v at w′ . Q-informativeness is globally more attractive
for u than to v (written v ≺Q u) if v ≾Q u and not u ≾Q v.
Axiom (Global consistency). For any w, any u, v, and any a, b ∈ A, if v ≺Q u,
A(a) < A(b) and v accepts a at w, then u accepts b at w.
Theorem 1.23. For a given k > 0, Ak (⋅) is the unique index that satisfies
local consistency, global consistency and homogeneity of degree −k in prices,
up to a multiplication by a positive number.
Proof. Let Q′ satisfy the conditions and consider Q = (Q′)1/k. It is homo-
geneous of degree −1 and still locally consistent, so by Theorem 1.21 the
relation has at least as much taste for Q-informativeness induces the same
order as ρ−1. This, in turn, implies that if v ≺
Q
u then v is uniformly more risk
averse than u. Combined with this fact, global consistency and homogeneity
of degree −1 in prices imply the two axioms that are uniquely satisfied by
positive multiples of A, according to Theorem 4 in Cabrales et al. (2012).
That A satisfies local consistency follows from Theorem 1.20. This implies
that Ak also satisfies local consistency. That other axioms are satisfied follows
from Cabrales et al. (2012) using Theorem 1.20. The same holds for positive
multiples of Ak.
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Corollary 1.13. Je, the cost adjusted entropy reduction index, does not
satisfy global consistency.
Example 1.18. (Based on Example 2 of Cabrales et al. (2012)). Let K ={1,2,3} and fix a uniform prior. Consider the information structures
α1 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 − 1 1
1 − 1 1
1 1 − 1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, α2 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 − 2 2
0.1 0.9
2 1 − 2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
and the information transactions a1 = (1, α1) and a2 = (1, α2). It can be
shown that
A(a1) ≈ − log (2
3

1/3
1 + 132/31 ) ,
and
A(a2) ≈ − log (1/32 ) .
This means that the ordering of the two transactions according to A depends
on the choices of 1, 2 > 0. Even when they are both small, their relative
magnitude matters.
In contrast, the cost adjusted entropy reduction index, Je, ranks a2 higher
than a1 for small 1, 2 > 0. To see this, note that
Je (a1) ≈ ln 3 − 0.462,
and
Je (a2) ≈ ln 3 − 0.550.
This means that there exists a choice of small enough 1, 2 such that A(a1) <
A(a2) and Je(a1) > Je(a2). Hence, there exists two CARA functions with
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different ARA coefficients (between A(a1) and A(a2)), which both accept a2
but reject a1, demonstrating that Je violates global consistency.
As discussed previously, the homogeneity axiom has some cardinal con-
tent. In what follows, it will be removed and replaced with less demanding
conditions: monotonicity in prices, and continuity with respect to prices.
Example 1.19 will show that these conditions do not suffice to ensure that
the local taste for Q-informativeness does not induce the trivial order or
even that the index is monotonic with respect to Blackwell’s order. As in
previous sections, with a stronger version of global consistency, these con-
ditions will suffice to pin down a unique index of informativeness (up to
a monotonic transformation), and this index will have all of the desirable
properties mentioned above.
Definition (Continuity). An index of informativeness is continuous (in price)
if for every α, Q(⋅, α) is a continuous function from R+ to R+.
Example 1.19. Q (µ,α) ∶= 1 − exp{− (1 + 1µ)} is positive and continuous.
It satisfies local consistency, but the relation has at least as much taste
for Q-informativeness applies to any two utilitiy-wealth pairs. Hence, for
any u and v, Q-informativeness is not more attractive for u than it is for
v, and so global consistency is satisfied. The coefficient of local taste for
Q-informativeness is equal to 1 for all agents at all wealth levels. Since Q is
independent of the signal structure, it is clearly not monotonic with respect
to Blackwell’s order.
Axiom (Strong global consistency). For any w, any u, v, and any a, b ∈ A,
if v ≾Q u, A(a) < A(b) and v accepts a at w, then u accepts b at w.
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Strong global consistency is clearly violated by the index from Exam-
ple 1.19, as any two utilities u, v satisfy v ≾Q u.
Theorem 1.24. If Q is a continuous index of the appeal of information
transactions that satisfies monotonicity in price and strong global consistency,
and the relation has at least as much taste for Q-informativeness is reflexive,
then Q is ordinally equivalent to A.
Proof. See appendix.
Corollary 1.14. If Q is a continuous index of the appeal of information
transactions that satisfies monotonicity in price and strong global consistency,
and the relation has at least as much taste for Q-informativeness is reflexive,
then Q satisfies monotonicity with respect to Blackwell dominance and local
consistency, and the coefficient of local taste for Q-informativeness is ordinally
equivalent to ρ−1.
1.9.3 The Demand for Information Transactions
Proposition 1.13. An information transaction a with A(a) = b is rejected
by u only if there exist some w such that local transactions with A of b are
rejected. An information transaction a with A(a) = b is accepted by u only if
there exist some w such that local transactions with A of b are accepted.
Proof. Omitted.
Corollary. (Cabrales et al., 2014, Theorem 2) If A(a) > sup
w
{ρu(w)} then
u rejects a at any wealth level. If A(a) < inf
w
{ρu(w)} then u accepts a at any
wealth level.
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Remark. Cabrales et al. (2014) derive a result on sequential transactions,55
which could be generalized to a result in the spirit of compound gamble
property. Since this result requires some notation, I do not provide it here.
Axiom (Generalized Samuelson property). ∀u,w′ S∞Q (u,w′) ≤ sup
w
SQ(u,w)
and R∞Q (u,w′) ≥ infw RQ(u,w).
Theorem 1.25. For a given k > 0, Ak (⋅) is the unique index that satisfies
the generalized Samuelson property, local consistency and homogeneity of
degree −k in prices, up to a multiplication by a positive number.
Proof. Omitted.
Theorem 1.26. If Q satisfies the generalized Samuelson property, reflexivity,
monotonicity with respect to first order time dominance and continuity then
Q is ordinally equivalent to A.
Proof. Omitted.
1.9.4 Properties of the Index A
The setting of information transactions is somewhat different than other
settings that are discussed in this paper, in that the index depends on the
prior, and is therefore not completely objective. Example 1.20 below shows
that the order induced by A is different for different priors. Thus, the prior
is a relevant part of the specification of the decision making problem that the
index is derived from. The fact that in the setting presented here the prior
55Section 7.3 of Cabrales et al. (2014).
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and the prices (which are more likely to be observable) coincide is comforting
in this regard.56
An important property of the index A is that it is monotonic with respect
to Blackwell’s (1953) partial ordering of information structures (Cabrales
et al., 2014). According to Blackwell’s order, one information structure is more
informative than another if the latter is a garbling of the prior. Blackwell
(1953) proved that one information structure is more informative than another
according to this partial ordering if and only if every decision maker prefers
it to the other. Cabrales et al. (2014) show that if α is more informative than
β in the sense of Blackwell, then A(µ,α) > A(µ,β) for every µ > 0 and every
prior.57 As Blackwell’s ordering is the parallel of stochastic dominance and
time dominance, this property is analogous to the properties of the indices
presented in previous sections. It is important to note that monotonicity
with respect to Blackwell dominance was not one of the requirements in
Theorem 1.24. Other desirable properties of the index include monotonicity
in prices and being jointly continuous in p, µ, and qs. For an extensive
discussion of the properties of this index see Cabrales et al. (2014).
Finally, the cardinal interpretation of the index A is relatively more
compelling, as the homogeneity (of degree -1) axiom may be interpreted
as stating that the index measures information per dollar payed. If this
interpretation is taken seriously, then the index may be used in practice for
comparing different information providers, charging a fixed fee.
56See also the next subsection which discusses the prior-free implications of A.
57Recall that A depends on the prior p, even though this fact is not reflected in the
notation I use.
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1.9.5 Prior-Free Implications
In this section I make the dependence of A on the prior, p, explicit and write
A(⋅, p). First, I note that the order induced by the index of the appeal of
information transactions depends on the prior in the strict sense. This can
be seen easily in the following example:
Example 1.20. Let K = {1,2,3} and let p1 = (.5 − , .5 − ,2) and p2 =(2, .5 − , .5 − ). Consider the information structures
α1 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 −  
 1 − 
.5 .5
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, α2 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
.5 .5
1 −  
 1 − 
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
for some small , and the information transactions a1 = (1, α1) and a2 = (1, α2).
It is easy to verify that A(a1, p1) > A(a2, p1), but A(a1, p2) < A(a2, p2).
Informally, this is true since, given pi, αi reveals almost all of the information
that an investor could hope for, but α−i could be improved upon significantly.
The upshot of the example is that without knowledge of the prior, an ana-
lyst cannot deduce the “correct” complete order which was derived previously.
But some comparisons could still be made, even in the absence of knowledge
about the prior. For example, since A is monotonic with respect to Blackwell
dominance for all p, whenever one structure, α, Blackwell dominated another,
β, it is the case that A ((µ,α) , p) ≥ A ((µ,β) , p) for all prices, µ, and all
prior beliefs, p. The same holds for comparisons of structures that differ only
in price.
Definition. An information transaction a is at least as appealing as b inde-
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pendently of the prior if A(a, p) ≥ A(b, p) for all prior beliefs, p.
As explained above, the order prior-independent at least as appealing is
strictly partial, but it includes all the comparisons that could be made by
Blackwell’s partial order and monotonicity in prices. I now turn to show
that it could compare strictly more pairs of information transactions. I base
my proof on an example used in Shorrer (2015) to show that, even though
the index Ie of Cabrales et al. (2013) depends on the prior, it can compare
strictly more pairs of information structures than Blackwell’s order.
Theorem 1.27. There exists information transactions a = (1, α) and b =(1, β), such that α does not dominate β in the Blackwell sense, yet a is at
least as appealing as b independently of the prior, and b is not at least as
appealing as a independently of the prior.58
This result suggests that, even though the prior-independent order is
partial, it still improves upon the more general Blackwell ordering. Thus,
restricting attention to the particular decision making problem of invest-
ment, allows to derive a more complete order than Blackwell’s, even without
specifying a prior. This result, therefore, contributes to the literature which
attempts to extend partial order of Blackwell by restricting the class of
decision problems and agents under consideration (e.g. Persico, 2000; Athey
and Levin, 2001; Jewitt, 2007).
Proof. Follows from the example.
58Cabrales et al. (2014) disentangle the roles of p, and propose an index that depends
on both security prices and the prior. The theorem will continue to hold in this setting,
even if independence of both the prior and prices is required.
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Example 1.21. Let K = {1,2} and and consider the information structures
α1 = ⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
.3 .7
.7 .3
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ , α2 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
.3 .7
.1 .9
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ ,
and the transactions a = (1, α1), b = (1, α2).
I claim that A(a, p) ≥ A(b, p) for all p. Identify p with the probability of
state 1, which lies in [0,1]. Fixing the two information structures, define a
function φa,b ∶ [0,1]Ð→ R as follows:
φa,b (⋅) ∶= exp{−A(b, ⋅)} − exp{−A(a, ⋅)} .
For p ∈ {0,1}, A (⋅, p) ≡ 0, hence φa,b (p) also equals zero. φa,b (⋅) is also
a continuous function (this follows from the properties of A) and twice
continuously differentiable in (0, 1) with a strictly positive second derivatives.
This implies that φa,b (⋅) is a convex and continuous function with φa,b (0) =
φa,b (1) = 0. But this means that φa,b (p) ≤ 0 for all p ∈ [0,1] which means
that A(b, p) ≤ A(a, p) for all p ∈ [0,1], hence a is at least as appealing as b
independently of the prior. It is not hard to verify that b is not at least as
appealing as a (by example, or using the strict convexity of φa,b).
Finally, it remains to check that the comparison is not due to monotonicity
in price or Blackwell’s order. The first is obvious, as a and b involve the
same price. It is not very hard to verify that α1 does not dominate α2 in
the Blackwell sense. To do this, note that the set of all 2 × 2 information
structures which are dominated by α1 is
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Conv
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
⎛⎜⎜⎝
1 0
1 0
⎞⎟⎟⎠ ,
⎛⎜⎜⎝
0 1
0 1
⎞⎟⎟⎠ ,
⎛⎜⎜⎝
.3 .7
.7 .3
⎞⎟⎟⎠ ,
⎛⎜⎜⎝
.7 .3
.3 .7
⎞⎟⎟⎠
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭ ,
where Conv denotes the convex hull of the four matrices. α2 is not included
in this set, as Figure 1.1 illustrates.
α1
[1 0
1 0
]
α1 [0 11 0]
[0 1
0 1
] [1 0
0 1
]
α2
Figure 1.1: The figure depicts the two dimensional space of 2 × 2 information
structures. These matrices could be written as [ x 1 − x
y 1 − y ] , where both x and y are
in [0,1]. In the figure, x is represented by the horizontal axis and y is represented
by the vertical axis. The shaded area are the matrices which represent information
structures which are dominated by α1 in the Blackwell sense. The point α2 is outside
the shaded area.
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1.10 Discussion
This paper presented an axiomatic approach for deriving an objective index
which could serve as a guide for decision making for different decision makers.
The approach was shown to pin down a unique index with desirable properties
in five settings, demonstrating its generality and applicability for different
decision making settings. This approach could potentially be used in other
settings in which indices are needed. A particular setting which seems
promising in this regard is the measurement of inequality, which has many
similarities to the setting of risk (Atkinson, 1970). Future research should
focus on characterizing the class of decision making problems to which the
approach is applicable.
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Chapter 2
More Complete Incomplete
Orders of Informativeness and
Segregation
2.1 Introduction
Understanding the demand for information is crucial for understanding
many important economic environments. Yet, comparing the desirability of
different information structures in a sensible way is an illusive undertaking.
The reason is that in some settings certain pieces of information may be vital
for some agents, while in other settings, or for different agents, other pieces
of information will be more important.1 The implication is that it is not
1The difficulty in generating a ranking which is independent of agents’ preferences is
discussed by Willinger (1989) in his paper which studies the relation between risk aversion
and the value of information. Willinger (1989) discusses his choice of using the expected
value of information (EVI) or “asking price” which was defined by LaValle (1968). The
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possible to rank all information structures so that higher ranked structures
are preferred to lower ranked ones by all agents at every decision making
problem and for all prior beliefs. Some pairs of information structures may,
however, be compared in this manner. In his seminal paper, Blackwell (1953)
showed that one information structure is preferred to another by all agents
in all settings if and only if the latter is a garbling of the former.2 That is, if
one is a noisy version of the other. But this order is partial and cannot be
used to compare many pairs of information structures.3
Cabrales et al. (2013) use an approach of total rejections in the spirit of
Hart (2011) to make such comparisons.4 They restrict attention to investment
decision problems, in a model a la Arrow (1972), and define a relation which
they name uniform investment dominance. This turns out to be a complete
order over all information structures, which refines the order suggested by
Blackwell (1953). Their order, however, depends on the (unique, fixed,
common) prior of the decision makers which are considered, and so they get,
in fact, a continuum of orders, one for each prior. These orders are indeed
different from each other; there exists pairs of information structures which
are ranked differently depending on the prior selected. This means that prior
EVI measures a certain decision maker’s willingness to pay for certain information, and so,
“... the difficulty of defining a controversial continuous variable representing the ‘amount of
information’ can be avoided.”
2A simple proof is provided in Leshno and Spector (1992).
3Lehmann (1988); Persico (2000); Athey and Levin (2001); Jewitt (2007) and others,
have extended this partial order by restricting the class of decision problems and agents
under consideration.
4In fact, they follow Hart’s utility uniform rejections which leads in his setting to the
index suggested in Foster and Hart (2009). Hart (2011) Also suggested wealth uniform
rejections which lead in his setting to the in his setting to the index suggested in Aumann
and Serrano (2008). Cabrales et al. (2014) Later followed this second approach and
suggested the index of appeal of information transactions.
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independent investment dominance is a partial order.
The first part of this paper treats a question which was left unanswered in
Cabrales et al. (2013): is prior independent investment dominance the same
as Blackwell’s partial order, or does it provide further insights for prior-free
comparisons of information structures in investment settings. This question
is important since an analyst cannot always observe the priors of agents in
the market. My answer is that the latter is correct. I prove that there exist
(many) pairs of information structures that could be compared by the partial
order of prior independent investment dominance, and cannot be compared
using Blackwell’s order. I provide a complete characterization for these pairs
of structures restricting attention to information structures with two states
of the world and two signals.
In the second part of the paper, I turn to the measurement of segregation,
another topic of interest for economists and other social scientists, which raises
similar difficulties. Massey and Denton (1988) enumerate several dimensions
of segregation. Much of the literature, including this paper, focuses on what
they call evenness, the (dis)similarity of the distributions of different social
groups among different locations. The standard model compares lists of
locations and their group composition. Examples include measures of racial
segregation where locations are physical locations and groups correspond to
different ethnicities (Massey and Denton, 1988), and occupational gender
segregation where locations correspond to different occupations and the
groups correspond to genders (Flückiger and Silber, 1999).
One strand of the literature concentrates on partial orders. Duncan and
Duncan (1955) treated the case of two groups (whites and non-whites), using
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segregation curves. Segregation curves are analogous to Lorenz curves, where
one race takes the role of the population, and the other takes the role of
income. The members of the “population” who are located in locations with
a lower proportion of the other race are treated as lower income individuals.
Lasso de la Vega and Volij (2014) recently demonstrated the close connection
of this literature to Blackwell’s order over information structures. They use
an axiomatic approach to propose a (partial) order over cities according to
the informativeness (in the sense of Blackwell) of neighborhoods about the
ethnic groups of its residents. They show that for the case of two ethnic
groups this order coincides with the one induced by segregation curves.5
Another strand of the literature is focused on complete orders and indices
(see for example Massey and Denton, 1988; Flückiger and Silber, 1999; Rear-
don and Firebaugh, 2002; Hutchens, 2004). Frankel and Volij (2011) present
a sequence of ordinal axioms and show that different subsets of these axioms
pin down different (classes of) indices, and that no complete order satisfies
all of the axioms. One of the orderings they characterize is represented by
the mutual information index, which is closely related to the index Cabrales
et al. (2013) use to represent uniform investment dominance. I use this close
relation and results from the first part of the paper to show that there exists
a partial order that satisfies all of their axioms (except for completeness) and
which strictly refines the partial orders of Lasso de la Vega and Volij (2014)
and of Hutchens (2015).
5Hutchens (2015) later proposed a refinement of this order.
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2.2 Preliminaries
I use the model and notation of Cabrales et al. (2013). I review it here briefly,
as a complete discussion could be found in their paper.
I consider agents with a concave and twice continuously differentiable util-
ity function for money, who have some initial wealth, w, and face uncertainty
about the state of nature. There are K ∈ N states of nature,6 {1, ...,K}, over
which the agents have the prior p ∈ ∆ (K) which is assumed to have a full
support.
I identify agents and utility functions, and denote the Arrow-Pratt coeffi-
cient of relative risk aversion of agent u at wealth w as (Pratt, 1964; Arrow,
1965, 1971):
%u(w) ∶= −wu′′(w)
u′(w) .
I restrict attention to agents with relative risk aversion that is increasing
in their wealth (IRRA). This means that %u(⋅) is non-decreasing for all
agents considered. Justifications for this assumption include: theoretical
considerations (Arrow, 1971), observed behavior in the field (Binswanger, 1981;
Post et al., 2008) and laboratory experiments (Holt and Laury, 2002). IRRA
utility functions include constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utilities, as
well as constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utilities (Hart, 2011). I further
focus on agents that are ruin averse, namely, that satisfy lim
w→0+u(w) = −∞. I
denote by U∗ the class of these utility functions.
6With a slight abuse of notation, I also denote {1, ...,K} by K. The meaning of K
should be clear from the context.
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The set of investment opportunities B∗ = {b ∈ RK ∣ ∑
k∈Kpkbk ≤ 0}, consists
of all no arbitrage assets.7 When an agent with initial wealth w chooses
investment b ∈ B∗ and state k is realized, his wealth becomes w + bk. Hence,
B∗ includes in particular the option of inaction. The reference to the members
of B∗ as no arbitrage investment opportunities attributes to pk an additional
interpretation as the price of an Arrow-Debreu security that pays 1 if the
state k is realized and nothing otherwise. Hence, p plays a dual role in this
setting.
Agents may choose their investment, but I do not allow for bankruptcy
(the possibility of negative wealth). I say that an investment b is feasible
at wealth w when w + bk ≥ 0 in every state k ∈ K. Before choosing a
feasible investment, the agent has an opportunity to engage in an information
transaction a = (µ,α), where µ > 0 is the cost of the transactions, and α is the
information structure representing the information that a entails. To be more
precise, α is given by a finite set of signals Sα and probability distributions
αk ∈ ∆ (Sα) for every k ∈K. When the state of nature is k, the probability
that the signal s is observed equals αk(s). Thus, the information structure
may be represented by a stochastic matrixMα, with K rows and ∣Sα∣ columns,
and the total probability of the signals is given by the vector pα ∶= p ⋅Mα.
For simplicity, assume that pα(s) > 0 for all s, so that each signal is observed
with positive probability. Further, denote by qsk the probability that the agent
assigns to state k conditional on observing the signal s, using Bayes’ law.
Note that although the notation does not indicate it, (qsk)Kk=1 = qs ∈ ∆ (K)
7I present a simplified version of Cabrales et al. (2013). Simplifications are for exposition
purposes only, and have no effect on any of my results.
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depends on α and the prior p.
Agents are assumed to choose the optimal feasible investment opportunity
in B∗ given their belief, q. Therefore, the expected utility of an agent with
utility u, initial wealth w and beliefs q is
V (u,w, q) = sup
b∈B∗, feasible∑k qku (w + bk) .8
In case that the agent acquires no information, his beliefs are given by the
prior p. Since the agent is risk averse, in such case his optimal choice is
inaction. So,
V (u,w, p) = u(w).
Accordingly, an agent accepts an information transaction if
∑
s
pα(s)V (u,w − µ, qs) > V (u,w, p) = u(w)
and rejects it otherwise.
The entropy reduction is defined by:
I(α, p) =H(p) −∑
s
pα(s) ⋅H(qs),
where,9
H(q) = −∑
k∈Kqk ln(qk),
and x lnx = 0 by continuity.
8Throughout, I use the convention that (−∞) ⋅ 0 = 0.
9Note that qs is not independent of the prior p, even though the dependence is not
made explicit by the notation I use.
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2.3 Results
Definition. For a fixed prior p information structure α uniformly investment-
dominates (or investment dominates, for short) information structure β
whenever, for every wealth w and price µ < w such that (µ,α) is rejected
by all agents with utility u ∈ U∗ at wealth w, β is also rejected by all those
agents.
Theorem. [Cabrales, Gossner and Serrano] For a fixed prior p, information
structure α investment-dominates information structure β if and only if
I(α, p) ≥ I(β, p).
Corollary. If α Blackwell dominates β then I(α, p) ≥ I(β, p) for all p.
Definition. An information structure α investment-dominates β indepen-
dently of the prior (or prior-independently investment-dominates), whenever
α investment-dominates β for any prior p.
Theorem. [Cabrales, Gossner and Serrano] There exists no linear ordering
that orders information structures according to the ordering of investment
dominance independently of the prior.
Example 2.1. Let K = {1,2,3} and let p1 = (.5 − , .5 − ,2) and p2 =(2, .5 − , .5 − ). Consider the information structures
α1 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 −  
 1 − 
.5 .5
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, α2 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
.5 .5
1 −  
 1 − 
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
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It is easy to verify that I(α1, p1) > I(α2, p1), but I(α1, p2) < I(α2, p2). This
is intuitive since, given pi, αi contains (almost) all the information that an
investor could hope for, but α−i could be improved upon significantly.
While information structures cannot be linearly ordered according to
investment dominance independently of the prior, the previous corollary
suggests that this relation is not vacuous. There are some cases where one
information structure investment-dominates another information for any prior,
for example, when the former Blackwell-dominates the latter. A natural
question that was left unanswered in Cabrales et al. (2013) is whether these
are the only cases. Namely, are prior-independent investment-dominance and
Blackwell-dominance the same? I answer this question in the negative.
Theorem 2.1. There exists α and β such that α investment-dominates β
independently of the prior, but α does not dominate β according to Blackwell’s
order.10
Proof. Follows from Example 2.2.11
Example 2.2. Let K = {1,2} and consider the information structures
α1 = ⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
.3 .7
.7 .3
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ , α2 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
.3 .7
.1 .9
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
I claim that I(α1, p) ≥ I(α2, p) for all p. I identify p with the probability
of state 1, which lies in [0,1]. Fixing the two information structures I define
10Using Example 2.2, Shorrer (2014) shows that the same applies to the index of appeal
of information transactions (Cabrales et al., 2014).
11I am grateful to Yufei Zhang for providing Example 2.2.
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a function φα1,α2 ∶ [0,1]Ð→ R as follows:
φα1,α2 (⋅) ∶= I(α2, ⋅) − I(α1, ⋅).
For p ∈ {0,1}, I (⋅, p) ≡ 0, hence φα1,α2 (0)=φα1,α2 (1) = 0. It is not hard to
verify that φα1,α2 (⋅) is a continuous function (this follows from the properties
of I). φα1,α2 (⋅) is also twice continuously differentiable, and
φ
′′
α1,α2 (p) = 0.0252 − 0.0192p(−0.3 − 0.4p)(0.7 − 0.4p)(0.3(−1 + p) − 0.1p)(1 + 0.3(−1 + p) − 0.1p) .
(2.3.0.1)
This expression is always positive for p ∈ (0,1), which implies that φα1,α2 (⋅)
is a strictly convex and continuous function with φα1,α2 (0) = φα1,α2 (1) =
0. But this means that φα1,α2 (p) < 0 for all p ∈ (0,1) which means that
I(α2, p) − I(α1, p) ≤ 0 for all p ∈ [0,1], hence α1 investment-dominates α2
independently of the prior.
It remains to show that α1 does not Blackwell-dominates α2. Let us
look at the geometry of Blackwell dominance more generally. Given a K × S
information structure α, the set of all K×S information structures dominated
by α is defined as Dom(α) = {αM ∶M ∈ (∆(S))S}. Namely, M ranges over
all S × S stochastic matrices. Being a linear image of the polytope (∆(S))S ,
Dom(α) is a polytope whose vertices are images of the vertices of (∆(S))S .
Namely,
Dom(α) = conv
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
α
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ei1⋮
eiS
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
∶ eijare vertices of ∆(S)
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
.
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The case of just two states (K = 2) and two signals (S = 2) is particularly
simple. The set of all 2× 2 information structures dominated by a given 2× 2
information structure form a parallelogram,
Dom
⎛⎜⎜⎝
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
x 1 − x
y 1 − y
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎞⎟⎟⎠ = conv
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
x 1 − x
y 1 − y
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ ,
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
y 1 − y
x 1 − x
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ ,
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 1
0 1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ ,
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 0
1 0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭ .
From Figure 2.1, it is easily seen that the information structure α2 from the
example is not Blackwell dominated by α1.
α1
[1 0
1 0
]
α1 [0 11 0]
[0 1
0 1
] [1 0
0 1
]
α2
Figure 2.1: The figure depicts the two dimensional space of 2 × 2 information
structures. These matrices could be written as [ x 1 − x
y 1 − y ] , where both x and y are
in [0,1]. In the figure, x is represented by the horizontal axis and y is represented
by the vertical axis. The shaded area are the matrices which represent information
structures which are dominated by α1 in the Blackwell sense. The point α2 is outside
the shaded area.
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The above counterexample extends to any number of states and signals.
I now focus on the case of 2 × 2 information structures (2 states of the world
and 2 signals), and provide a complete characterization of comparable pairs.
Definition 2.1. Given two 2×2 information structures α and β, the function
φα,β ∶ [0,1]Ð→ R is defined as follows:
φα,β (⋅) ∶= I(β, ⋅) − I(α, ⋅).
Theorem 2.2. For 2 × 2 information structures α and β, α investment-
dominates β independently of the prior if and only if
φ′α,β (0+) ≤ 0, and
φ′α,β (1−) ≥ 0.
Furthermore, α and β are comparable using this partial order if and only if
φ′α,β (0+)φ′α,β (1−) ≤ 0.
Proof. By definition, α investment-dominates β independently of the prior
if and only if φα,β is non-positive on the interval [0,1]. My proof is a
generalization of the investigation of the function φα1,α2 in the proof of
Theorem 2.1. The main step is to show that [0, 1] could be divided into two
intervals, [0, t] and [t, 1] (with t possibly equal to 0 or 1), such that in one of
these intervals φα,β is convex and the other is concave. In other words: φα,β
is either convex, concave, or “S-shaped”: convex on one side of t and concave
on the other side. From this analysis and the fact that φα,β(0) = φα,β(1) = 0,
one readily concludes the first part of the theorem. The second part follows
92
from the first, since φα,β = −φβ,α.
I turn now to proving that for every 2 × 2 structures α and β, there exist
t ∈ [0, 1] such that φα,β is either convex or concave in each one of the intervals[0, t] and [t,1] separately.
Denote
α = ⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
x 1 − x
y 1 − y
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ , β =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
a 1 − a
b 1 − b
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ ,
for some x, y, a, b ∈ [0,1]. The function φα,β is continuously twice differen-
tiable on [0,1]. Assume first that neither of the information structures is
degenerate, that is, equals
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 0
1 0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ or
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 1
0 1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦. Direct computation shows
that
φ′′α,β (p) = (x − y)2pβ(1)pβ(2) − (a − b)2pα(1)pα(2)pα(1)pα(2)pβ(1)pβ(2) . (2.3.0.2)
The denominator is positive on (0,1), as a multiplication of four positive
factors. The nominator is an affine function in p: it is the difference of two
quadratic polynomials that have the same quadratic term. This implies that
the entire expression could change signs at most once. This concludes the
proof in the non-degenerate case.
If both α and β are degenerate, then φα,β ≡ 0; if only α is degenerate,
then
φ′′α,β (p) = −(a − b)2pβ(1)pβ(2) ;
and if only β is degenerate, then
φ′′α,β (p) = (x − y)2pα(1)pα(2) .
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In all of the three degenerate cases φ′′α,β has the same sign throughout the
interval (0,1).
The following theorem provides a sufficient condition which is much
simpler to verify and illustrate than the condition of Theorem 2.2.
Theorem 2.3. For a non-degenerate information structure α = ⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
x 1 − x
y 1 − y
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
and an information structure β = ⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
a 1 − a
b 1 − b
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦, α investment-dominates β
independently of the prior if
(x − y)2a(1 − a) − (a − b)2x(1 − x) ≥ 0,
and
(x − y)2b(1 − b) − (a − b)2y(1 − y) ≥ 0.
Note that Theorem 2.1 follows from Theorem 2.3. The condition in
Theorem 2.3 specifies an intersection of two ellipses which is a strictly convex
set; therefore any non-extreme point on the relative boundary of dom(α) is
an internal point of the set of information structures investment-dominated
by α independently of the prior.
Proof. (of Theorem 2.3) With the notation of the proof of Theorem 2.2 it
is sufficient to show that φα,β is convex in [0,1], or equivalently, φ′′α,β is
non-negative in (0,1). As seen through (2.3.0.2), since the denominator is
always positive, it is sufficient to show that the nominator is non-negative.
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Namely,
L(p) = (x − y)2pβ(1)pβ(2) − (a − b)2pα(1)pα(2) ≥ 0 ∀p ∈ (0,1).
Since L(p) is a linear function of p, one needs only verify that the two end
points, at p = 0,1, are non-negative, which is exactly the condition of the
theorem.
Remark 2.1. Using this sufficient condition, one can show that two 2 × 2
information structures drawn uniformly at random are comparable with
probability greater than .84, compared with a 2/3 probability that they are
comparable using Blackwell’s criterion.
2.4 Segregation
In this section I use the previous results to show that all of the axioms
suggested by Frankel and Volij (2011), with the exclusion of completeness,
are satisfied simultaneously by a partial order which refines the ones of Lasso
de la Vega and Volij (2014) and of Hutchens (2015). In particular, for the
two ethnic groups case it refines the order induced by the segregation curves
criterion.
2.4.1 Preliminaries
I use the model and notation of Frankel and Volij (2011). I review it here
briefly, as a complete discussion could be found in their paper.
Population is assumed to be a continuum. I refer to groups as ethnic
groups and to locations as schools. The objects to be ranked are (school)
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districts, which are defined as follows:
Definition. A district X = ⟨N,G, (Tng )g∈G,n∈N⟩ ≡ ⟨N(X),G(X), T (X)⟩ is a
triplet where N is a finite non-empty set of schools, G is a finite non-empty
set of ethnic groups, and for each g ∈ G and n ∈ N , Tng is a non negative real
number representing the number of members of ethnic group g attending
school n.
When there is no risk of confusion, I will sometime just write the ethnic
composition of the schools in the district. For example, ⟨(1,3), (2,2)⟩ repre-
sents a district with two schools, and two ethnic groups (labeled black and
white). The first has one black student and three white students, and the
second has two students from each ethnic group.
For any scalar α > 0, αX denotes a district in which for all n ∈ N and
g ∈ G the number of students of ethnicity g in school n is multiplied by α. For
any two districts X,Y with the same ethnic groups X ⊎Y denotes their union
into a single district. For example, if X = ⟨(1,2), (5,5)⟩ and Y = ⟨(3,4)⟩ then
2X = ⟨(2,4) , (10,10)⟩ and X ⊎ Y = ⟨(1,2), (5,5), (3,4)⟩.
Some more notation will prove useful.
Tg = ∑
n∈NTng : the number of students of ethnic group g in a district,
Tn = ∑
g∈GTng : the number of students attending school n,
T = ∑
n∈N g∈GTng : the total number of students in the district,
Pg = TgT : the proportion of group g students in the district,
pin = TnT : the fraction of the population attending school n,
png = TngTn (when Tn > 0, and 0 otherwise): the proportion group g students
in school n,
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tng = TngTg (when Tg > 0, and 0 otherwise): the fraction of group g students
attending school n.
A general class of districts is denoted by C. Sometimes, a class of districts
with K ethnic groups will be considered. Such class will be denoted by CK .
Additionally, CA = ∪
K≥2CK .
Given a class of districts C, an ordering of segregation, or a segregation
ordering, is a binary relation on that class which is transitive and reflexive.
I denote such ordering by ≿ and interpret the statement X ≿ Y to mean
“district X is at least as segregated as district Y .” ≻ and ∼ are derived in the
usual way. Throughout attention will be restricted to orderings that treat
schools symmetrically.12
The Mutual Information index is equal to the difference between the
entropy of a district’s ethnic distribution and the weighted average entropy
of the ethnic distributions of its schools:
M(X) =H(P ) − ∑
n∈N(X)pi
nH(pn).
Restricting attention to districts with two ethnic groups {W,B}, it is
possible to associate each district with a Lorenz segregation curve, the equiv-
alent of a Lorenz curve where individuals from one race takes the role of the
“population” and the role of “income” is taken by the proportion of members
of the other race in their school. If the Lorenz segregation curve of X is
always below that of Y we say that Y at least as segregated as X according
to the Lorenz criterion (written Y ≿L X). Lasso de la Vega and Volij (2014)
12That is, any permutation on the set of schools in X induces a district which is exactly
as segregated.
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show that Y ≿L X if and only if the information structure given by the
matrix p(Y ) (with p(Y )n,g = png (Y )) Blackwell dominates the one given by
p(X). Thus, the Blackwell criterion could be viewed as a generalization
of the Lorenz criterion that is applicable even when more than two ethnic
groups are present. Hutchens (2015) proposes a refinement of this orders
which allows to permute the labels of the ethnic groups in one of the districts
before applying the Lorenz criterion. I refer to his criteria as Symmetric
Lorenz and symmetric Blackwell respectively.
2.4.2 Axioms
The following axioms are taken from Frankel and Volij (2011). As they discuss
extensively, most of them also appear elsewhere in the segregation literature.
Axiom (Completeness (C)). For all X,Y ∈ C, X ≿ Y or Y ≿X.13
Axiom (Nontriviality (N)). There exists X,Y ∈ C, such that X ≻ Y .
Axiom (Continuity (CONT)). For any district Z ∈ C, the set of districts
that have the same groups and schools as Z and are at least as segregated as
Z is closed, as is the set that have the same groups and schools as Z and are
no more segregated than Z.
Axiom (Scale Invariance (SI)). For any district Z ∈ C and any scalar α > 1,
αZ ∼ Z.
Axiom (Symmetry (SYM)). The segregation ordering is invariant to per-
mutations of the groups in the district. For any X = ⟨N,G,T ⟩ ∈ C and any
13The paper by Frankel and Volij (2011) only considers complete orders, and so this
axiom is not stated explicitly.
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permutation σ on G, the district Xσ = ⟨N,G, T¯ ⟩ such that T¯ng = Tnσ(g) satisfies
Xσ ∼X.
Axiom (Independence (IND)). Let X,Y ∈ C have equal populations and equal
group distributions. Then for any Z ∈ C, X ⊎Z ≿ Y ⊎Z if and only if X ≿ Y .
Axiom (School Division Property (SDP)). Let X ∈ C be a district and n a
school in X. Let X ′ be the district that results from splitting school n into
two schools, n1 and n2. Then X ′ ≿X. Furthermore, if one of the new schools
is empty, or the two schools have the same ethnic distribution (pn1 = pn2)
then X ′ ∼X.
Axiom (Composition Invariance (CI)). For any district X ∈ C, group g ∈
G(X), and scalar α > 0, let X ′ be the district resulting from multiplying the
number of group g students in each school in X by α. Then X ′ ∼X.
Axiom (Group Division Property (GDP)). Let X ∈ C be a district in which
the set of ethnic groups is G = G(X). Let X ′ be the result of partitioning
some group g ∈ G into two subgroups, g1 and g2, such that either one subgroup
is empty (Tgi = 0 for some i ∈ {1,2}) or the two subgroups have the same
distribution across schools (tng1 = tng2 for all n ∈ N(X)). Then X ′ ∼X.
2.4.3 Results
Theorem. [Frankel and Volij] An ordering on CA satisfies C, SI, IND, SDP,
N, GDP, SYM and CONT if and only if it is represented by the Mutual
Information index.
Corollary. [Frankel and Volij] No ordering on CA satisfies C, SI, IND, SDP,
N, GDP, SYM and CONT and CI.
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Proof. The indexM is not invariant to the transformation described in Axiom
CI.
Example. [Frankel and Volij] letX = ⟨(10,0), (0,1000)⟩ andX ′ = ⟨(1000,0), (0,1000)⟩.
CI requires that X ∼X ′. but M(X) ≠M (X ′), as the entropy of a district’s
ethnic distribution is greater under X ′ and the weighted average entropy of
the ethnic distributions of schools is the same for both.
Theorem. An order which satisfies SDP and SI is monotonic with respect
to Blackwell’s criterion.
Proof. Frankel and Volij (2011) provide a proof assuming C, and their proof
generalizes to this case as well.
Definition 2.2. X ∈ CA is at least as segregated as Y ∈ CA according to
the ordering ≿∗ if there exists a permutation matrix Π such that t(X) prior
independently investment dominates Πt(Y ).
That is, I allow permuting the names of races in one of the districts
before comparing the matrices t(X) and t(Y ) using the prior independent
investment dominance criterion.
Theorem 2.4. The (partial) ordering on CA ≿∗ strictly refines the symmetric
Blackwell criterion and satisfies SI, IND, SDP, N, GDP, SYM and CONT
and CI.
The theorem says that ≿∗ satisfies all of the axioms stated above with
the exclusion of completeness (C), and that it refines the orderings of Lasso
de la Vega and Volij (2014) and Hutchens (2015).
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Proof. Recall that M(X) =H(P ) − ∑
n∈N(X)pinH(pn) satisfies all axioms but
CI. Now, observe that I(t(X), P (X)) = H(P ) − ∑
n∈Npin ⋅H(pn) =M(X). It
is not hard to verify that this implies that ≿∗ satisfies all the axioms but CI
and C.
Furthermore, for any district X ∈ C, group g ∈ G(X), and scalar α > 0, if
X ′ is the district resulting from multiplying the number of group g students
in each school in X by α, then t(X) = t(X ′) (but P (X) ≠ P (X ′)). Thus,
X ≿∗ Y if and only if X ′ ≿∗ Y . Hence, ≿∗ satisfies CI.
From Example 2.2 there exists α and β such that I(α, p) ≥ I(β, p) for all
p, and α does not Blackwell dominates β, not even allowing for permutations
as in the symmetric Blackwell criterion.14 Thus, any two districts X and
Y in CA with T (X) = T (Y ) = 1 and t(X) = α and t(Y ) = β have that X is
more segregated than Y according to ≿∗ but not according to the symmetric
Blackwell criterion.
Finally, the fact that the definition of ≿∗ allows for any permutation of
t(Y ), combined with that fact that I is monotonic with respect to Blackwell
dominance, implies that ≿∗ refines the symmetric Blackwell criterion.
Corollary 2.1. The restriction of ≿∗ to C2 strictly refines the symmetric
Lorenz ordering.
14This part could be verified quickly using Theorem 2.3.
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Chapter 3
Optimal Truncation in
Matching Markets1
3.1 Introduction
One of the great success stories in economic theory is the application of
matching theory to two-sided markets. A classic example is the National
Resident Matching Program (NRMP), in which medical school students are
matched to residency positions in hospitals. Rather than hospitals pursuing
students via a decentralized series of offers, refusals and acceptances, matching
occurs via a centralized mechanism. In this mechanism, each student ranks
the hospital programs, and each hospital ranks the students. They submit
these lists to an algorithm, which determines which students will be matched
to which programs.
Such a centralized process has a number of advantages. First and foremost,
1Co-authored with Peter Coles
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the algorithm on which this and many similar centralized processes are based
produces an outcome that is stable with respect to reported preferences.2 In
a stable matching, no two agents mutually prefer each other to their assigned
match, nor does any matched participant prefer to be unmatched. A second
advantage is that eliminating a decentralized offer process may save time and
other resources. Finally, as Roth and Xing (1994) have shown, a centralized
mechanism can successfully halt the unraveling of a market.3 Centralized
matching mechanisms also power a variety of other markets, including the
public school systems in New York, Boston, Singapore and other cities, as
well as numerous specialized medical fellowships.
These centralized markets all employ versions of an algorithm proposed
by Gale and Shapley (1962). The algorithm, which in one-to-one markets
is often referred to as the Men-Proposing Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
(MP-DA), takes as its inputs preference lists reported by agents, and outputs
a stable matching. When agents are asked to report preference lists for
submission to MP-DA, this begs the question: Do all agents have an incentive
to report truthfully? Dubins and Freedman (1981) and Roth (1982) provide
the answer: they do not. In fact, Roth showed that no mechanism that
produces stable matchings will induce truth-telling as a dominant strategy
for all agents. However, in the preference list submission game induced by
2In 1998, the algorithm used in the NRMP was altered to accommodate student couples
and allow for specialized hospital positions, so that the outcome is “close to” a stable
matching (see Roth and Peranson, 1999).
3Before the NRMP was introduced in the 1950s, offers and interviews were made as
early as the fall of students’ third year in medical school, which was undesirable for a
number of reasons. The willingness of both hospitals and students to participate argues
strongly in favor of the program’s effectiveness. The NRMP enjoys participation rates of
close to 100% of eligible students, with over 38,000 students participating in the March
2012 match.
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MP-DA, for all participants on one side of the market, the “men,” truth-telling
is a dominant strategy.4 But this leaves open the question of how participants
on the other side of the market, the “women,” might benefit by strategically
misrepresenting their preferences.
Recent work has examined conditions under which gains to strategic ma-
nipulation are limited for all participants in the market, not just those on one
side. One approach in the literature concerns large markets. Roth and Per-
anson (1999) observe that in the data from the NRMP, very few participants
could have improved their outcomes by reporting different preferences. They
show via simulations that when the length of preference lists is held fixed
and the number of participants grows, the size of the set of stable matching
shrinks (a property they term “core convergence”), so that opportunities for
manipulation are reduced. Immorlica and Mahdian (2005) demonstrate this
result theoretically, finding that in large marriage markets where preference
list length is bounded, nearly all players have an incentive to truthfully report
preferences. Kojima and Pathak (2009) generalize this result, showing that in
many-to-one markets, preference list manipulation, as well as other modes of
strategic manipulation such as non-truthful reporting of capacities (see also
Sönmez, 1997), are again limited. Lee (2011) considers one-to-one matching
markets where agent utilities are drawn from distributions with bounded
support that have both a common and an independent component. He shows
that when all agents report truthfully, the proportion of participants who can
4This is true in one-to-one, or “marriage” markets, where each agent has the capacity
to match with at most one other agent. In many-to-one settings, e. g. students matching to
hospitals, truth-telling is no longer a dominant strategy when, in the Deferred Acceptance
Algorithm, the “hospitals” side makes the offers (see Roth, 1985).
104
achieve a significant utility gain from manipulation vanishes as the market
grows large.5
Our approach takes a different tack. We do not require preference lists
to be short, and ask: how should players optimally misrepresent preferences
in markets that do not satisfy non-manipulability conditions? How “far”
could optimal behavior be from truthfulness? We wish to study optimal
manipulation, along with payoffs and market-wide welfare effects, and ask
how strategic behavior and outcomes change as we vary market conditions.
The particular form of strategic misrepresentation we focus on is preference
list truncation; that is, listing in order the first several partners from one’s true
preference list, and identifying all other partners as unacceptable. Truncation
has an intuitive logic: by listing less-preferred partners as unacceptable, the
probability of being matched with these partners drops to zero. Agents using
this strategy might hope that correspondingly, the likelihood of being matched
to a partner who remains on the truncated list will go up. In the context
of MP-DA, this intuition is confirmed: submitting a truncated preference
list weakly increases the likelihood of being matched to some agent on the
truncated list, regardless of beliefs about the lists other agents submit. But
submitting a truncated preference list is a risky strategy. Limiting acceptable
partners also increases the likelihood of ending up with no match. Analysis
of this tradeoff is the crux of the results in this paper.
While always a method for weakly increasing the likelihood of matching
5In a very different approach, Featherstone and Mayefsky (2010) run lab experiments
in 5×5 marriage markets, and find that participants have trouble learning to find beneficial
deviations under MP-DA, even if there are potential gains (though participants have more
success in finding successful manipulation when facing “priority” mechanisms).
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with better-ranked opponents, in some uncertain settings, truncation is
optimal: Roth and Rothblum (1999) show that when agents’ beliefs satisfy
a form of symmetry termed “M-symmetry,” they can do no better than to
truncate. Ehlers (2004) demonstrated that this result holds under somewhat
more general conditions.
Whether optimal or not, we analyze truncation, both in symmetric and
general settings. We ask: to what degree should players truncate, if at all?
(Note that submitting one’s true preference list is also a form of truncation.)
Can a participant realistically gain from truncation when she is extremely
uncertain about what opponents might report? If players anticipate that
others may be truncating, how does this affect their behavior? Do participants
truncate in equilibrium? What are the welfare implications in a truncation
equilibrium?
To evaluate the consequences of truncation, we first characterize the
payoff from truncation for a woman with general beliefs over the preference
lists other agents will submit in terms of the distributions of her most and
least preferred achievable mates. In a market with N men and N women,
when a woman believes submitted preferences of others are uniformly chosen
from the set of all full-length preference lists, she may safely truncate a
large fraction of her list with low risk of becoming unmatched. Further, as
there is a large gap between the expected rank of the mate she receives from
truthful revelation and her most preferred achievable mate (Pittel (1989)
shows these asymptote to N/ logN and logN respectively), truncation can
lead to gains. The optimal degree of truncation can be significant. We
demonstrate that in large, balanced, uniform markets the optimal level of
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truncation approaches 100%.6 That is, when there are many agents in the
market, a woman optimally submits an extremely short list relative to her
full preference list – in the limit, the fraction of men that she leaves on her
list goes to zero.
The two sides of the market diverge in their tastes for truncation equilibria.
Compared to the outcome from truthful reporting, women prefer any equilib-
rium in which they all use truncation strategies; for men the opposite is true.
Furthermore, if there are two truncation equilibria that can be compared
in the degree of truncation, women prefer the equilibrium in which they
truncate more, while men prefer the equilibrium in which women truncate
less. Under uniform preferences, we demonstrate the existence of a symmetric
equilibrium where all women use the same truncation strategy. However,
even under uniform preferences, asymmetric equilibria, where women vary in
their degrees of truncation, may also exist. In such equilibria, and in contrast
to the across-equilibria results, the women who truncate least are best off.
Intuitively, while women benefit from truncation by other women, they would
prefer not to bear the risk of truncation themselves.
Relaxing the uniform preferences assumption and returning to the envi-
ronment where players have arbitrary beliefs, we examine comparative statics.
We find that optimal truncation levels vary with risk preference: regardless
of beliefs over reported opponent preferences, the less risk-averse a player,
the more she should truncate.
6Recently, Ashlagi et al. (2013) have shown that the requirement that the number of
men and women is balanced is crucial for the existence of the large gap in expected ranks.
We discuss the robustness of our results to imbalances in the number of men and women
in Chapter 4.
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We then turn to correlation in players’ preferences. The correlated
preferences we consider are meant to capture the notion that in many settings,
agents largely agree in their preferences over partners on the other side of
the market, but that an individual’s preferences may idiosyncratically depart
from common opinion. We find that the higher the likelihood a participant
places on opponents having preferences similar to her own, the less she should
truncate. Our findings largely corroborate the simulation results of Roth and
Peranson (1999), who find that when preferences are correlated, the set of
stable matchings is small, and therefore the set of submitted preference lists
that could lead to gains is minimal. An important difference between our
correlation setting and Roth and Peranson’s is that we consider incomplete
information, where realized matchings may be unstable with respect to true
preferences (even while stable with respect to reported preferences).
To place this analysis in context, several comments are in order. While, for
the reasons stated earlier, we believe truncating the bottom of one’s list is an
intuitive manipulation in the preference list submission problem, in different
environments eliminating better-ranked members from one’s preference list
might be a reasonable strategy. For example, in the job market for economists,
departments may choose not to interview certain highly-accomplished can-
didates, reasoning that these candidates will receive offers they prefer more
(see Coles et al., 2010). In efforts to best use costly and scarce interview slots,
departments may effectively “top-truncate” their preferences lists, focusing
instead on candidates more likely to ultimately accept an offer. In general,
it is when market frictions generate costs that this behavior arises. Lee and
Schwarz (2012) consider a setting where information acquisition is costly, so
108
that firms prefer to interview workers who have a high likelihood of accepting
(and likelihood is based on the number and identity of other firms interviewing
a worker). Coles et al. (2013) consider a setting where workers can signal
their preferences to firms, so that firms may choose not to make offers to
better-ranked candidates, and instead make offers to candidates who have
indicated likeliness to accept. In our paper, the analysis is performed after
any costly information gathering has taken place, so these considerations do
not arise.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 lays out the
stable marriage setting and illustrates the fundamental tradeoff associated
with truncation. In Section 3.3 we characterize the return to truncation,
first for general beliefs, then in a uniform setting. In Section 3.4, we prove
the existence of a truncation equilibrium in symmetric settings, and explore
equilibrium welfare implications. Based on this existence result, we provide
simulation evidence for a significant degree of truncation in equilibrium.
Section 3.5 and Section 3.6 examine how truncation behavior relates to risk
preferences and correlation of agent preferences, respectively. Section 3.7
concludes.
3.2 Matching Markets Background
We begin by setting out the basic model of matching. In contrast to some
of the well-known matching papers, we approach the notion of preferences
of participants from a cardinal rather than an ordinal perspective, which
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allows us to discuss choice under uncertainty.7 Note, however, that standard
matching results involving ordinal preferences also apply as we may infer
preference orderings from cardinal utilities.
3.2.1 Marriage Markets and Stability
A marriage market of size N consists of a triplet (M,W, u), where M is the
set of men, W is the set of women, ∣M∣ = ∣W ∣ = N , and u = ∏
i∈M∪Wui is the
profile of preferences for men and women.8
Preferences um ∶ W ∪ {m} → R for man m ∈ M are given by a von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function in which m derives utility um(w) from
matching with woman w and um(m) from remaining single. For simplicity,
we assume that um is one-to-one, so that m is never indifferent between any
two certain options. Preferences uw for woman w ∈W are defined similarly
on M ∪ {w}.
As um is one-to-one,m’s preferences um induce a strict preference ordering
Pm overW∪{m}.We refer to Pm asm’s preference list. For example, if N = 3,
um(w1) > um(w3) > um(w2) > um(m) yields preference list (w1,w3,w2,m),
meaning m prefers woman w1 to w3 to w2 to being single. Note that men may
prefer bachelorhood over some of the women. For example, (w1,w3,m,w2)
indicates that m prefers w1 to w3 to remaining single to w2. We say that man
m finds w acceptable if m prefers w to remaining single. When convenient, we
7Some matching papers do manage to study choice under uncertainty even when
agents have only ordinal preferences. For example, Ehlers and Massó (2007) and Roth and
Rothblum (1999) use the related concepts of “Ordinal Bayesian Nash Equilibrium” and
“Pw-stochastic dominance,” respectively.
8The assumption ∣M∣ = ∣W ∣ was made for technical and notational convenience. How-
ever, it plays an important role in Theorem 4.1, as discussed in the Chapter 4.
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list only a man’s acceptable women. Preference lists for women are defined
similarly, and we let P denote the profile of preference lists.
A matching is a pairing of men and women, so that each woman is
assigned at most one man and each man at most one woman. Formally,
a matching µ is a mapping from M ∪W to M ∪W such that for every
m ∈M, µ(m) ∈ W ∪ {m}, and for every w ∈ W, µ(w) ∈M ∪ {w}, and also
for every m,w ∈M ∪W, µ(m) = w if and only if µ(w) =m. When µ(x) = x,
agent x is single or unmatched under matching µ. For agents that are not
single, we refer to µ(m) as m’s wife and µ(w) as w’s husband. The terms
partner and mate are also used. In a matching, each agent cares only about
his or her partner, and not about the partners of other agents, so that we
may discuss agent preferences over matchings.
Given preferences, a matching is stable if no agent desires to leave his
or her mate to remain single, and no pair of agents mutually desire to leave
their mates and pair with each other. Formally, given a matching µ, we say
that it is blocked by (m,w) if m prefers w to µ(m) and w prefers m to µ(w).
A matching µ is individually rational if for each x ∈M ∪W with µ(x) ≠ x,
x finds µ(x) acceptable. A matching µ is stable if it is individually rational
and is not blocked. In general, more than one stable matching may exist for
given preferences.
Given preferences, a woman w is achievable for m if there is some stable
matching µ in which w = µ(m). Achievable mates of women are defined
similarly.
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3.2.2 The Men-Proposing Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
In their seminal 1962 paper, Gale and Shapley prove that in any marriage
market there exists a stable matching. To demonstrate this result, they
propose an algorithm – the Men-Proposing Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
(MP-DA) – to generate a stable matching given any profile of preferences
lists.
MP-DA takes as its input a preference list profile P for agents M ∪W,
and the output is a matching µM [P ]. When P is clear from the context, we
write µM to denote µM [P ].9 The algorithm works iteratively as follows:
• Step 1. Each man proposes to the first woman on his preference
list. Each woman then considers her offers, rejects all men deemed
unacceptable, and if any others remain, rejects all but her most preferred
mate.
• Step k . Each man who was rejected in step k− 1 makes an offer to the
next woman on his preference list. If his preference list is exhausted,
or if he prefers bachelorhood to the next woman on his list, he makes
no offer. Each woman behaves as in step 1, considering offers in hand
(including any man she has retained from the previous step) and rejects
all but her most preferred acceptable suitor.
• Termination. If in any step k, no man makes an offer, the algorithm
terminates. Each woman is paired with her current mate and this
matching is final.
9In one-to-one markets, the women-proposing version of the algorithm (WP-DA) has
identical but reversed properties, with output denoted by µW [P ].
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Gale and Shapley show that this algorithm must terminate in finite time,
and they provide a remarkable characteristic of the resulting outcome.
Theorem. (Gale-Shapley) The matching µM resulting from MP-DA is stable.
Furthermore, for any other stable matching µ, every man weakly prefers µM
to µ and every woman weakly prefers µ to µM .
The stability of the matching produced by MP-DA offers numerous
advantages, as outlined in the introduction. But men are particularly satisfied
with this outcome. For the men, the algorithm produces the optimal stable
matching, based on reported preferences. For the women, however, this is
not the case. As we will see, this feature may mean some women prefer
to strategically misreport preferences, causing the algorithm to produce a
different matching.
3.2.3 The Preference List Submission Problem for Men
We now turn to the incentive properties of MP-DA. That is, in a setting
where agents are asked to submit preference lists to the algorithm, we ask if
they have an incentive to report something other than the truth. We will see
that women may, while men do not.
Consider a set of agents M ∪W. Agent i ∈M ∪W with preferences ui
must submit a preference list Pˆi to MP-DA, where Pˆi is chosen from the set
of i ’s possible preference lists Pi. The agent’s beliefs about what preference
lists others will report are represented by the random variable P˜−i, which
takes as its rangeP−i, the set of all possible preference list profiles for others.
Note that since ui is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, agent i
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may compare outcomes in this incomplete information setting.
Agent i solves the Preference List Submission Problem:
max
Pˆi∈PiE[ui(µM [Pˆi, P˜−i](i))].
Dubins and Freedman (1981) and Roth (1982) have shown that for any
man m with preferences um and beliefs P˜−m, it is optimal for m to submit
his true preference list Pm (which corresponds to um).
Theorem. (Dubins and Freedman; Roth) In the Preference List Submission
Problem,
Pm ∈ arg max
Pˆm∈Pm E[um(µM [Pˆm, P˜−m](m))].
3.2.4 The Preference List Submission Problem for Women
For women submitting preference lists to MP-DA, truth-telling may not be
optimal. One way a woman w might misrepresent preferences is by submitting
a truncation of her true preference list; that is, listing in order the first several
men from her true preference list and declaring all other men unacceptable.
Truncation generates a tradeoff: it may cause a woman to match with the
better-ranked men she leaves on her list, but may also cause her to be left
unmatched. In this section we demonstrate this tradeoff, pose the problem
of optimal truncation, and describe conditions so that in the Preference List
Submission Problem, among all possible preference list submission strategies,
truncation is optimal.
The following example demonstrates the tradeoff at hand.
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Example 3.1. Strategic Truncation. Suppose men and women have the
following preference lists:
m1 m2 m3 w1 w2 w3
w3 w2 w1 m1 m1 m1
w1 w1 w2 m2 m3 m2
w2 w3 w3 m3 m2 m3
.
We consider the strategic incentives of woman 1, assuming all other agents
report truthfully. First, suppose w1 submits her true preference list. In this
case, MP-DA stops after one step and w1 is matched tom3, her least preferred
mate. The stable matching is indicated above in bold.
Now suppose that w1 misrepresents her preferences and submits the
truncated list (m1,m2). In this case, she will reject man m3’s first round
offer in the MP-DA. Man m3 must then make an offer to w2 in the next
round. Woman w2 will accept m3 over m2, who made her an offer in the
previous round. Man m2 then finds himself single, and must make an offer
to w1. Woman w1 accepts m2’s offer and MP-DA terminates, yielding the
matching in bold below:
m1 m2 m3 w1 w2 w3
w3 w2 w1 m1 m1 m1
w1 w1 w2 m2 m3 m2
w2 w3 w3 m2 m3
.
Therefore, by truncating her list, w1 improves her outcome.
To see how truncation can be dangerous, suppose w1 truncates her list
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even more and submits (m1) only. In this case, the algorithm will leave her
unmatched, as shown in bold below:
m1 m2 m3 w1 w2 w3
w3 w2 w1 m1 m1 m1
w1 w1 w2 m3 m2
w2 w3 w3 m2 m3
.
Remark 3.1 characterizes woman w’s match when she submits a truncated
version of her preference list, demonstrating generally how truncation can
lead to the three outcomes in our example. For k ∈ {0, . . . ,N}, we denote by
P kw the preference list which includes in order only w’s k most preferred men,
and call this the k-truncation of her true preference list Pw. If fewer than k
men are acceptable to w, then P kw ≡ Pw.
Remark 3.1. Let P be the preference list profile of all agents inM∪W . Then
µM [P kw, P−w](w) is w’s least preferred achievable mate under P with rank≤ k. Should no such mate exist, µM [P kw, P−w](w) = w.
The example illustrates a general principle; given the preference lists sub-
mitted by others, truncation by woman w can have one of three consequences:
1. No effect. Woman w has truncated below her least preferred achievable
mate.
2. Improvement. Woman w truncates above her least preferred mate, and
is matched with her least preferred achievable mate above the point of
truncation.
3. Unmatched. Woman w has over-truncated, truncating above her most
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preferred achievable mate.
If woman w is certain of the preference lists P−w others are submitting, her
truncation decision is simple: she calculates her most preferred achievable
mate under P = (Pw, P−w) and truncates her list to just include him. If
instead w believes her opponents will submit preference lists according to
some probability distribution, then truncating her list at k generates a lottery
over outcomes in which either her partner will be among her k most preferred
men, or else she will be unmatched. This tradeoff, between improvement and
becoming unmatched, will guide our analysis in this paper.
Optimality of Truncation
Truncation is not the only possible misrepresentation of preferences. A woman
could reverse two men in her preference list, list men as acceptable who are
in fact unacceptable, drop men from the middle of her list, or use some
combination of these. However, under some conditions, truncation is optimal.
The next proposition states that under certainty, women can do no better
than to truncate (Roth and Vande Vate, 1991).
Proposition. (Roth and Vande Vate) Suppose woman w has preferences uw
and knows others will report preference lists P−w to MP-DA. Then truncating
such that µW (w) is the last acceptable partner on her list is an optimal
strategy for w.
Perhaps surprisingly, when a woman has very little information about
the preference lists others might report, she again can do no better than to
truncate. In order to gain from non-truncation misrepresentations, such as
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swapping the positions of two men in her reported preference list, a woman
must have very specific information about the preference lists others report.
Without such information, it is best to leave the men in their correct order.
Roth and Rothblum (1999) demonstrate this principle using the following
framework.
Let woman w’s beliefs about reported preference lists of others be rep-
resented by P˜−w, a random variable taking on values in P−w. If P−w is a
preference list profile for agents −w, define Pm↔m′−w to be the preference list
profile in which m and m′ swap preference lists, and all women swap the
positions of m and m′ in their lists. We say that woman w’s beliefs are(m,m′)-symmetric if Pr(P˜−w = P−w) = Pr(P˜−w = Pm↔m′−w ) for all P−w ∈P−w.
For a subset M′ ⊆ M, beliefs P˜−w are M′-symmetric if they are (m,m′)-
symmetric for all m,m′ ∈M′.
Theorem. (Roth and Rothblum) Suppose w’s beliefs about reported preference
lists of others areM-symmetric. Then any preference list Pˆw she might submit
to MP-DA is weakly Pw-stochastically dominated by some truncation of her
true preference list.10
Hence, when w is certain about reported preference lists of her opponents,
or when she has extreme, symmetric uncertainty, truncation is optimal.
10Pˆw is Pw-stochastically dominated by Pˆ ′w iff for any vNM utility function that
corresponds to Pw, the expected utility from submitting Pˆ ′w is at least as great as the
expected utility from submitting Pˆw.
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The Truncation Problem
Even when truncation is not optimal, we may sometimes wish to restrict the
choice set for women to truncations of her true preference list. We define
the Truncation Problem for woman w with preferences uw and beliefs P˜−w
on others’ submitted preference lists as
max
k∈{0,...,N}E[uw(µM [P kw, P˜−w](w))].
For convenience, whenever we consider the Truncation Problem for a woman
w, we will relabel men so that w has uw(m1) > uw(m2) > . . . > uw(mN).
3.3 Characterizing Truncation Payoffs
In this section we explore a woman’s payoff from submitting a truncation
of her true preference list. We first derive a formula for her payoff from
truncating at any point in her list in terms of the distribution of her most
and least preferred achievable mates. When a woman believes that reported
preference lists of her opponents are distributed symmetrically over the set
of all preference lists, we can say more about her gains from truncation:
conditional on truncation yielding an improvement, w ’s expected partner
rank will be exactly half of (1 + her point of truncation). Further, in uniform
markets, it is highly likely that for an individual woman, some degree of
truncation will yield an improvement, and that, in fact, she may safely and
beneficially truncate a large fraction of her list. We demonstrate that as
the market grows large, the length of a woman’s optimal reported list, as a
fraction of her full preference list length, goes to zero. Hence, even in a setting
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where agents possess very little information about opponent preferences, there
is room for significant strategic misrepresentation.
3.3.1 Truncation in Two Stages: Match, then Divorce
To aid us in our analysis, we show that when woman w submits a k -truncation
of her preference list to MP-DA, the outcome is identical to that from a two
stage Divorcing Algorithm. In the first stage of the algorithm, agents submit
preference lists to MP-DA. In the second stage, w ‘divorces’ her mate and
declares all men with rank ≥ k unacceptable. This sets off a chain of new
offers and proposals, ending in a new match.11
The Divorcing Algorithm takes as its input a set P of preference lists, a
woman w, and a truncation point k ∈ {0, . . . ,N}, and generates a matching
µDIV [P, k,w].
The Divorcing Algorithm
• Step 0. Initialization. Run MP-DA to find the men-optimal matching
µM [P ]. If w is single or if w’s mate has rank ≤ k in Pw, terminate.
Otherwise, divorce w from her mate. Declare candidates with rank ≥ k
unacceptable for w.
Iteration over steps 1 and 2:
• Step 1. Pick an arbitrary single man who has not exhausted his
preference list. If no such man exists, terminate.
11Our Divorcing Algorithm is closely related to the techniques used in McVitie and
Wilson (1971), where a “breakmarriage” operation is used to generate all the stable
matchings for a given marriage market.
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• Step 2. The man chosen in the previous step makes an offer to the most
preferred woman on his preference list who has not already rejected
him. If this woman finds the man acceptable and she prefers him to
her current mate (or is single), she divorces (if necessary) and holds the
new man’s offer. Return to step 1.
The Divorcing Algorithm yields a matching identical to the output from w’s
submission of a k -truncated list to MP-DA:
Proposition 3.1. For all k ∈ {0, . . . ,N}, P ∈ P and w ∈ W, we have
µDIV [P, k,w] = µM [P kw, P−w].
With this equivalence in hand, when we consider the submission of a
truncated preference list, we can think of it as a two stage process, focusing
on the chain of offers (if there is one) in the Divorcing Algorithm. We will be
interested in whether a chain will end with i) a new acceptable man proposing
to woman w, or with ii) a single man making an acceptable offer to a single
woman in W /w, or else exhausting his list. These outcomes correspond to
truncation yielding an improvement over truthful reporting, and truncation
leaving w unmatched, respectively. Knowing that following a “divorce,” w
will receive at most one more offer will enable us to calculate the returns to
truncation, conditional on truncation yielding an improvement.
3.3.2 Truncation under General Beliefs
In this section, we characterize woman w’s payoff from submitting a truncated
version of her true preference list in terms of the distributions of her most
and least preferred achievable mates. The results build on Remark 3.1, which
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illustrates how in settings of certainty, a woman may gain, lose or see no
change from truncation.
We consider the Truncation Problem for woman w with preferences uw
and beliefs P˜−w about reports of other agents. Throughout the section, uw
(and hence, Pw) is fixed, so we can denote w’s payoff from k-truncation when
others submit preference lists P−w as
v(k,P−w) ≡ uw(µM [P kw, P−w](w)).
Note that v(N,P−w) gives w’s payoff if she reports truthfully, and v(k,P−w) =
uw(w) if k-truncation leaves w unmatched. The Truncation Problem then
becomes
max
k∈{0,...,N}E[v(k, P˜−w)].
To evaluate E[v(k, P˜−w)], we condition on the three possible effects of trun-
cation: no effect, improvement, and causing w to become unmatched.
Define kl(P−w) and kh(P−w) to be w’s rank of her mate under µM [P ]
and µW [P ], respectively. That is, kl(P−w) (kh(P−w)) gives the rank of w’s
least (most) preferred achievable mate when −w report preference lists P−w.
Set kl(P−w) = kh(P−w) = N + 1 when w has no achievable mate. Let f(⋅) be
the probability mass function of the random variable kl(P˜−w) so that
f(x) = Pr(kl(P˜−w) = x)
for x ∈ {1, . . . ,N + 1}. Let F (⋅) be the associated cumulative distribution
function. Similarly, let g(⋅) be the probability mass function and G(⋅) be the
cumulative distribution function of the random variable kh(P˜−w).
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Using F (⋅), G(⋅), and Remark 3.1, we can express w’s expected payoff
from k-truncating her list by using the law of conditional expectations:
E[v(k, P˜−w)] = F (k) ⋅ ∑ki=1 f(i)F (k)uw(mi)+ [G(k) − F (k)] ⋅ E[v(k, P˜−w) ∣ P˜−w ∈P2(k)]+ [1 −G(k)] ⋅ uw(w),
(3.3.2.1)
where the set P2(k) ≡ {P−w ∣ v(k,P−w) > v(N,P−w)} gives the cases when
truncation yields an improvement, compared to truthful reporting. When
truncation causes w to be unmatched, her payoff is clearly uw(w), and
when truncation has no effect, the likelihood of being matched with x is
f(x)/F (x).12
In the next two sections, we will focus on the middle term of the sum in
3.3.2.1; that is, the cases where truncation yields improvement. We will first
see that when there are gains, the improvement can be significant. We will
see later that in large markets, these gains may outweigh the risk of being
left unmatched.
3.3.3 Truncation under M-Symmetric Beliefs
In this section, we examine the Truncation Problem when woman w hasM-symmetric beliefs. We show that conditional on w’s truncation yielding an
improvement compared to truthful reporting, her mate is equally likely to be
any man she lists as acceptable. This is somewhat surprising, because when
w has unconditional M-symmetric beliefs and submits preferences in the
MP-DA, we would certainly not expect w’s mate to be uniformly distributed;
12If F (k) = 0, the first term in the sum is zero.
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because of the stability requirement, she is far more likely to be matched
with her more preferred mates.
Lemma. (Truncation under M-Symmetric Beliefs) Suppose woman w’s be-
liefs P˜−w about the reported preference lists of her opponents areM-symmetric.
Then according to her beliefs,
Pr{µM [P kw, P˜−w](w) =mi ∣P˜−w ∈P2(k)} = Pr{µM [P kw, P˜−w](w) =mj ∣P˜−w ∈P2(k)}
for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,N}, i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Hence,
E[v(k, P˜−w) ∣ P˜−w ∈P2(k)] = ∑ki=1 uw(mi)
k
.
The intuition in this result comes from the Divorcing Algorithm. Consider
the settings where k -truncation will yield an improvement for w (P−w ∈
P2(k)). By first reporting her true preferences and then divorcing her mate,
we know that there will ensue a chain of offers. This chain ends when exactly
one man – ranked better than her former mate – will make an offer to w. By
the symmetry of w’s beliefs, this is equally likely to be any of these men.
Crucial to the reasoning is that since we know truncation will yield an
improvement, this corresponds to an algorithmic outcome where exactly one
new superior offer is made to w. In MP-DA generally, multiple offers may
be made to w, making it difficult to pinpoint the distribution of her mate’s
rank.13
13This result is related to the Principle of Deferred Decisions (“don’t do today what
you can put off until tomorrow”), which was applied to the stable marriage problem in
Knuth (1976). We may think of woman w as deferring her views on her preferences over
men {1, . . . , k} until she actually receives an offer from one of them. When the first one
arrives, only then does she assign the man a rank, which in expectation will be 1+k
2
.
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With our Lemma in hand, we can now express w’s expected payoff from
truncation at k as
E[v(k, P˜−w)] = F (k) ⋅ ∑ki=1 f(i)F (k)uw(mi)+ [G(k) − F (k)] ⋅ ∑ki=1 uw(mi)k+ [1 −G(k)] ⋅ uw(w).
(3.3.3.1)
3.3.4 Optimal Truncation in Large Markets
We now investigate optimal truncation for women when the market size grows
large. We will focus on the special case of uniform beliefs. That is, when
facing the Truncation Problem, w believes reported preference lists P−w of her
opponents to be chosen uniformly and randomly from the set of all possible
full preference list profilesP−w (where a full preference list profile is a profile
in which each agent prefers any possible mate to being unmatched). Uniform
beliefs are a special case of M-symmetric beliefs.14 Hence, under uniform
beliefs, we can be sure that truncation is optimal.
The stable marriage problem under uniform beliefs has received attention,
especially in the mathematics and computer science literature, in large part
because this setting facilitates average and worst case analyses (see Dzierzawa
and Oméro, 2000; Knuth, 1976; Pittel, 1989). But for our purposes, uniform
beliefs offer a tractable incomplete information setting where agents know
little about the preferences of others.
14But uniformity is not equivalent to M-symmetry. Under M-symmetric beliefs, a
woman may have specific knowledge about how the men rank her. For example, she may
know that all the men prefer her to w2. With uniform beliefs, such knowledge is ruled out.
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Suppose that woman w has preferences uw(⋅) linear in the rank of her
match (where being unmatched is treated as rank N + 1), or else has any
strictly increasing, convex transformation of such preferences. Suppose further
that w has uniform beliefs. Define
k∗(N) ≡ max⎛⎝arg maxk∈{0,...,N}E[uw(µM [P kw, P˜−w](w))]⎞⎠ .
For a market of size N, k∗(N) describes woman w ’s optimal point of trunca-
tion, given that the other women submit their true preference lists. If there
are multiple optima, we conservatively select that which involves the least
truncation. We now have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. Let woman w have uniform beliefs and preferences linear in
rank (or any strictly increasing, convex transformation of such preferences).
Then lim
N→∞ k∗(N)N = 0.
Theorem 4.1 states that as the market size grows large, the fraction of
the list that an individual woman optimally truncates goes to 100%.15 Note
that under uniform beliefs, Roth and Rothblum’s optimality theorem applies.
Hence, the aggressive truncation strategies described in the theorem are the
best overall strategies, not just the optimal truncation strategies.
The intuition behind this theorem can be gleaned from statistical facts
about the most and least preferred achievable mates for women. In large
markets where preferences are uniform, the expected rank of the most pre-
ferred achievable mate of a woman (which is the same as the expected rank
15We thank a referee for pointing out that this theorem will continue to hold if all
agents drew uniformly at random preferences of length αN for α ∈ (0,1). We omit formal
proof of this statement which would require slight adaptations to the theorems that we
cite in our own proof.
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of her mate under WP-DA) is very low relative to the length of her list; it
asymptotes to logN (Pittel, 1989). This suggests that a woman may safely
truncate a large fraction of her list with little risk of becoming unmatched.
Furthermore, the expected rank of a woman’s match under MP-DA is signifi-
cantly worse, asymptoting to NlogN (Pittel, 1989). In fact, for large markets,
Pittel (1992) proved that the worst-off wife will be matched with a husband
at the bottom of her list with probability approaching 1. This large gap in a
woman’s expected most and least preferred achievable mates suggests that
not only is it safe to truncate a large fraction of one’s list in large markets,
but that a woman will also generate gains from such a truncation. See the
appendix for the details of the proof, and Chapter 4 for a discussion of the
unbalanced case in which these properties cease to hold (Ashlagi et al., 2013).
To get a sense of the impact of truncation and to see examples of optimal
truncation levels, we simulate markets of size N = 10, 100, 1, 000, and 10, 000
(Figure 3.1). In each market, we randomly generate a full preference list for
each agent, and calculate an individual woman’s payoff from truncating at
each point in {0, . . . ,N}, where a woman’s payoff is given by (N + 1)− her
partner’s rank. We then iterate 100,000 times and average her payoffs.16
Observe that under truthful reporting, w ’s payoff (given by the right hand
side intercepts) is very close to NlogN , the asymptotic limit found in Pittel
(1989). Even in the largest market we simulated, N = 10,000, w ’s payoff at
16Formally, we are estimating E[v(k, P˜−w)], the expectation of a random variable, by
averaging many independent draws of v(k, P˜−w). With 100,000 draws, the 95% confidence
intervals around each estimate of E[v(k, P˜−w)] are so small that they are imperceptible
when drawn on the graphs. For example, when N = 1,000 and k = 500, the estimate of
E[v(500, P˜−w)] is 874.5, and the 95% confidence interval is (873.8, 875.2).
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Figure 3.1: Simulation Results for Truncation Payoffs. The graphs display(N + 1)− an individual woman’s expected partner rank from truncating her list at
each point k ∈ {0, . . . ,N} and submitting these preferences to MP-DA. Preference
lists of the other agents are uniformly random, selected from the set of all possible
full length preference list profiles, and payoffs are averaged over 100,000 draws.
Markets are of size 10, 100, 1,000 and 10,000.
the peak is roughly 10% higher than her payoff from truthful reporting. Note
further that in each market, peak utility is lower than N + 1 − logN , the
asymptotic expected rank of a woman’s most preferred achievable mate. A
woman will never be able to do better than this, even with perfect information
about reported preferences of others.
In each of the graphs in Figure 3.1, and especially when N = 1,000 and
N = 10,000, there is a flat area on the right hand side. These lower levels of
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truncation are unlikely to have any impact on payoffs – indeed establishing
this is a crucial step in the proof of Theorem 4.1. Additional truncation can
generate better mates, but still bears little risk of over-truncation. Finally,
for extreme levels of truncation there is a high probability of over-truncation,
leading to a steep dropoff in payoffs. As N grows larger, the “safe range”
increases: we obtain larger flat zones and peaks moving to the left.
3.4 Truncation Equilibria and Welfare
In this section we consider the Bayesian game in which agents must submit
preference lists to MP-DA. We demonstrate that in equilibria in truncation
strategies, compared to outcomes from truthful preference list reporting,
welfare for men is lower, welfare for women is greater, and the expected
number of matches is lower. When there are multiple equilibria that can
be compared in degree of truncation, women prefer the equilibrium where
they truncate most, while men prefer the equilibrium where they truncate
least. In uniform markets, we demonstrate the existence of a symmetric
equilibrium in truncation strategies, but asymmetric equilibria may also
exist. In a truncation equilibrium where some women truncate more than
others, the women who truncate less receive higher payoffs. That is, while
across equilibria women prefer to see higher degrees of truncation, within an
equilibrium, they prefer not to be the ones bearing the risk of truncating.
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3.4.1 Equilibria under General Preferences
Define the Preference List Submission Game as follows: Let U be a finite
subset of the set of all possible utility profiles for I =M ∪W and φ(⋅) be
a distribution over U . Let the message space of any agent i ∈ I be Pi, the
set of all possible strict preference lists for player i, with P =∏
i
Pi. Recall
that µM [P ] gives the MP-DA matching for reported preference lists P . The
Preference List Submission Game is the Bayesian game described by
⟨I,P, µM [⋅], U, φ(⋅)⟩ .
A pure strategy for agent i is a mapping si ∶ Ui →Pi, and a mixed strategy
for i is a mapping σi ∶ Ui → ∆(Pi) which describes a randomization over
submitted preference lists for each possible type. Define a truncation strategy
for woman w as a strategy in which w mixes over truncations of her true
preference list. For any two truncation strategies σw and σ′w for a woman
w, we say that σw involves more truncation than σ′w if the distribution over
truncation points induced by σw first order stochastically dominates the
distribution induced by σ′w.
We will restrict attention to equilibria where men report preferences
truthfully, an assumption motivated by the dominant-strategy result of
Dubins and Freedman (1981) and Roth (1982).17 Define a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium σ = (σm1 , . . . , σmN , σw1 , . . . , σwN ) in which men report truthfully
and women mix over truncation strategies as an equilibrium in truncation
strategies. The following theorem describes welfare in such equilibria.
17If we ignore this requirement, there is always a trivial equilibrium in which all players
submit an empty list.
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Theorem 3.2. Let σ and σ′ be equilibria in truncation strategies in which
each woman truncates more under σ than under σ′. Then compared to the
outcomes in σ′, under σ,
i) welfare for women is weakly greater
ii) welfare for men is weakly lower
iii) the expected number of matches is weakly lower.
Furthermore, under both σ and σ′, i), ii) and iii) hold in comparison to the
outcomes from truthful reporting of preferences to MP-DA.
The results of Theorem 3.2 can be obtained by considering the effect of
incremental truncations in light of Proposition 3.1. An incremental truncation
by a woman w can only negatively affect the welfare of men: a “divorced” man
will receive a worse mate, and the chain of offers that follows can only lead
to worse mates for the other men as well. Since the chain will end in an offer
accepted by some woman, or else in no match, the incremental truncation
weakly decreases the number of matches. This logic underpins results ii) and
iii). At the same time, incremental truncation by a woman has a (weakly)
positive spillover on the welfare of other women: rejection of a man can only
lead to more offers for other women. The spillover from the truncation of
other women, together with her best response requirement, imply that each
woman weakly prefers the equilibrium with more truncation, and that any
truncation equilibrium is preferred to truthful reporting.
Theorem 3.2 is similar in spirit to Kojima (2006) and Konishi and Ünver
(2006) who show that in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern
markets, every hospital prefers a Nash equilibrium to any reported profile
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of larger capacities. Theorem 3.2 also brings to mind the welfare result
in Coles et al. (2013), in which signaling equilibria with varying cutoffs are
compared. In each of these settings, actions by one side of the market –
capacity reduction in Kojima (2006) and Konishi and Ünver (2006), signaling
by women in Coles et al. (2013), and truncation in this paper – serve to “shift
the balance of power.” When there are equilibria with varying degrees of
action, the sides of the market are at odds over which equilibrium is preferred,
and whether any action is desirable at all.18
3.4.2 Equilibria in Uniform Markets
Let a uniform market be the setting in which each agent is equally likely
to have any full preference list. Additionally, agent utility depends on
partner rank, agents identically value a match with their rth ranked choice∀ r ∈ {1, . . . ,N}, and have identical value to being unmatched.
Theorem 3.3. In uniform markets, there exists a symmetric equilibrium((σm)N , (σw)N) where men each use the strategy σm of truthful reporting and
women each use the strategy σw, which is a mixture over truncation strategies.
Proof. We begin by constructing an auxiliary game. In this game, the
set of players is the same as in the original game, the set of pure strategies
for each woman is {0,1, ...,N}, and men all have one strategy, {N}. States
of the world are profiles of preferences, which are realized with the same
18Another paper that bears mention is Ashlagi and Klijn (2012), which considers “group
manipulations in truncation strategies” by women in the MP-DA. Such manipulations
weakly benefit other women and harm other men. The results in Ashlagi and Klijn (2012)
differ from ours, as we focus on equilibria and on incomplete information.
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probability distribution as in the original game, but now players learn neither
the preferences of others, nor their own preferences. Payoffs are defined
according to the same utility function as in the original game, where each
player receives the payoff from being matched to his stable partner under the
profiles truncated at levels corresponding to the pure strategies chosen.
A standard argument due to Nash (1951) shows that the auxiliary game
has an equilibrium, symmetric with respect to women. It is easy to see that
this remains an equilibrium in the game where players observe their own
preferences (but not the preferences of others) before choosing an action
(truncation). Finally, returning to the unrestricted game, we recall Roth
and Rothblum’s optimality of truncation theorem from Section 4.2.3. Since
men are playing dominant strategies, and since the strategies yield M-
symmetric beliefs, we conclude that the profile of strategies that we found
is an equilibrium in the game where strategies are unrestricted. If it were
not, then some woman could do strictly better by using a non-truncation
strategy. But since each woman w’s beliefs in this setting are M-symmetric,
a truncation strategy weakly dominates this non-mixed strategy, which yields
a contradiction.19 ◻
In addition to symmetric equilibria, asymmetric equilibria may exist. The
following example illustrates this.
19Using the same proof technique and following Ehlers (2008), we can also prove
that in uniform matching markets that use an anonymous mechanism satisfying positive
association, individual rationality, and independence of truncations, there exists a non-
trivial equilibrium in which all men play the same truncation strategy and all women play
the same truncation strategy. This class of mechanisms includes all priority mechanisms
and all linear programming mechanisms introduced in British entry-level medical markets
and in public school choice in some American cities.
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Example 3.2. Consider a 2×2 uniform market. Suppose each woman derives
utility 10 from being matched to her top choice, 1 from being matched to her
second choice, and 0 otherwise. We first calculate the probability of three
events:
A = {There is a unique stable matching, and in this matching w1 is
matched to her top choice}
B = {There is a unique stable matching, and in this matching w1 is
matched to her second choice}
C = (A ∪B)c = {There are two stable matchings}
A simple calculation shows that P (A) = 58 , P (B) = 28 and P (C) = 18 .
Now suppose agents report preferences to MP-DA. If the other agents
are truthful, w1 should truncate her list to include only her most preferred
man (thus earning 68 × 10 > 58 × 10+ 38 × 1). But if w1 truncates her list in this
manner, w2 has no incentive to truncate at all. Even if it turns out there
was room for beneficial truncation (event C ), w1 has already done the “hard
work” of truncating. She bears the risk of becoming unmatched, but also
shifts the outcome from one matching to the other, improving payoffs for
both women. ◻
Several observations can be made from this example. First, payoffs are
higher in this equilibrium than under truthful reporting, as predicted by
Theorem 3.2. Second, when w1 truncates more, w2 prefers to truncate less.
While we don’t have a result that truncation under uniform preferences is a
case of strategic substitutes, this example (and simulation evidence in Figure
3.3) stand in contrast to the complete information world where truncation
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strategies are strategic complements. There, when some woman wi truncates,
this can only improve (or leave unchanged) the most preferred achievable
mate for each wj . Under complete information, this translates to a (weakly)
greater optimal degree of truncation.
Another observation from the example is that w2’s utility is 68 × 10+ 28 × 1,
which is greater than the utility of w1, which is 68 × 10. That is, the agent
who truncates less has greater utility than the agent who truncates more.
In uniform markets, this result generalizes: within asymmetric truncation
equilibria, we have a crisp preference among women against truncation.
Theorem 3.4 encapsulates this.
Theorem 3.4. Consider any asymmetric equilibrium in a uniform market
where w1 truncates more than w2 (in the sense of first order stochastic
dominance). Then i) if w1 and w2 swap strategies, the resulting profile will
also be an equilibrium and ii) w2 prefers the original equilibrium, in which
she truncates less.
Intuitively, w1 and w2 face the same opposition except for one feature:
each woman “competes” with the other, but not with herself. Woman 2, who
truncates less, benefits from facing competition in which the other woman
truncates more. Given that w1 is willing to take the risk of this truncation,
w2 no longer feels compelled to do so herself.20
20A more general version of Theorem 3.4 also holds. For any Preference Submission
Game with two “symmetric” women, i) and ii) remain valid.
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3.4.3 Simulations: Finding a Symmetric Equilibrium
In this section we run simulations to explore equilibria in a uniform market.
We assume that agents care about the rank of their partners (as in Figure
3.1, graphed as N + 1−rank, so that the graphs display maxima rather than
minima), and we examine a market with N = 30. The simulations suggest that
under these assumptions, there is a pure strategy symmetric equilibrium with
a common truncation point that involves a non-trivial degree of truncation.
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Figure 3.2: Woman w’s expected payoff in a uniform market as a function of
her truncation point when women W /{w} truncate at j. N = 30. Iterations =
1,000,000.
We first examine how returns to truncation for w change when other
women also truncate their lists. In Figure 3.2 we examine the effect on w’s
payoffs when womenW /{w} all truncate at a common point j, where j takes
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on various values. For lower j, curves for w are higher. This follows from
the positive spillover of truncation: when W /{w} truncate their lists, this
benefits woman w.
In Figure 3.2 it is also apparent that as w’s opponents truncate more,
e.g., from j = 30 to j = 25 to j = 15, etc., w should truncate less: as j
increases, peaks move to the right. As in Example 3.2, this stands in contrast
to the complete information result where truncation strategies are strategic
complements. Note that at the extreme, when j = 1, w can never benefit from
truncation. Since truncation still bears risk, her optimal degree of truncation
in this case is N = 30.
Observe also that whenW /{w} submit very short lists, e.g., j ∈ {1, 5, 10},
w’s optimal truncation point is hard to observe because her payoff curve
becomes very flat. The reasons for this flatness are two-fold: When other
women submit very short lists, the expected number of stable matchings is
known to be small (see Immorlica and Mahdian, 2005). Hence, there are
minimal opportunities for beneficial truncation. At the same time, when other
women truncate, the expected partner rank for w is very low (favorable). This
leaves little danger that moderate levels of truncation will leave w unmatched.
The minimal rewards and risks to truncation lead to the flatness of payoff
curves.
By running a very large number of iterations, we identify the peaks of
the curves in Figure 3.2. This exercise corroborates the hypothesis that
under uniform preferences, truncation is a case of strategic substitutes. As
illustrated in Figure 3.3, the optimal truncation point for w is inversely
related to j, the common truncation point of women W /{w}. Of course, due
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to the flatness of the expected payoff graph, optimal truncation points for
small j are “just barely” optimal.
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Figure 3.3: Optimal truncation point of woman w in a uniform market as a
function of the common truncation point j of women W /{w}. N = 30. Iterations =
10,000,000.
By overlaying the 45○ line, we identify the point of truncation in a pure
strategy symmetric equilibrium to be 14, more than a 50 percent truncation
of the entire list.21 When all women truncate at this common point, no single
woman sees significant gains from truncation compared to truthful reporting.
However, since truncation has a positive externality on other women, the
21To test whether this is indeed a symmetric equilibrium, we “guess and verify.” We
repeatedly sample w’s payoffs under (k, j) where k is w’s truncation point and j is the
common truncation point of W /{w}, and establish that w ’s payoffs under (14,14) are
sufficiently distant from those under (15,14), (13,14), and other profiles. To do this, we
construct confidence intervals around (14,14) and, using different draws, around other
profiles. We observe that these intervals have an empty intersection.
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equilibrium payoff is non-trivially greater than the payoff should all women
report truthfully (see Figure 3.2).
This equilibrium potentially leads to ex-post instability with respect to
true preferences. Some women might over-truncate and be left unmatched.
More subtly, when other women truncate, woman w may be paired with a
mate that is not achievable under the true preferences.
These instabilities suggest a possible application of these results: the
impact of strategic behavior on a post-market “scramble” for positions. Since
truncation can lead to unmatched participants following the match, a second,
organized match might be helpful to find partners for these agents. Indeed,
post-market scrambles have been organized in both the market for medical
residents as well as in the job market for new economists.22
At first observation, an organized scramble would reduce the downside
to remaining unmatched in the primary match. But this might induce
additional risk-taking behavior (more truncation) by participants. Such
behavior would increase the pool size in the second match, raising the value
of being unmatched, inducing even more truncation. A secondary match might
ultimately enjoy high participation levels, but only because it has drawn
participants away from the primary match, complicating overall welfare
analysis.
22The NRMP offers the “Supplemental Offer and Acceptance Pro-
gram” (SOAP), which replaced a somewhat less orderly scramble (see
http://www.nrmp.org/2012springmeeting.pdf). The American Economic Associa-
tion organizes the “Scramble” in which candidates seeking jobs and employers with
positions open late in the job market can announce their availability on the AEA website
(see http://www.aeaweb.org/joe/scramble).
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3.5 Truncation and Risk Aversion
While gains to truncation can be significant, truncation is nevertheless a risky
strategy. When w’s opponents truncate, truncation for w is particularly risky:
compared to truthful reporting, optimal truncation offers minimal benefit,
and over-truncating can lead to large losses. One might expect agents with
more conservative attitudes toward risk to shy away from this proposition.
In this section, we ask how a woman’s truncation behavior varies as we vary
her attitude towards risk.
We consider a general setting, with arbitrary preferences for woman w
and beliefs about reported preferences of others. Let ψ(⋅) be any strictly
increasing, concave transformation. We will show that for any beliefs about
others, woman w with preferences uw(⋅) will truncate more than a woman
wψ who has identical beliefs, but preferences given by ψ(uw(⋅)).
Recall that when we fix w′s preferences to be uw(⋅), we defined shorthand
v(k,P−w) ≡ uw(µM [P kw, P−w](w)),
her payoff from submitting truncated preference list P kw. Now define
vψ(k,P−w) ≡ ψ(uw(µM [P kw, P−w](w)),
the payoff from submitting truncated preference list P kw for a woman wψ with
preferences ψ(uw(⋅)).
The following theorem states that if w prefers truncating less to more,
then wψ definitely prefers truncating less to more.
Theorem 3.5. Let P˜−w be any random variable distributed over P−w. Then
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∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,N − 1},∀t ∈ {1, . . . ,N − k} we have
E [v(k, P˜−w)] ≤ E [v(k + t, P˜−w)] ⇒
E [vψ(k, P˜−w)] ≤ E [vψ(k + t, P˜−w)] .
Furthermore, if i) ψ(⋅) is strictly concave, and ii) under P˜−w, each man is
achievable for w with positive probability, then the second inequality is strict.
The constructive proof nicely illustrates incremental truncation analysis,
so we provide it in-text.
Proof. We begin with the proof for t = 1. An analogous argument works for
all other t in the given range, with necessary proof adjustments described
at the end. Our technique focuses on two lotteries over outcomes. Let Qk+1
be the lottery over mates for w when she truncates at k + 1, and let Qk be
the lottery when she truncates at k. Our goal is now to show that if Qk
is mean-decreasing as compared to Qk+1 from w’s perspective (in terms of
her von Neumann-Morgenstern utility), then it will be mean-decreasing from
wψ’s perspective as well.
Distributions Qk+1 and Qk are shown in Figure 3.4. Recalling Proposition
3.1, k-truncating is equivalent to (k + 1)-truncating followed by k-truncating.
That is, lottery Qk is equivalent to starting with lottery Qk+1, then rolling
the die again if w receives her (k + 1) ranked choice. Hence,
qki ≥ qk+1i ∀i ∈ {1, .., k} ∪ {w}.
Let shorthand ui(Q), i ∈ {w,wψ} describe i’s expected utility from lot-
tery Q. Suppose first that uw(Qk) = uw(Qk+1), that is, E [v(k, P˜−w)] =
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E [v(k + 1, P˜−w)], so that from w’s perspective, Qk is a mean-preserving
spread of Qk+1. Then by Jensen’s inequality, uwψ(Qk) ≤ uwψ(Qk+1) . If
ψ(⋅) is strictly concave and Qk ≠ Qk+1 (which follows from ii) ), then
uwψ(Qk) < uwψ(Qk+1).
Now suppose that uw(Qk) < uw(Qk+1), so that from w’s perspective,
Qk is mean-decreasing as compared to Qk+1. We will now construct an
intermediate lottery Q′ such that
1. Qk+1 Pw-stochastically dominates Q′ and
2. From w’s perspective, Qk is a mean preserving spread of Q′.
Define lottery Q′ so that Q′ is identical to Qk+1, except that we replace
outcome k + 1 (w’s (k + 1) ranked choice) with lottery α(k + 1) + (1 − α)w.
Choose α ∈ [0,1] such that w has uw(Q′) = uw(Qk). Such an α must exist:
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when α = 1, Q′ = Qk+1, and when α = 0, uw(Q′) ≤ uw(Qk). Our desired α
follows from the Intermediate Value Theorem.
By construction, Qk+1 Pw-stochastically dominates Q′. With respect to
w’s utility, we also have that Qk is second order stochastically dominated by
Q′. To see this, observe that Q′ was constructed to have the same mean as
Qk, and that compared to Q′, Qk shifts probability mass to the extremes:
qkj ≥ q′j for j ∈ {1, .., k} ∪ {w}.
Since Pw = Pwψ , by Pw-stochastic dominance, wψ also strictly prefers
Qk+1 to Q′. By Jensen’s inequality, wψ weakly prefers Q′ to Qk. Hence,
uwψ(Qk) < uwψ(Qk+1),
so the theorem is proved for t = 1.
When t > 1, we may again construct an intermediate lottery Q′ , this time
that transfers weight from {k + 1, k + 2, . . . , k + t} to the unmatched option
w. Just as before, we can construct Q′ to ensure that Qk+1 Pw-stochastically
dominates Q′ , and that from w’s perspective, Qk is a mean preserving spread
of Q′. The key insight is that truncation transfers probability mass to the
extremes: the most preferred mates, as well as the unmatched option. ◻
We can now use Theorem 4.5 to sort optimal truncation points based on
degree of concavity.
Corollary 3.1. Let kli be the minimum optimal truncation point (by rank)
and let khi be the maximum optimal truncation point for woman i ∈ {w,wψ}.
Then klw ≤ klwψ and khw ≤ khwψ . Furthermore, if conditions i) and ii) from
Theorem 4.5 hold, then khw ≤ klwψ .
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Proof. If klw is w’s minimum optimal truncation point, then w strictly
prefers truncation at klw to truncation at any k < klw. Following the reasoning
of Theorem 4.5, wψ must then prefer truncation at klw to truncation at any
k < klw. Hence, klw ≤ klwψ . A similar argument can be used to show khw ≤ khwψ .
If khw is w’s maximum optimal truncation point, then w (weakly) prefers
truncation at khw to truncation at any k < khw. If conditions i) and ii) hold,
then wψ must strictly prefer truncation at khw to truncation at any k < khw.
Hence, khw ≤ klwψ . ◻
Thus, when facing the same environment, players who are more risk averse
truncate less, with the set of optimal truncation points overlapping at the
very most at one point.
The key insight in the analysis is the interpretation of truncation as a risky
lottery, and then mapping the additional risk associated with incremental
truncation to an extra lottery a woman must face. If a woman doesn’t like to
face the extra lottery, then certainly a woman with more concave preferences
will not want to face it.
Note that despite pertaining to risk aversion, the results in this section do
not restrict the structure of uw(⋅) in any way. For example, we do not require
uw(⋅) to be “concave.” Rather, it is the relative concavity that is crucial. For
example, if we restrict ourselves to the class of functions that are s-shaped
in rank, we know that within this class, concave transformations induce less
truncation.
In a general sense, this result can be taken as advice to participants.
Players can observe the patterns of behavior of others, size up their own
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attitudes toward risk, and truncate more or less accordingly. In markets where
there is a steep dropoff in utility from a woman’s most preferred partner to
her second choice, a smaller dropoff from choice two to three, and so forth, we
may anticipate more aggressive truncation. On the other hand, if participants
are largely content with any of the available choices, but see great disutility
from being unmatched, truncation is not advisable.
This result can also offer advice to a market designer. If an objective is
to maximize the number of matches, a market designer may wish to choose
the less risk averse side to be the “proposers” in the Deferred Acceptance
Algorithm. If the two sides of the market are identical in all regards except for
their risk preferences, the more risk averse side will be less likely to truncate,
even if manipulations increase their expected partner rank. Lower levels of
truncation will increase the number of realized matches, and consequently,
reduce the number of participants left unmatched. However, in making
this choice, the market designer should take other market features into
consideration as well, as we demonstrate in the next section.
3.6 Correlated Preferences
In the Preference List Submission Problem for Women, we now let woman
w believe other women in the market have preferences similar to hers. We
consider how woman w should vary her degree of truncation as the degree of
similarity varies. We provide evidence, both theoretical and simulation-based,
that the greater the similarity in the preferences of other women to her own,
the less woman w should truncate.
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3.6.1 Perfectly Correlated Preferences
We consider first the case of perfectly correlated preferences on the women’s
side of the market.
Remark. When women have identical preferences, there is a unique stable
matching.
To see this, note that the top-ranked man, as agreed upon by all women,
must be matched with his most preferred partner in any stable matching,
or else these two would constitute a blocking pair. The second-ranked man
must then be matched to his most preferred remaining woman, and so on.
MP-DA reduces to a serial dictatorship, determined by the common ranking
of the men.
Since there is a unique stable matching in this setting, an individual
woman’s misrepresentation of her preference list can never improve her match.
In fact, if a woman is certain that other women share her preferences (and
are reporting truthfully), but is uncertain about what men will submit to
the algorithm, truncation can very well lower her outcome by leaving her
unmatched.
3.6.2 Partially Correlated Preferences
In this section, we introduce a notion of partial correlation of preferences
indexed by a single parameter α. We will show that the greater the degree of
correlation, the less a woman should truncate.
Consider the Preference List Submission Problem for woman w with
preferences uw and beliefs P˜−w about reported preference lists of opponents.
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Let p(⋅, ⋅) be the probability mass function for w’s beliefs. That is,
p(PM, PW /{w})
gives the likelihood that the men will report preference lists PM and womenW /{w} will report preference lists PW /{w}. Define the marginal probability
over mens’ preference profiles by pM(⋅).
Given p(⋅, ⋅), define beliefs pC(⋅, ⋅) by
pC(PM, PW /{w}) ≡ ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
pM(PM) if Pwˆ = Pw ∀wˆ ∈W /{w}
0 otherwise
.
pC(⋅, ⋅) is the distribution that preserves the marginal distribution over men’s
preferences pM(⋅), but where the other women share the preferences of w.
Define beliefs pα(⋅) by
pα(P−w) ≡ (1 − α)p(P−w) + αpC(P−w).
Hence, as α varies from 0 to 1, pα ranges from p to pC . The marginal
distribution over men’s preferences remains fixed, while the correlation of
women’s preferences steadily increases (the distribution remains constant if
p = pC).
The set of optimal truncation points for woman w with preferences uw
and beliefs indexed by α is given by
k∗(α, p, uw) ≡ arg max
k∈{0,...,N} Epα[v(k, P˜−w)].
Notice that since the choice set is finite, k∗(⋅, ⋅) will be non-empty.
Let kh(α, p, uw) = max[k∗(α, p, uw)] and kl(α, p, uw) = min[k∗(α, p, uw)],
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the optimal choices involving the least and most truncation respectively.
The following proposition states that for any preferences uw and beliefs
p, as we increase the degree of correlation α, woman w should truncate less.
Proposition 3.2. Let α,α′ ∈ [0,1] with α′ > α. Then kl(α′, p, uw) ≥
kl(α, p, uw) and kh(α′, p, uw) ≥ kh(α, p, uw).
The proof relies on the fact that when there is a unique stable matching,
it can never hurt to submit a full list. Using this fact, we can show that if
under low correlation, w prefers truncating less to more, then under high
correlation w definitely prefers truncating less to more. This is enough to
sort optimal truncation points.
Intuition for this result is related to the size of the set of stable match-
ings. Truncation can yield improvement only when there are multiple stable
matchings. The greater the degree of correlation, the smaller this set, and
the lower the likelihood that a window for gain from truncation exists.
The anticipated level of correlation in the environment might influence
the advice a market designer offers participants. If correlation is high, the
designer can safely advise participants to report truthfully, and it is in
their best interest to do so. With low correlation (sufficiently heterogeneous
preferences), players may anticipate gains from truncation, which if acted on,
could lead to unstable matchings.
3.6.3 Noisy Preferences
In Section 3.6.2, a woman believes it is possible that opponents have prefer-
ence lists identical to hers. In this section, woman w believes women have
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preference lists similar to hers, but not necessarily identical. We model such
beliefs for women by generating noisy deviations from a common preference
list. By performing simulations, we corroborate the theoretical results in
Section 3.6.2; more correlation means a woman should truncate less.
We generate correlated preferences as follows. Each man mi is assigned a
random number ri ∼ U[0, 1], and this value is agreed upon by all women. For
each man mi, each woman wj also assigns an idiosyncratic (noise) component,
qij ∼ U[0, 1]. Woman wj ’s rankings over men are then determined by the sum
α ⋅ ri + (1 − α)qij , where α ∈ [0,1] is a parameter that we will vary. Observe
that from the perspective of any woman w, the preferences of other women
are noisy versions of her own rankings. Values of α close to one imply low
noise, so α measures the degree of correlation. Men are assumed to have
uniformly random rankings over the women.23
The process just described is used only to determine preference orderings.
We further assume that w ’s payoff is given by (N + 1 − partner rank), and
being unmatched is just worse than being matched to her least preferred
man, so we can compare outcomes to those depicted in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.5 graphs the return to truncation for various values of α. For
each value, we randomly generated 100,000 preference list profiles and for
each k, we graph woman w ’s average payoff from k-truncation, when other
agents are truthful.
When α = 0 (the top curve), this corresponds to uniform beliefs for w,
23The common starting point for preferences might be an aggregate ranking based
on available data, like the US News and World Report’s annual ranking of universities.
Caldarelli and Capocci (2000) simulate preferences in a one-to-one model similarly. In
their model, the common component ri is a man’s “beauty,” which in their view, evidently,
is not in the eye of the beholder.
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Figure 3.5: The graphs display (N + 1)− an individual woman’s expected partner
rank from truncating her list at each point k ∈ {0, . . . ,N} and submitting these
preferences to MP-DA. Preference lists of men are uniformly random, and lists for
women are randomly generated using the procedure described in the text. Payoffs
are averaged over 100,000 draws.
the case studied in Section 3.3.4. When α = 1, all women rank men the same
way, the stable matching will be unique, and truncation cannot be helpful
(as in Section 3.6.1).
From Figure 3.5, we make two key observations. First, woman w dislikes
correlation. This fact is easy to explain. If all women agree on who the top
men are, they “compete” for them as mates. The lower the correlation, the
less the competition, and the better the expected mate for w. Second, w’s
optimal truncation point increases as correlation increases. This corroborates
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the result in Section 3.6.2: when there is more correlation, w should truncate
less.
3.7 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we study optimal strategic behavior in one-to-one matching
markets that are based on the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm, when agents
have incomplete information about the preferences of others. We focus
on truncation strategies. Among classes of strategies for preference list
misrepresentation, truncation is an attractive option because it is guaranteed
to weakly increase the likelihood of matching with one’s more preferred
partners. By contrast, more complicated strategies, such as swapping the
order of agents in a preference list, may require detailed information about
the preferences reported by others, and their outcomes are more difficult to
predict.
Recent work by Immorlica and Mahdian (2005), Kojima and Pathak
(2009) and others demonstrate that in large markets where agents submit
short preference lists, opportunities for manipulation are limited. Lee (2011)
presents a random utility model and shows that, in some sense, gains from
manipulation become small in large markets.24 In light of these findings one
may ask whether agents – especially agents with little detailed information
– can ever substantially gain from manipulation. Our paper answers in the
affirmative. When agents view reported preference lists of others as being
24Lee’s model is more general than ours, in many respects. Note, however that his
model requires agent utilities to be bounded, while our model does not exclude unbounded
functions.
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drawn uniformly from the set of all possible full length preference lists, they
may truncate their lists with little risk of being unmatched, but with the
potential to see large gains in terms of the expected partner rank. Importantly,
we show that while according to Lee (2011), utility gain from manipulation
may be small, the optimal truncation may still be substantial. This finding
provides an essential qualification to his results.
For many of the settings in which the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
has been successfully applied, notably in the NRMP and in the Boston and
New York school systems, the markets do reflect large numbers and short
preference lists. But the high levels of optimal truncation demonstrated in
this paper raise a key issue: in large markets where agents submit short
preference lists, can we be sure that the short lists were not simply the result
of optimization? Costliness of information discovery often places natural
limits on the length of submitted preference lists. Flyouts are costly for
medical students; perhaps somewhat less so for hospitals. Nevertheless, this
paper illustrates the theoretical possibility that even with full information
about one’s own preferences, substantial truncation (submission of short lists)
may simply be utility-maximizing strategic behavior.
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Chapter 4
Strategic Behavior in
Unbalanced Matching
Markets1
4.1 Introduction
A great success story in economic theory is the application of the Deferred
Acceptance Algorithm (DAA), proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962), to real
world two-sided matching markets. The DAA and its variants have been used
extensively in school choice settings (Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2005), and most
famously in the National Resident Matching Program (Roth and Peranson,
1999). The advantages of mechanisms using DAA over other mechanisms
have been discussed extensively (See for example (Roth, 1990)). Importantly,
1Co-authored with Peter Coles
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it was shown that while no stable matching mechanism is strategy proof,
mechanisms applying the DAA have truthful reporting as a dominant strategy
for the proposing side (Dubins and Freedman, 1981; Roth, 1982). The choice
of the proposing side has received some attention in the public domain and in
the literature (Roth and Peranson, 1999), but the general message that has
emerged from this body of literature is that the choice of the proposing side
has a small effect over agents’ utilities (Roth and Peranson, 1999; Immorlica
and Mahdian, 2005; Kojima and Pathak, 2009; Lee, 2011; Ashlagi et al., 2013;
Azevedo and Leshno, 2012).
This paper takes a different perspective on this issue. We look for the
(exact) best responses of agents, and consider the degree of manipulation
expected in the market. To do this, we restrict attention to truncation
strategies, which are endowed with a natural metric for measuring the extent
of manipulation (how many acceptable partners were declared unacceptable).
This class of strategies was shown to be optimal in symmetric low-information
settings (Roth and Rothblum, 1999; Ehlers, 2004). We derive comparative
statics on the extent of manipulation as a function of risk aversion and
correlation, and show that more risk averse agents submit longer lists (so
they are “more truthful”) and that correlation in preferences also reduces the
incentives to manipulate. These results are similar to the findings of Coles
and Shorrer (2014), but they are more general as we do not assume that the
markets are balanced.
The main innovation in this paper is inspired by the results of Ashlagi et al.
(2013). In contrast to the findings of Roth and Peranson (1999) regarding the
“large core” of markets when agents have long preference lists, and the related
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findings of Pittel (1989), Ashlagi et al. (2013) show that if the number of
agents on each side of the market is not balanced, the core becomes small in
the typical case. So while the gap between men (women) expected partner
ranks under the men and women proposing versions of the DAA is high in
a balanced marked, even a slight imbalance “shrinks” this gap significantly.
In light of this finding we ask: What are the effects of imbalance on the
incentives to misrepresent one’s preferences? The answer is: it depends!
Under the men-proposing version of the DAA, if there are more women than
men, women optimally submit “long” lists. When the sides of the market
are balanced, a woman facing truthful opponents should submit a short
list; asymptotically she truncates 100% of her list. When women are over
demanded (on the short side), we provide simulation evidence that extreme
truncation is still optimal. We also show that truncation is “safe” when
women are on the short side, but not when they are on the long side of
the market. To summarize, the extent of optimal truncation may crucially
depend on whether the strategic agents (the ones not on the proposing side)
are on the long side or the short side of the market.
A market designer may prefer that agents submit either long or short
lists. She may be concerned about the incentives for truthfulness for several
reasons. For one, she may wish to advise participants that being truthful will
not harm them, so as to “level the playing field” between savvy and naive
agents (Pathak and Sonmez, 2008; Featherstone and Mayefsky, 2010). The
number of matched agents and the (ex-post) stability of the match may also
be affected (Featherstone and Niederle, 2011). An additional reason why
designers may want to induce truthful reporting is that the submitted profiles
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may provide a signal as to the desirability of agents on the two sides of the
market. In school choice settings, for example, truthful reporting allows
school districts to learn about the actual desirability of different schools (??).
But market designers may also have reasons to favor shorter lists. From a
computational perspective, running the DAA on shorter lists is faster. More
importantly, the designer may think that there is a cost (actual or mental)
to the system or to participants on one side of the market for generating
a long preference list. For example, a school may be required to give each
applicant a tour, paperwork may be required for each school that appears
on an applicant’s list, and a student may simply find it hard to compare his
100th and 101st choices. We take no stand on whether ensuring truthfulness
or promoting short lists is more desirable, but merely wish to provide advice
to the market designer given objectives regarding list length.
4.2 Preliminaries
We begin by setting out the basic model of matching. Following Coles and
Shorrer (2014), and in contrast to some of the well-known papers in the field
of matching, we endow agents with cardinal rather than ordinal preferences.
4.2.1 Marriage Markets and Stability
In this paper, only one-to-one two sided matching markets will be considered.
We call these markets marriage markets for short, and label one side on the
market as men M, and the other as women W. Both men and women are
referred to as agents.
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The preferences of man m ∈M are given by a von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function um ∶W ∪{m}Ð→ R. um(w) is the utility that man m derives
from being matched with woman w with certainty, and um(m) is his utility
from being unmatched. For simplicity, we assume that um is one-to-one, so
that there are no indifferences. Preferences for women are defined similarly.
We denote by u = Π
i∈M⊍Wui the profile of agents preferences.
Since we have assumed that agents’ preferences are one-to-one, they
induce strict preference orderings on all possible partners and the possibility
of remaining unmatched. For a man m ∈M we denote by Pm the preference
list over W ∪ {m} that is induced by um. For example, Pm ranks w3 higher
than w1 if um (w4) > um (w1). We say that w ∈ W is acceptable for m if
um(w) > um(m), so m prefers being matched with w over remaining single.
We sometimes omit unacceptable mates fromm’s preference list for notational
convenience. Preference lists for women are defined similarly, and we denote
by P the profile of all preference lists.
A matching µ is a mapping from M ∪W to itself, such that for each
m ∈M we have that µ(m) ∈W∪{m}, for each w ∈W we have µ(w) ∈M∪{w}
and for each x ∈M⊍W µ2(x) = x. When µ(x) = x we say that x is single
or unmatched under the matching µ. Otherwise, we refer to µ(w) as w’s
husband and µ(m) as m’s wife under the matching µ. We also use the terms
partner and mate. The preferences over partners induce natural preference
order over matchings, where each agent ranks the matchings according to the
partner that is assigned to him.
A matching is individually rational if for every x ∈M⊍W, the agent x
weakly prefers µ(x) to remaining single. A matching is blocked by a pair
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(w,m) ∈W ×M if both w prefers m to µ(w) and m prefers w to µ(m). A
matching is stable if it is individually rational and not blocked by any pair.
There always exists a stable matching in a market, but in general there may
be more than one (Gale and Shapley, 1962). For given preferences, we say
that a woman w is achievable for a man m if there exists a stable matching
µ such that µ(w) =m. A symmetric definition applies to womens’ achievable
mates.
4.2.2 The Men-Proposing Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
To prove that every marriage market has a stable matching, Gale and Shapley
(1962) proposed the Men-Proposing Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (MP-
DA). It takes as an input a profile of preferences P of a set of agents M⊍W
and outputs a stable matching µM [P ]. When P is clear form the contexts,
we sometimes omit it and write µM instead of µM [P ]. The following is a
description of the algorithm.
• Step 1. Each man proposes to the first woman on his preference
list. Each woman then considers her offers, rejects all men deemed
unacceptable, and if any others remain, rejects all but her most preferred
mate.
• Step k . Each man who was rejected in step k− 1 makes an offer to the
next woman on his preference list. If his preference list is exhausted,
or if he prefers bachelorhood to the next woman on his list, he makes
no offer. Each woman behaves as in step 1, considering offers in hand
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(including any man she has retained from the previous step) and rejects
all but her most preferred acceptable suitor.
• Termination. If in any step k, no man makes an offer, the algorithm
terminates. Each woman is paired with her current mate and this
matching is final.
Gale and Shapley show that this algorithm must terminate in finite time,
and they provide a remarkable characteristic of the resulting outcome.
Theorem. (Gale-Shapley) The matching µM resulting from MP-DA is stable.
Furthermore, for any other stable matching µ, every man weakly prefers µM
to µ and every woman weakly prefers µ to µM .
Since there is no actual content to gender (it is just a label), it is clear
that the women-proposing version of the algorithm (WP-DA) has identical
but reversed properties. We denote its output given an input P by µW [P ].
As discussed by Roth (1990), stability is a desirable property for a
matching mechanism. But the theorem illustrates a particular feature of the
stable matching produced by the MP-DA (WP-DA); it is the most desirable
stable matching for men (women), and the least desirable for women (men).
This paper focuses on the strategic incentives that emerge from this property
under incomplete information, and their effects on the realized matchings
given strategic reporting.
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4.2.3 The Preference List Submission Problem
We now turn to study the incentive properties of stable matching mechanism
which use the MP-DA. In a setting where agents are asked to report preferences
lists to the mechanism, we consider if they have an incentive to report
truthfully, or to submit a different preference list.
Consider a set of agents M⊍W. Agent i ∈M⊍W with preferences ui
must submit a preference list Pˆi to MP-DA, where Pˆi is chosen from the set
of i ’s possible preference lists Pi. The agent’s beliefs about what preference
lists others will report are represented by the random variable P˜−i, which
takes as its rangeP−i, the set of all possible preference list profiles for others.
Note that since ui is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, agent i
may compare outcomes in this incomplete information setting.
Agent i solves the Preference List Submission Problem:
max
Pˆi∈PiE[ui(µM [Pˆi, P˜−i](i))].
Dubins and Freedman (1981) and Roth (1982) have shown that for any
man m with preferences um and beliefs P˜−m, it is optimal for m to submit
his true preference list Pm (which corresponds to um).
Theorem. (Dubins and Freedman; Roth) In the Preference List Submission
Problem,
Pm ∈ arg max
Pˆm∈Pm E[um(µM [Pˆm, P˜−m](m))].
This is not the case for women, as they may misrepresent their preferences
and get preferable outcomes in some settings (Roth, 1982). A natural way to
misrepresent one’s preferences is by submitting a truncated preferences list.
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A truncated preference list is identical to the original one, except that some
acceptable partners are declared unacceptable. Denote by P kw the preference
list which includes in order only w’s k most preferred men, and call this
the k-truncation of her true preference list Pw. If fewer than k men are
acceptable to w, then P kw ≡ Pw. Truncation generates a simple tradeoff which
is described by the following proposition:
Proposition. Let P be the preference list profile of all agents in M⊍W.
Then µM [P kw, P−w](w) is w’s least preferred achievable mate under P with
rank ≤ k. Should no such mate exist, µM [P kw, P−w](w) = w.
The proposition implies that when others’ submitted preferences lists
are known with certainty it is easy to find a truncation strategy that would
match the woman with her most preferred achievable partner, but also that
when there exists uncertainty about others’ submitted lists truncation may
yield each of the three possible results relative to truthful reporting:
1. No effect - when woman w has truncated below her least preferred
achievable mate
2. Improvement - when woman w truncates above her least preferred
achievable mate, and is matched with her least preferred achievable
mate above the point of truncation
3. Turning unmatched - when woman w has an achievable mate, but has
over-truncated by truncating above her most preferred achievable mate
Since the realized outcome depends on the realized profile that others submit,
each truncation yields a lottery given the beliefs P˜−w, and the problem of
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choosing the optimal truncation corresponds to choosing the most preferable
lottery.
Optimality of Truncation
Truncation is not the only possible misrepresentation of preferences. A woman
could reverse two men in her preference list, list men as acceptable who are
in fact unacceptable, drop men from the middle of her list, or use some
combination of these. However, under some conditions, truncation is optimal.
The next proposition states that under certainty, women can do no better
than to truncate (Roth and Vande Vate, 1991).
Proposition. (Roth and Vande Vate) Suppose woman w has preferences uw
and knows others will report preference lists P−w to MP-DA. Then truncating
such that µW (w) is the last acceptable partner on her list is an optimal
strategy for w.
Perhaps surprisingly, when a woman has very little information about
the preference lists others might report, she again can do no better than to
truncate. In order to gain from non-truncation misrepresentations, such as
swapping the positions of two men in her reported preference list, a woman
must have very specific information about the preference lists others report.
Without such information, it is best to leave the men in their correct order.
Roth and Rothblum (1999) demonstrate this principle using the following
framework.2
2Ehlers (2004) provides weaker conditions, in the same spirit, under which truncation
is still optimal.
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Let woman w’s beliefs about reported preference lists of others be rep-
resented by P˜−w, a random variable taking on values in P−w. If P−w is a
preference list profile for agents −w, define Pm↔m′−w to be the preference list
profile in which m and m′ swap preference lists, and all women swap the
positions of m and m′ in their lists. We say that woman w’s beliefs are(m,m′)-symmetric if Pr(P˜−w = P−w) = Pr(P˜−w = Pm↔m′−w ) for all P−w ∈P−w.
For a subset M′ ⊆ M, beliefs P˜−w are M′-symmetric if they are (m,m′)-
symmetric for all m,m′ ∈M′.
Theorem. (Roth and Rothblum) Suppose w’s beliefs about reported preference
lists of others areM-symmetric. Then any preference list Pˆw she might submit
to MP-DA is weakly Pw-stochastically dominated by some truncation of her
true preference list.3
Hence, when w is certain about reported preference lists of her opponents,
or when she has extreme, symmetric uncertainty, truncation is optimal.
The Truncation Problem
Even when truncation is not optimal, we may sometimes wish to restrict the
choice set for women to truncations of her true preference list. We define
the Truncation Problem for woman w with preferences uw and beliefs P˜−w
on others’ submitted preference lists as
max
k∈{0,...,N}E[uw(µM [P kw, P˜−w](w))].
3Pˆw is Pw-stochastically dominated by Pˆ ′w iff for any vNM utility function that
corresponds to Pw, the expected utility from submitting Pˆ ′w is at least as great as the
expected utility from submitting Pˆw.
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4.3 Optimal Truncation in Unbalanced Markets
Following Coles and Shorrer (2014) and Ashlagi et al. (2013) we consider
a setting where each agent draws independently uniformly at random a
complete preference list (so that all mates are acceptable).4 We assume
further that for each agent i, ui (⋅) is linear in the rank of i’s match, where
being unmatched is treated as rank one below the lowest ranked mate. For a
balanced uniform market with N men and N women, define
k∗(N) ≡ max⎛⎝arg maxk∈{0,...,N}E[uw(µM [P kw, P˜−w](w))]⎞⎠ .
k∗(N) describes woman w ’s optimal point of truncation, given that the other
agents submit their true preference lists. If there are multiple optima, we
conservatively select that which involves the least truncation. Coles and
Shorrer (2014) prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. Let woman w have uniform beliefs and preferences linear in
rank (or any strictly increasing, convex transformation of such preferences).
Then lim
N→∞ k∗(N)N = 0.
Theorem 4.1 states that for balanced markets, as the market size grows
large, the fraction of the list that an individual woman optimally truncates
goes to 100%. The intuition behind this theorem can be gleaned from
statistical facts about the most and least preferred achievable mates for women.
In large balanced markets where preferences are uniform, the expected rank
4While this assumption is not very realistic for real markets, it may serve as an
approximation for the behavior of the top tiers in a tiered market. For example, it may be
the case that everyone agrees about the composition of the top tier of schools and students,
but personal tastes causes the orderings to vary (Ashlagi et al., 2013).
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of the most preferred achievable mate of a woman (which is the same as the
expected rank of her mate under WP-DA) is very low relative to the length
of her list; it asymptotes to logN (Pittel, 1989). This suggests that a woman
may safely truncate a large fraction of her list with little risk of becoming
unmatched. Furthermore, the expected rank of a woman’s match under
MP-DA is significantly worse, asymptoting to NlogN (Pittel, 1989). In fact, for
large markets, Pittel (1992) proved that the worst-off wife will be matched
with a husband at the bottom of her list with probability approaching 1.
This large gap in a woman’s expected most and least preferred achievable
mates suggests that not only is it safe to truncate a large fraction of one’s
list in large markets, but that a woman will also generate gains from such a
truncation.
Figure 4.1 presents simulation results for balanced markets of size 10, 100,
1,000 and 10,000. It is clear from the figures that, when all other agents are
truthful, the best response of a strategic woman is to submit a (very) short
list. It also appears that the gains from truncation may be significant. In
a market of size 10,000, the partner rank could potentially be reduced by
about 1,000 in expectation (10% of the market size).
The recent paper by Ashlagi et al. (2013) implies that the large gap
between the best and worst stable partners is a knife-edge case. When markets
are even slightly unbalanced, under any stable matching the rank of the mates
that an agent on the over demanded side of the market gets is approximately
logN in expectation, while the other side can expect approximately NlogN .
5
5The approximations calculated by Ashlagi et al. (2013) involve multiplicative constants
and describe expected payoffs conditional on an agent being assigned a partner.
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Intuitively, these results imply that unbalanced matching markets typically
have a “small core.” In turn this suggests that submitting a long list may
constitute an optimal strategy in unbalanced uniform markets. In light of
their findings, we inspect strategic behavior in the unbalanced setting.
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Figure 4.1: Simulation Results for Truncation Payoffs. The graphs display(N + 1)− an individual woman’s expected partner rank from truncating her list at
each point k ∈ {0, . . . ,N} and submitting these preferences to MP-DA. Preference
lists of the other agents are uniformly random, selected from the set of all possible
full length preference list profiles, and payoffs are averaged over 100,000 draws.
Markets are of size 10, 100, 1,000 and 10,000.
4.3.1 The Case of More Women Than Men
Given L ≥ 0, for a market with N men and N +L women define
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k∗(N,L) ≡ min⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩⎛⎝arg maxk∈{0,...,N}E[uw(µM [P kw, P˜−w](w))]⎞⎠
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭ .
k∗(N,L) describes woman w ’s optimal point of truncation, given that the
other agents submit their true preference lists. If there are multiple optima,
we conservatively select that which involves the most truncation. Note that
for L = 0, k∗(N,0) ≤ k∗(N) so the results of Theorem 4.1 apply to k∗(N,0).
We now have the following theorem, which constitutes a partial converse
of Theorem 4.1. The theorem shows that the intuition from Ashlagi et al.
(2013) extends to the incomplete information setting when women are over
demanded.
Theorem 4.2. Given L > 0, consider a market with N men and N + L
women. Let woman w have uniform beliefs and preferences linear in rank
(or any strictly increasing, concave transformation of such preferences).
Then k∗(N,L)N ≥ LL+1 so limN→∞ k∗(N,L)N ≥ LL+1 . In particular k∗(N,L)N ≥ 12 and
lim
N→∞ k∗(N,L)N ≥ 12 .
Proof. Recall that a truncation by woman w could lead to one of three results:
1. No effect: woman w has truncated below her least preferred achievable
mate
2. Improvement: woman w truncates above her least preferred mate,
and is matched with her least preferred achievable mate above the point of
truncation
3. Becoming unmatched: woman w has an achievable mate, but has
over-truncated, truncating above her most preferred achievable mate
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Figure 4.2: Simulation Results for Truncation Payoffs. The graphs display
101– an individual woman’s expected partner rank from truncating her list at each
point k ∈ {0, . . . ,100} and submitting these preferences to MP-DA. Preference lists
of the other agents are uniformly random, selected from the set of all possible full
length preference list profiles, and payoffs are averaged over 100,000 draws. All
markets have 100 men, and the number of women varies between 90, 95, 99, 101,
105 and 110.
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In a balanced market, truncation worsened a woman’s outcome only
when MP-DA terminated with one man exhausting his list. But when women
outnumber men, truncation may causeMP-DA to terminate when a previously
unmatched woman receives an offer. Note that when agents are truthful, at
least one woman will have received no proposals prior to the truncation. Of
course improvement upon truncation is possible only if w does not end up
single.
Using the principle of deferred decisions, it is easy to see that conditional
on a truncation making a difference, the probability of improvement is less
than 1L+1 ≤ 12 . To show this, recall that unmatched women have not received
any proposals. Hence, it follows from the principle of deferred decisions and
symmetry that, following truncation, any future proposal is at least as likely
to be directed at these women as to w. The algorithm terminates only when
such a proposal happens.
Now consider the marginal benefit to w from omitting the lowest-ranked
man from a list of length m+ 1. The most w can hope for is an improvement
in her match of m ranks (from m + 1 to the top).6 If this omission instead
leaves her unmatched, she drops N −m ranks (from m + 1 to N + 1). Since
the probability of becoming unmatched conditional on truncation having any
effect is at least L1+L ≥ 12 , the expected gain cannot be positive if m < LL+1N .
Hence, the optimal list length for w is at least LL+1N ≥ 12N .
The left panels of Figure 4.2 illustrate our findings. We simulated markets
with 100 men and 99, 95 and 90 women. In each market we generate
6In fact, the gain is m+1
2
in expectation - the expected rank of the remaining partners.
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independently and at random a full preference list for each agent. We then
calculate an individual woman’s payoff, given that all other agents submit
their true lists, for each possible level of truncation. Payoffs are depicted by
101 – partner rank, and we report the average result over 100,000 iterations.
The simulations support the findings of Theorem 4.2, as the optimal list
length in all three markets is greater than 50. Indeed, the optimal list lengths
are higher than 50, 84 and 91, the respective lower bounds the theorem
indicates. In contrast to Figure 4.1, the balanced market case, it is almost
impossible to detect the peak of the graphs. That is, not only should women
submit long lists, but there is little to gain by truncating optimally. Note
that as one would expect, women do worse as the competition on their side
increases.
A few points related to Theorem 4.2 deserve attention. First, under
uniform beliefs, Roth and Rothblum’s optimality theorem applies whether
the market is balanced or not. This implies that the truncation strategies
described in Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 are the best overall strategies, not just
the optimal truncation strategies. Hence, we have a natural metric for the
“distance” between the optimal strategy and truthfulness. The importance
of Theorem 4.1 is in showing that the best response to straightforward
behavior of others could be “far” from truthful, and so provides an important
qualification to the literature which finds truthful reporting to be close to
optimal (Roth and Peranson, 1999; Immorlica and Mahdian, 2005; Kojima
and Pathak, 2009; Lee, 2011; Ashlagi et al., 2013). Theorem 4.2 qualifies this
previous finding. We show that our example relies heavily on the fact that
the number of women is not larger than the number of men.
170
A second point worth noting is that our choice of k∗(N,L) was a con-
servative one. We could have instead chosen to state the theorem using
k∗(N,L) ≡ max⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩⎛⎝arg maxk∈{0,...,N}E[uw(µM [P kw, P˜−w](w))]⎞⎠
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭, breaking ties in fa-
vor of less truncation as in the definition of k∗(N), and the theorem would
of course still hold (since k∗(N,L) ≥ k∗(N,L) by definition).
Finally, in contrast to most of the results in this strand of the literature,
our theorem is not a “large market result”; our result holds for any N
and L. That is, manipulation opportunities are minimal (in the sense of
distance from truthful submission) whenever women outnumber men, for
unbalanced markets of any size. However, a simple corollary of our result is
that as imbalance in a market increases, manipulation opportunities vanish
altogether.
Corollary 4.1. Given a sequence {LN} with lim
N
LN =∞ and a sequence of
uniform markets with N men and N +LN women, if woman w has uniform
beliefs and preferences linear in rank (or any strictly increasing, concave
transformation of such preferences), then lim
N→∞k∗(N,LN) = 1.
The simulation results presented in Figure 4.2 are consistent with the
results of Ashlagi et al. (2013). In contrast to the relatively large gain that
a woman may be able to realize by truncating in a balanced market, when
there are more women than men the graph of the expected payoff is much
flatter between the optimum and truthful reporting. It is also true that in
this case truncation is relatively risky. One can see from Figure 4.2 that,
for example, in a market with 101 women and 100 men, submitting a list of
length 30 exposes a woman to a significant risk of remaining unmatched. The
171
following theorem formalizes this observation by providing a lower bound on
the probability of becoming unmatched following a relatively conservative
truncation.
Theorem 4.3. Fix L>0 and δ ∈ (0,1). For N large enough, in a uniform
market with N men and N +L women, if all other agents report truthfully
and woman w submits a truncation list of length less than δN , she will be
unmatched with probability at least .49+LN+L .
Proof. From Pittel (1992, Theorem 6.2) we know that in a balanced uniform
market of size N , the probability that the worst-off woman gets a mate ranked
worse than δN approaches 1. This probability only increases when there are
more women than men (Kelso and Crawford, 1982). Now consider a woman
truncating her list shorter than δN while all other agents are truthful. From
Pittel’s theorem, for large N the probability that this truncation makes a
difference is at least 1N+L+1 . For large enough N , this expression is greater
than .999N . Conditional on the truncation making a difference, using the
principle of deferred decisions, the resulting chain of rejections is at least
as likely to terminate with a proposal to a woman that did not receive any
proposals until w divorced her partner, as it is to return to w. This implies
that even in the event that w is matched when she (and all others) report
truthfully, by truncating her list to a size smaller than δN she raises her
probability of being unmatched by at least L1+L × .999N > .49N . Multiplying both
sides of the inequality by the probability of w being matched if she reports
truthfully, and adding the probability of w being unmatched if she reports
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truthfully, produces the lower bound:
L
N +L + (1 − LN +L) .49N = L + .49N +L .
Symmetry implies that w will remain unmatched with probability LN+L
no matter what (full) list she reports. We are interested in the increase
in probability of being left unmatched relative to truthful reporting ( .49N+L).
While the increase does not appear to be large at first glance, several facts
must be taken into account. First, this is a lower bound, and there is no
good reason to suspect that it is tight. Moreover, the lower bound for the
increase in probability is of the same order of magnitude as the probability
of remaining unmatched under truthful reporting. Second, the degree of
truncation of w may be minimal. The theorem allows w to submit 99% of her
list and the results will still hold. A third point is that these results should
be compared with the opposite case, where men outnumber women. This is
exactly what we do in the next section.
4.3.2 The Case of Fewer Women Than Men
The results of Ashlagi et al. (2013) regarding the small core apply regardless
of the direction of the imbalance. That is, no matter the size or direction
of the imbalance, the expected potential improvement is small. One might
therefore suspect that when men outnumber women, an analog to Theorem
4.2 would apply and room for manipulation would again be small. This,
however, does not appear to be the case. The simulation results presented in
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the right panel of Figure 4.2 indicate that when there are fewer women than
men, the optimal level of truncation may still be significant.
The figure depicts (simulated) truncation payoffs for men in markets with
100 men and 101, 105 and 110 women. In contrast to the case where women
outnumber men, in this case the peaks of all three graphs involve lists of
length shorter than 31.
Comparing the right and left panels of Figure 4.2, three additional facts
stand out. The first is that women do much better when the balance tips
slightly in their favor: payoffs with 99 women and 100 men are much higher
than when there are 101 women. This difference becomes starker as the
imbalance increase. This corroborates the findings of Ashlagi et al. (2013) in
the case when w reports truthfully. Also salient is that even though optimal
truncation may be far from the truth, such a manipulation increases payoffs
only minimally. This too could be deduced from their paper. The third
salient feature is not a direct consequence of their findings (though it is
related to techniques used in their proofs). The simulations suggest that
truncation is “safer” for women when they are over-demanded. That is, when
there are more men then women, women may submit relatively short lists
without facing a large risk of becoming unmatched, even if there is little gain
from doing so.
The next theorem shows that this third fact holds more generally.
Theorem 4.4. Fix L ≥ 0. For a uniform market with N + L men and N
women, a woman that submits a truncation containing more than L + (2 +
a) log2N men will be matched with probability at least 1 −O (N−c(a)), where
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c(a) = 2a [3 + (4a + 9) 12 ]−1. In particular a women that submits a truncated
list of more than L+10 log2N men will be unmatched with probability at most
O ( 1
N2
) .
Proof. For notational simplicity we provide the proof for the case of L +
10 log2N , but analogous arguments would apply for all other cases. The
proof has two steps. First, recall that in a market that uses MP-DA, adding
men to the market makes the other men weakly worse-off and women weakly
better-off (Kelso and Crawford, 1982). Second, from Pittel (1992, Theorem
6.1) we know that in a balanced market of size N , submitting a truncated list
with 10 log2N men ensures being matched with probability 1 −O ( 1
N2
). In a
market with all the women and an arbitrary subset of the men containing
N agents, by submitting a truncated list with L + 10 log2N men, a woman
submits a list containing, at least, her most preferred 10 log2N men in the
subset in order. By Pittel’s theorem, this ensures that the woman is matched
with probability at least 1 − O ( 1
N2
). But the first point ensures that by
adding the other L men to the market all women are weakly better-off. In
particular, no woman that would have been matched in the smaller market
can become unmatched.
Remark. The statement of Theorem 4.4 is intentionally silent on the strategies
of women -w. The proof shows that the statement holds when all other women
are truthful. But the proof also holds whenever other women use truncation
strategies, or any anonymous strategies. The logic is simple: truncation by
other women only increases w’s probability of being matched given any list
she submits.
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Intuition for Theorem 4.4 may come from considering markets with large
imbalances. Consider, for example, uniform markets with N women and(1 + λ)N men, for positive λ. In these markets, MP-DA terminates only
after λN men have proposed to all of the women. Since preferences are
independent, this implies (using the “principle of deferred decisions”) that
even in the men optimal stable matching, a woman is matched with a man
high on her list with high probability (her expected partner rank is lower
than NλN = 1λ).
Rather than being an analog, Theorem 4.4 stands in sharp contrast to
Theorem 4.3. The ratio between the length of the lists described in Theorem
4.4 and the ones described in Theorem 4.3 approaches 0 as N grows large
(since the lists from Theorem 4.4 are much shorter). Yet the ratio of the
increases in the probability of becoming unmatched approaches infinity if
the (short) list in the setting of Theorem 4.4 is chosen to be sufficiently long
(e.g. 11 log2N).
To illustrate Theorem 4.4, we present additional simulation evidence.
We simulated a market with 1000 men and 999 women, and estimated the
returns to truncation for a woman w given that all other agents are truthful,
reporting average results over 100,000 iterations. The results are summarized
in the left panel of Figure 4.3. While difficult to observe with the naked
eye, the maximum is attained at 89, so that in terms of list length, the best
response is still “far” from truthful reporting.
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Figure 4.3: Simulation Results for Truncation Payoffs. In markets with
1000 men and 999 or 1001 women, the graph displays 1001– an individual woman’s
expected partner rank from truncating her list at each point k ∈ {0, . . . ,1000} and
submitting these preferences to MP-DA. Preference lists of the other agents are
selected, uniformly at random, from the set of all possible full length preference list
profiles, and payoffs are averaged over 100,000 draws.
4.4 Other Aspects Impacting the Optimal Level of
Truncation
Coles and Shorrer (2014) provide several comparative statics for the optimal
level of truncation in the case of balanced markets. We demonstrate that
these hold in the unbalanced case as well.
4.4.1 Truncation and Risk Aversion
As discussed previously, truncation is a risky strategy. Compared to truthful
reporting, truncation may offer some benefit, but over-truncating can lead
to large losses depending on the profile of preferences that is submitted by
others. One might expect agents with more conservative attitudes toward
risk to shy away from this proposition. In this section, we formalize this
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intuition.
We consider a general setting, with arbitrary preferences for woman w
and beliefs about reported preferences of others. Let ψ(⋅) be any strictly
increasing, concave transformation. We claim that for any beliefs about
others, woman w with preferences uw(⋅) will truncate more than a woman
wψ who has identical beliefs, but preferences given by ψ(uw(⋅)).
We fix w′s preferences to be uw(⋅), and define the shorthand
v(k,P−w) ≡ uw(µM [P kw, P−w](w)),
w’s payoff from submitting truncated preference list P kw. Now define
vψ(k,P−w) ≡ ψ(uw(µM [P kw, P−w](w)),
the payoff from submitting truncated preference list P kw for a woman wψ with
preferences ψ(uw(⋅)).
The following theorem states that if w prefers truncating less to more,
then wψ definitely prefers truncating less to more.
Theorem 4.5. Let P˜−w be any random variable distributed over P−w. Then∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,N − 1},∀t ∈ {1, . . . ,N − k} we have
E [v(k, P˜−w)] ≤ E [v(k + t, P˜−w)] ⇒
E [vψ(k, P˜−w)] ≤ E [vψ(k + t, P˜−w)] .
Furthermore, if i) ψ(⋅) is strictly concave, and ii) under P˜−w, each man is
achievable for w with positive probability, then the second inequality is strict.
We can now use Theorem 4.5 to sort optimal truncation points based on
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degree of concavity.
Corollary 4.2. Let kli be the minimum optimal truncation point (by rank)
and let khi be the maximum optimal truncation point for woman i ∈ {w,wψ}.
Then klw ≤ klwψ and khw ≤ khwψ . Furthermore, if conditions i) and ii) from
Theorem 4.5 hold, then khw ≤ klwψ .
We omit the proofs, as they are straightforward analogs of the proofs of
Theorem 5 and Corollary 1 in Coles and Shorrer (2014). The key insight in
the analysis is the interpretation of truncation as a risky lottery, and then
mapping the additional risk associated with incremental truncation to an
extra lottery a woman must face. If a woman doesn’t like to face the extra
lottery, then certainly a woman with more concave preferences will not want
to face it. Note that despite pertaining to risk aversion, the results in this
section do not restrict the structure of uw(⋅) in any way. For example, we do
not require uw(⋅) to be “concave.” Rather, it is the relative concavity that is
crucial.
This result can offer advice to a market designer. If she wishes to see
long lists, for example since her objective is to maximize the number of
matches, a market designer may wish to choose the less risk averse side to be
the “proposers” in the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm. If the two sides of
the market are identical in all regards except for their risk preferences, the
more risk averse side will be less likely to truncate, even if manipulations
increase their expected partner rank. Lower levels of truncation will increase
the number of realized matches, and consequently, reduce the number of
participants left unmatched. However, in making this choice, the market
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designer should take other market features into consideration as well, as we
demonstrate in the next section.
4.4.2 Truncation and Correlated Preferences
Coles and Shorrer (2014) provided theoretical and empirical evidence that,
in the balanced setting, correlation in preferences of agents on one side of
the market reduces their incentive to truncate. In this section, we show that
their findings generalize to unbalanced markets.
We consider first the case of perfectly correlated preferences on womens’
side of the market. In this case, there exist a unique stable matching, and so
women have no incentive to truncate their lists at all when all others report
truthfully. If women are uncertain about mens’ preferences, truncation may
only lead them to a worse outcome, provided that others are truthful.
While perfect correlation and independence are easy to model, partial
correlation may appear in many forms. In this paper, we focus on one simple
such form. Consider the Preference List Submission Problem for woman
w with preferences uw and beliefs P˜−w about reported preference lists of
opponents. Let p(⋅, ⋅) be the probability mass function for w’s beliefs. That
is,
p(PM, PW /{w})
gives the likelihood that the men will report preference lists PM and womenW /{w} will report preference lists PW /{w}. Define the marginal probability
over mens’ preference profiles by pM(⋅).
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Given p(⋅, ⋅), define beliefs pC(⋅, ⋅) by
pC(PM, PW /{w}) ≡ ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
pM(PM) if Pwˆ = Pw ∀wˆ ∈W /{w}
0 otherwise
.
pC(⋅, ⋅) is the distribution that preserves the marginal distribution over men’s
preferences pM(⋅), but where the other women share the preferences of w.
Define beliefs pα(⋅) by
pα(P−w) ≡ (1 − α)p(P−w) + αpC(P−w).
Hence, as α varies from 0 to 1, pα ranges from p to pC . The marginal
distribution over men’s preferences remains fixed, while the correlation of
women’s preferences steadily increases (the distribution remains constant if
p = pC).
The set of optimal truncation points for woman w with preferences uw
and beliefs indexed by α is given by
k∗(α, p, uw) ≡ arg max
k∈{0,...,N} Epα[v(k, P˜−w)].
Notice that since the choice set is finite, k∗(⋅, ⋅) will be non-empty.
Let kh(α, p, uw) = max[k∗(α, p, uw)] and kl(α, p, uw) = min[k∗(α, p, uw)],
the optimal choices involving the least and most truncation respectively.
The following proposition states that for any preferences uw and beliefs
p, as we increase the degree of correlation α, woman w should truncate less.
Proposition 4.1. Let α,α′ ∈ [0,1] with α′ > α. Then kl(α′, p, uw) ≥
kl(α, p, uw) and kh(α′, p, uw) ≥ kh(α, p, uw).
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The proof of the proposition is analogous to the proof of Proposition 2 in
Coles and Shorrer (2014), and is therefore omitted.
The anticipated level of correlation in the environment might influence
the advice a market designer can offers participants. If correlation is high,
the designer can safely advise participants to report truthfully, and it is in
their best interest to do so. With low correlation (sufficiently heterogeneous
preferences), players may anticipate gains from truncation, which if acted on,
could lead to unstable matching.
4.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study optimal strategic behavior in unbalanced one-to-
one matching markets, where matchings are determined by the Deferred
Acceptance Algorithm and agents have incomplete information about the
preferences of others. We focus on truncation strategies, which are attractive
for agents as they are simple and always weakly increase the probability of
being matched with more-preferred mates. From a computational perspective,
this reduces significantly the dimensions of the strategy space, allowing us to
use simulations to pinpoint optimal behavior. This restriction also induces a
natural metric on the extent of manipulation: the shorter the lists submitted,
the further they are from truthfulness. This allows us to make relative
statements about optimal list.
The main innovation of this paper is in studying the effect of imbalance
in the number of agents on the two sides of a market on their potential
for manipulation. We study a stylized setting which we term a uniform
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market, and find that the degree of manipulation observed in this setting
critically depends on the direction of the imbalance. When women are on the
long side of the market (there are more women than men), we find that the
incentives for women to manipulate are significantly diminished compared to
a balanced market. This finding is consistent with the intuition of Ashlagi
et al. (2013), who find that the expected gap between an agent’s highest and
lowest achievable mates is small in unbalanced uniform markets.
By contrast, when men outnumber women, we provide evidence that a
woman’s best response to truthful behavior by others involves a significant
degree of truncation. This finding qualifies results that suggest opportunities
for manipulation in such settings are minimal (e. g. in terms of potential gain
in utility (Lee, 2011)). We further show that truncation is safe when women
are on the short side (more men than women) but not when they are on the
long side.
We also provide comparative statics regarding the extent of manipulation,
regardless of the direction of size of a market imbalance. When women are
more risk averse, they should be less aggressive in their degree of truncation.
Correlation in womens’ preferences also reduces their incentive to truncate.
Matching mechanisms based on the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm are
used extensively in a variety of entry level labor markets (Roth, 1990) and in
school choice (Pathak and Sonmez, 2008). One advantage of DAA is that it
induces truthful reporting as a dominant strategy for one side of the market
(Roth, 1982; Dubins and Freedman, 1981). This alone is an argument market
designers have used to decide which side will be the “proposing” one (Roth,
1990).
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In addition to shedding light on strategic behavior in unbalanced markets
generally, our paper introduces a new factor that might be considered when
selecting the proposing side: direction of imbalance. By selecting the over-
demanded side to propose, potential for strategic manipulation is minimized.
Selecting the over-demanded side to receive offers leaves room for significant,
safe manipulation. While simplistic and stylized in many respects, our result
is a first effort to extend the logic market designers rely on in choosing the
proposing side. Future work should find more general environments in which
the extent of manipulation may be compared, and explore the interaction
between the different forces that determine the incentives to manipulate.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Proofs
A.1.1 Fact A.1 and Lemmata A.1 and A.2
Definition (Full-image). An index of riskiness Q satisfies full-image if for
every  > 0, ImQ (G) = R+.
full-image says that even when the support of the gambles is limited to an -
ball, the image of Q is all of R+. Both QAS and QFH satisfy full-image. This is
simply demonstrated by considering gambles of the form g = [, ec1+ec ;−, 11+ec ]
and g′ = [, 12 ;− 1+⋅c , 12], as QAS(g) = 1c and QFH(g′) = 1c .
Fact A.1. If Q satisfies full-image then RQ(u,w) ≥ SQ(u,w) for every u
and w.
Proof. By the properties of the supremum, since
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{Q(g)∣ g ∈ G and g is accepted by u at w}
∪ {Q(g)∣ g ∈ G and g is rejected by u at w} = R+.
If the supremum of the first set is less than the infimum of the second,
then intermediate points do not belong to either in violation of full-image.
Lemma A.1. If Q satisfies homogeneity and 0 < SQ(u,w) <∞ for all u and
w, then Q satisfies full-image.
Proof. For some u and w, SQ(u,w) = c, 0 < c < ∞. Hence for some small
positive ′, for every 0 <  < ′ there exists gambles in G with Q-riskiness
greater than c2 . Since multiplying by 0 < λ < 1 keeps the gambles in G, there
are gambles with any level of Q-riskiness lower than c2 in G. Since for λ > 1,
 < ′ implies that λ < ′, the same applies to G λ . But, using homogeneity,
this means that G includes gambles with any level of Q-riskiness lower than
λ ⋅ c2 . Since λ > 1 was arbitrary, the proof is complete.
Lemma A.2. If Q satisfies homogeneity and local consistency, then 0 <
SQ(u,w) = RQ(u,w) <∞ for all u and w.
Proof. Local consistency states that
∀u ∀w ∃λ > 0 ∀δ > 0 ∃ > 0 RQ(u,w) − δ < λ < SQ(u,w) + δ,
which implies that
∀u ∀w ∃λ > 0 RQ(u,w) ≤ λ ≤ SQ(u,w).
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Since for any u, w, and  > 0 the set {g∣ g ∈ G, g is rejected byuatw} is
non empty, there exists a sequence of gambles {gn} such that for each n
gn is rejected, gn ∈ G 1
n
and Q (gn) < (1 + 1n) ⋅ S1/nQ (u,w). For small δ > 0
, let hn ∶= (1 − δ)gn for each n. For n large enough, hn are all accepted
since Q(hn) = (1 − δ)kQ(gn) < S1/nQ (u,w) and hn is in G 1n . But this implies
that RQ (u,w) > (1 − δ)k SQ(u,w) since hn are almost always accepted and
lim
n→∞Q(hn) = (1 − δ)k limn→∞Q(gn) = (1 − δ)k SQ(u,w). Since δ was arbitrarily
small, this implies RQ (u,w) ≥ SQ(u,w). So, putting the results together,
gives ∀u ∀w ∃λ > 0 λ ≤ SQ(u,w) ≤ RQ(u,w) ≤ λ,
which completes the proof.
A.1.2 Theorem 1.2
Proof. (i) I first show that for every a > 0 any combination of the form
Qa(g) ∶= QFH(g) + a ⋅ ∣QFH(g) −QAS(g)∣ is an index of riskiness for which
the coefficient of local aversion equals the coefficient of local aversion to QFH .
The reason is that for small supports, the second element in the definition is
vanishingly small by Inequality 1.3.0.3, and so Qa and QFH should be close.
Fix a > 0. First, note that
∀g ∈ G 0 < QFH(g) ≤ QFH(g) + a ⋅ ∣QFH(g) −QAS(g)∣ ,
so Qa(g) ∈ R+. Additionally, for every δ > 0 there exists  > 0 small enough
such that for every g ∈ G,
QFH(g) ≤ QFH(g) + a ⋅ ∣QFH(g) −QAS(g)∣ ≤ QFH(g) + δ. (A.1.2.1)
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Inequality A.1.2.1 stems from the small support combined with Inequality
1.3.0.3. It tells us that the coefficient of local aversion to Qa-riskiness cannot
be different from AQFH which equals AQAS according to Theorem 1.1. That
local consistency is satisfied follows from the same reasoning. The proof of
(i) is completed by recalling that QFH ≠ QAS , that both indices are locally
consistent (immediate from Theorem 1.1) and homogeneous.1
(ii) Follows from Example 1.2.
A.1.3 Theorem 1.3
Proof. I start with the first part. In one direction, ρu(w) > ρv(w′) implies
that (u,w) ⋗ (v,w′) (Yaari, 1969), so Lemma 1.1 implies that AQ(u,w) ≥
AQ(v,w′).
To see that AQ(u,w) ≠ AQ(v,w′), define c ∶= (ρu(w)+ρv(w′)2 )−1. Let{gn}∞n=1 be a sequence of gambles such that gn ∈ G 1
n
and QAS(gn) = c. For a
small δ > 0 let hn = (1 + δ)gn. By Theorem 1.1, for large values of n, gn and
hn will be rejected by u at w and accepted by v at w′, so
SQ(v,w′) ≥ RQ(v,w′) ≥ (1 + δ)k ⋅ SQ(u,w) > SQ(u,w) ≥ RQ(u,w),
where the strict inequality follows from the fact that ∞ > SQ(u,w) > 0 by
Lemma A.2, the first and the last inequality follow from the local consistency
axiom, and the second inequality follows from the definitions of RQ and
1An alternative proof could use indices of the form:(QFH)α(QAS)1−α, α ∈ (0, 1). This
form may prove to be useful in empirical work, since it enables some flexibility in the
estimation. In addition, it allows us to put some weight on the FH measure that “punishes”
heavily for rare disasters (Barro, 2006).
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SQ and homogeneity, by the properties of gn and hn. This proves that
AQ(u,w) > AQ(v,w′).
In the other direction, if AQ(u,w) > AQ(v,w′) then, from homogene-
ity and the fact that ∞ > RQ(v,w′) > RQ(u,w) > 0, there exists a se-
quence of gambles {kn}∞n=1 such that kn ∈ G 1
n
and Q(kn) = c′, where
c′ ∶= (AQ(u,w)+AQ(v,w′)2 )−1. For a small δ > 0 let ln = (1 + δ)gn. A simi-
lar argument shows that
SQAS(v,w′) = RQAS(v,w′) ≥ (1+δ) ⋅SQAS(u,w) > SQAS(u,w) = RQAS(u,w),
where the strict inequality follows from the fact that SQAS(u,w) > 0
by Lemma 1.2, the equalities follow from the same lemma, and the weak
inequality follows from the definitions of RQAS and SQAS and the homogeneity
of QAS , by the properties of gn and ln. Using Lemma 1.2 once again, this
implies that ρu(w) > ρv(w′).
For the second part, recall that u at w is at least as averse to Q-riskiness as
v at w′ if for every δ > 0 there exists  > 0 such that SQ(v,w′) ≥ RQ(u,w)− δ.
This implies that SQ(v,w′) ≥ RQ(u,w), which from Lemma A.2 implies that
RQ(v,w′) ≥ RQ(u,w).
In the other direction, if RQ(v,w′) ≥ RQ(u,w), then by Lemma A.2∞ > SQ(v,w′) ≥ RQ(u,w) > 0. This means that for every δ > 0 there exists
 > 0 such that SQ(v,w′) ≥ RQ(u,w) − δ, as SQ is the limit of SQ and RQ is
the limit of RQ.
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A.1.4 Proposition 1.2
Definition (Wealth-independent compound gamble (Foster and Hart, 2013)).
An index Q has the wealth-independent compound gamble property if for
every compound gamble of the form f = g + 1Ah, where Q(g) = Q(h), 1 an
indicator, A is an event such that g is constant on A (g∣A ≡ x for some x)
and h is independent of A, Q(f) = Q(g).
Proof. Foster and Hart (2013) show that QAS satisfies wealth-independent
compound gamble. If QAS(g) ≠ QAS(h), take the one with higher (lower)
level of AS riskiness, and increase (decrease) all its values be  large enough
to equate the level of riskiness of the two gambles. Use wealth independent
compound gamble and monotonicity with respect to stochastic dominance to
deduce the required conclusion.
A.1.5 Theorems 1.4 and 1.5
Proof. The Theorems follow from Theorems 1.6 and 1.7 by Claims 1.2 and 1.3.
For a direct proof of Theorem 1.5, let Q be as in the statement. Take some
CARA function, u, and an arbitrary wealth level w0, and observe that
S∞Q (u,w0) ≥ infw SQ(u,w) = SQ(u,w0) ≥ RQ(u,w0) = supw RQ(u,w) ≥ R∞Q (u,w0).
The equalities follow from the lack of wealth effects in CARA functions
acceptance and rejection decisions, and the middle inequality follows from
reflexivity.
The inequality suggests that all rejected gambles are (weakly) Q-riskier
than all accepted ones. Using monotonicity, continuity, and continuity of u,
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for each accepted gamble there exists  > 0 small enough such that if reduced
from all the realizations of the gamble, the resulting gamble will still be
accepted. Hence, the ranking is in fact strict.
Iterating the above argument with all other possible (C)ARA values
proves that Q refines the order that QAS yields (recall that CARA functions
accept or reject according to a QAS riskiness cutoff, which is the inverse of
their ARA coefficient). Finally, continuity implies that the index must induce
the same order as QAS . That QAS satisfies the properties follows from the
discussion above.
A.1.6 Theorem 1.7
Proof. First, observe that for any CARA utility function u it must be the
case that u is globally at least as averse to Q-riskiness as u, by reflexivity and
the lack of wealth effects in CARA functions. Now consider two gambles g
and g′ with QAS(g) > QAS(g′). Consider u CARA with ρu ≡ 2QAS(g)+QAS(g′) .
u accepts g′ and rejects g, implying that Q(g) ≥ Q(g′), since otherwise
strong global consistency will be violated (the violation would be the fact
that u is globally no less averse to Q-riskiness than itself, u accepts g′ with
Q(g′) > Q(g), but rejects g).
Next, I claim that if QAS(g) > QAS(g′), but Q(g) = Q(g′), then there
exists a gamble g such that QAS(g) > QAS(g′), but Q(g) < Q(g′) in
contradiction to the above result. To see this note that from monotonicity
of Q, for any small  > 0 a gamble g = g +  has Q(g) < Q(g), and from
continuity of QAS , for small enough , QAS(g) > QAS(g′).
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Finally, I claim that if QAS(g) = QAS(g′), but Q(g) > Q(g′), then there
exists a gamble g such that QAS(g) < QAS(g′), but Q(g) > Q(g′). To see
this, apply the same argument from the previous paragraph, only this time
use the continuity of Q and the monotonicity of QAS .
The upshot of the above discussion is that QAS(g) > QAS(g′) ⇐⇒
Q(g) > Q(g′) as required.
A.1.7 Theorem 1.8
Lemma A.3. If Q is a continuous index of performance that satisfies global
consistency, reflexivity, translation invariance, monotonicity and homogeneity,
and u and v are two CARA utilities with ρu ≤ ρv, then u is globally inclined
to invest in Q-performers at least as v.
Proof. From reflexivity and the fact that there are no wealth effects for CARA
functions it follows that u is globally inclined to invest in Q-performers at least
as itself. The conclusion follows, as for any w,w′, v accepts less transactions
at w′ than u at w in the sense of set inclusion, so for all q¯ > q > 0 and δ > 0,
there exists  > 0 such that
0 ≤ sup(q,r)∈T {Q (r) ∣ (q, r) is rejected by uat w}≤ inf(q,r)∈T {Q (r) ∣ (q, r) is accepted by uat w′} + δ≤ inf(q,r)∈T {Q (r) ∣ (q, r) is accepted by vat w′} + δ,
where q¯ is the value that is used for reflexivity at (u,w).
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Lemma A.4. The following are equivalent:
(i) u at w is locally inclined to invest in PAS-performers at least as v at
w′
(ii)ρu(w) ≤ ρv(w′)
Proof. ¬ (ii) Ô⇒ ¬ (i): By Theorem 1.1 if ρu(w) > ρv(w′), then for small
enough  > 0 v at w′ accepts any local transaction such that QAS(q ⋅ r) =
3
2ρu(w)+ρv(w′) or QAS(q ⋅ r) = 3ρu(w)+2ρv(w′) , and such transactions are rejected
by u at w. Such transactions have PAS(r) = q ⋅ 2ρu(w)+ρv(w′)3 and PAS(r) =
q ⋅ ρu(w)+2ρv(w′)3 respectively. This implies that
sup(q,r)∈T {PAS (r) ∣ (q, r) is rejected by u at w} ≥ q ⋅ 2ρu(w) + ρv(w
′)
3
>
q ⋅ ρu(w) + 2ρv(w′)
3
≥ inf(q,r)∈T {Q (r) ∣ (q, r) is accepted by v at w′}
, for all  > 0, so (i) does not hold (use δ = q¯3 ⋅ ∣2ρu(w)+ρv(w′)3 − ρu(w)+2ρv(w′)3 ∣
to get a contradiction).(ii) Ô⇒ (i): By Theorem 1.1 and an argument as above, PAS satisfies
reflexivity. Thus, for some q¯1, for all q¯1 > q > 0 and all δ > 0 there exists  > 0
with
0 ≤ sup(q,r)∈T {PAS (r) ∣ (q, r) is rejected by u at w} ≤≤ inf(q,r)∈T {PAS (r) ∣ (q, r) is accepted by u at w} + δ.
By the same theorem, there exists q¯2 such that for all q¯2 > q > 0 and δ there
exists ′ > 0 with
inf(q,r)∈T′ {Q (r) ∣ (q, r) is accepted by u at w} ≤
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≤ inf(q,r)∈T′ {Q (r) ∣ (q, r) is accepted by v at w′} + δ.
Thus, for all min{q¯1, q¯2} > q > 0 and all δ′(= 2δ) > 0, there exists min{, ′} >
¯ > 0 such that
0 ≤ sup(q,r)∈T¯ {Q (r) ∣ (q, r) is rejected by u at w} ≤≤ inf(q,r)∈T¯ {Q (r) ∣ (q, r) is accepted by v at w′} + δ′.
Lemma A.5. PAS is a continuous index of performance that satisfies reflexiv-
ity, global consistency, translation invariance, monotonicity and homogeneity.
Proof. Translation invariance is immediate as the index could be expressed
as a function of r − rf . From now on, assume without loss of generality that
rf = 0. For homogeneity, note that both the expectation operator and QAS
are homogeneous of degree 1, and so their ratio is homogeneous of degree
0. Continuity follows from the continuity of QAS and the fact that if rn
are bounded and converge to r, E [rn] converges to E [r] from the bounded
convergence theorem.
For any r if E [r] = c > 0 then for all λ > 0 E [(r + λ)] = c+λ ≡ (1 + )E [r]
for some  > 0. From homogeneity of degree 1 and monotonicity with respect
to first order stochastic dominance of QAS one has
QAS ( r
E [r]) = QAS ( (1 + ) rE [(1 + ) r]) = QAS ((1 + ) rc + λ ) >
> QAS ( r
c + λ) > QAS ((r + λ)c + λ ) ,
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where the inequalities follows from monotonicity of QAS with respect to first
order stochastic dominance, and from the homogeneity of degree 1 of QAS .
The previous inequality implies that PASrf (r + λ) > PASrf (r).
Reflexivity was proved in Lemma A.4. Global consistency is implied by
the global consistency of QAS , by Lemma A.4.
Lemma A.6. If P is a continuous index of performance that satisfies reflexiv-
ity, global consistency, translation invariance, monotonicity and homogeneity
of degree 0, then it is ordinally equivalent to PAS.
Proof. Assume, by way of contradiction that P satisfies the conditions but is
not ordinally equivalent to PAS . There are three ways such violation happen:
1. There exist r, r′ ∈R1 with PAS(r) > PAS(r′) and P (r) < P (r′)
2. There exist r, r′ ∈R1 with PAS(r) > PAS(r′) and P (r) = P (r′)
3. There exist r, r′ ∈R1 with PAS(r) = PAS(r′) and P (r) < P (r′)
There is no loss of generality in treating only the first case. The reason is
that using monotonicity and continuity, we could slightly shift r and r′ to
break the equalities in the right direction while not effecting the inequalities.
Given a violation of type 1, consider an agent with CARA utility function,
u such that ρu ≡ .6PAS(r)+ .4PAS(r′). Note that u accepts (1, r) but rejects(1, r′), and that u is globally inclined to invest in P -performers at least as u
by Lemma A.3. But this means that global consistency is violated by P .
Proof. (Of the theorem) Follows from the lemmata.
A.1.8 Lemma 1.4
Lemma A.7. g ∈H ⇐⇒ log(1 + g) ∈ G.
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Proof. In one direction, g ∈H⇒ g ∈ G andQFH(g) < 1. SinceQFH(g) ≥ L(g)
it follows that log(1+ g) is well-defined. As g ∈ G, it assumes a negative value
with positive probability and therefore so does log(1+g). Finally, QFH(g) < 1
implies that E [log(1 + g)] > 0. Hence, log(1 + g) ∈ G.
In the other direction, if log(1 + g) ∈ G we have that log(1 + g) assumes a
negative value with positive probability and therefore so does g. In addition,
we have ∑pi log(1 + gi) > 0. Hence, by Fact 1.1, g ∈H.
Proof. (of Lemma 1.4) Note that for every g ∈ H and S > 0, we have
E [(1 + g)− 1S ] = E [e− log(1+g)S ]. Consequentially, Lemma A.7 and Theorem A
in AS imply that the unique positive solution for the equation is S(g) =
QAS (log(1 + g)).
A.1.9 Theorem 1.10
Lemma A.8. For all g ∈H, If u ∈ U has a constant RRA then %u(w)−1 < 1S(g)
if and only if E [u(w +wg)] > u(w) ∀w > 0.
Proof. As positive affine transformations of the utility function do not change
acceptance and rejection, it is enough to treat functions of the form u(w) =−w1−α. Now observe that:
E [u(w +wg)] > u(w) ⇐⇒ E [−w1−α(1 + g)1−α] > −w1−α ⇐⇒
⇐⇒ E [(1 + g)1−α] < 1 ⇐⇒ E [e(1−α)⋅log(1+g)] < 1 ⇐⇒
⇐⇒ QAS (log(1 + g)) < 1
α − 1 ⇐⇒ α − 1 < 1S(g) .
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Lemma A.9. For every u, v ∈ U , if inf
x
%u(x) ≥ sup
x′ %v(x′) then for every w,
if u accepts g at w so does v.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that v(w) = u(w) = 0 and that
v′(w) = u′(w) = 1. For every t > 1
log v′(tw) = log v′(tw) − log v′(w) = t∫
1
∂ log v′(sw)
∂s
ds = t∫
1
w
v′′(sw)
v′(sw) ds =
= t∫
1
1
s
⋅ (swv′′(sw)
v′(sw) )ds ≥
t∫
1
1
s
⋅ (swu′′(sw)
u′(sw) )ds = logu′(tw)
log v′(w
t
) = log v′(w
t
) − log v′(w) = t∫
1
∂ log v′(ws )
∂s
ds = t∫
1
−w
s2
v′′(ws )
v′(ws ) ds =
= t∫
1
1
s
⋅ (−w
s
v′′(ws )
v′(ws ) )ds ≤
t∫
1
1
s
⋅ (−w
s
u′′(ws )
u′(ws ) )ds = logu′(wt )
This means that for every t > 0:
v(tw) = v(tw) − v(w) = t∫
1
wv′(sw)ds ≥ t∫
1
wu′(sw)ds = u(tw)
And so, if E [u(w +wg)] > u(w) = 0 then necessarily E [v(w +wg)] >
v(w) = 0 as E [v(w +wg)] ≥ E [u(w +wg)].
Lemma A.10. For every u ∈ U and every w > 0, RS (u,w) = SS (u,w) and
AS(u,w) = %u(w) − 1.
The proof of Lemma A.10 is analogous to the proof of Lemma 1.2 and is
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therefore omitted. Recalling that the CRRA utility function with parameter
α is often expressed as
−w1−α = −w−(α−1),
this transformation of %u(⋅) seems particularly natural.
Proof. (Of the theorem, sketch). First observe that for every α > 0
S ((1 + g)α − 1) = QAS (log(1 + g)α) = QAS (α ⋅ log(1 + g)) = α⋅QAS (log(1 + g)) = α⋅S(g),
so S satisfies Scaling. By Lemma A.10, ∞ > RS(u,w) = SS(u,w) = 1%u(w)−1 >
0 (which implies that S satisfies local consistency).
To see that S satisfies global consistency, observe that the fact that AS
is ordinally equivalent to % implies that if v ≻ u then there exist λ ≥ 1 with
inf
w
%v(w) ≥ λ ≥ sup
w′ %u(w′). Therefore, by Lemma A.9 if v accepts g at w so
does an agent with a CRRA utility function with RRA equals λ. Furthermore,
by Lemma A.8, if S(h) < S(g) this agent will accept h at any wealth level.
Applying Lemma A.9 again implies that u accepts h at w.
For uniqueness, assume that Qˆ satisfies the requirements. By Lemma A.7
Pˆ (g) ∶= Qˆ(eg − 1) is an index of riskiness Pˆ ∶ G → R+. For every α > 0, we
have Pˆ (αg) = Qˆ(eαg − 1) = Qˆ ((1 + eg − 1)α − 1) = α ⋅ Qˆ(eg − 1) = α ⋅ Pˆ (g), so
Pˆ satisfies homogeneity. I next claim that Qˆ(g) > Qˆ(h) if and only if S(g) >
S(h). To see this, note that from Theorem 1.9 AQˆ is ordinally equivalent to
% and that from local consistency and scaling 0 < SQ(u,w) = RQ(u,w) <∞
(see Lemma A.2 for a proof of the analogous case). From these facts it follows
that S and Qˆ order lotteries in the same manner (as before, using CRRA
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functions). Hence, Pˆ and QAS also agree on the order of lotteries. Since
both Pˆ and QAS are homogeneous, we have that Pˆ = C ⋅QAS for some C > 0.
This in turn, implies that Qˆ = C ⋅ S, for some C > 0.
A.1.10 Theorem 1.11
Proof. First, observe that for any CRRA utility function u it must be the case
that u is globally at least as averse to Q-riskiness as u, by reflexivity and the
lack of wealth effects in CRRA functions. Now consider two gambles g and
g′ with S(g) > S(g′). Consider u CRRA with %u ≡ 1 + 2S(g)+S(g′) . u accepts
g′ and rejects g, implying that Q(g) ≥ Q(g′), since otherwise strong global
consistency will be violated (the violation would be the fact that u is globally
no less averse to Q-riskiness than itself, u accepts g′ with Q(g′) > Q(g), but
rejects g).
Next, I claim that if S(g) > S(g′), but Q(g) = Q(g′), then there exists a
gamble g such that S(g) > S(g′), but Q(g) < Q(g′) in contradiction to the
above result. To see this note that from monotonicity of Q, for any small
 > 0 a gamble g = g +  has Q(g) < Q(g), and from continuity of S, for
small enough , S(g) > S(g′).
Finally, I claim that if S(g) = S(g′), but Q(g) > Q(g′), then there exists a
gamble g such that S(g) < S(g′), but Q(g) > Q(g′). To see this, apply the
same argument from the previous paragraph, only this time use the continuity
of Q and the monotonicity of S.
The upshot of the above discussion is that S(g) > S(g) ⇐⇒ Q(g) > Q(g)
as required.
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A.1.11 Theorem 1.14
Lemma A.11. Let c = (xn, tn)Nn=1 be an investment cashflow. If rk(s) <
rj(s) for all s ∈ [t1, tN ] then, for all t, ∑
n
e
−tn∫
t
rk(s)ds
xn ≤ 0 implies that
∑
n
e
−tn∫
t
rj(s)ds
xn < 0.
Proof. Denote by n∗ the highest index with xn < 0. Then
∑
n
e
−tn∫
t
rk(s)ds
xn = ∑
n≤n∗e
−tn∫
t
rk(s)ds
xn + ∑
n>n∗e
−tn∫
t
rk(s)ds
xn = (A.1.11.1)
= −∑
n≤n∗e
−tn∫
t
rk(s)ds ∣xn∣ + ∑
n>n∗e
−tn∫
t
rk(s)ds ∣xn∣ ,
and
−∑
n≤n∗e
−tn∫
t
rk(s)ds ∣xn∣ + ∑
n>n∗e
−tn∫
t
rk(s)ds ∣xn∣ ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ (A.1.11.2)
⇐⇒ etn∗∫t rk(s)ds ⋅ ⎛⎜⎝−∑n≤n∗e−
tn∫
t
rk(s)ds ∣xn∣ + ∑
n>n∗e
−tn∫
t
rk(s)ds ∣xn∣⎞⎟⎠ ≤ 0,
and similar statements hold when rk is replaced with rj . But,
e
tn∗∫
t
rk(s)ds ⋅ ⎛⎜⎝−∑n≤n∗e−
tn∫
t
rk(s)ds ∣xn∣ + ∑
n>n∗e
−tn∫
t
rk(s)ds ∣xn∣⎞⎟⎠ =
−∑
n≤n∗e
− tn∫
tn∗rk(s)ds ∣xn∣ + ∑
n>n∗e
− tn∫
tn∗rk(s)ds ∣xn∣ >
−∑
n≤n∗e
− tn∫
tn∗rj(s)ds ∣xn∣ + ∑
n>n∗e
− tn∫
tn∗rj(s)ds ∣xn∣
as positives are only multiplied by smaller numbers and negatives are multi-
plied by greater (positive) numbers.
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Lemma A.12. If c = (xn, tn)Nn=1 is an investment cashflow then there exists
a unique positive number r such that ∑
n
e−rtnxn = 0. Furthermore, if r˜(t) > r >
rˆ(t) for all t ∈ [t1, tN ], then the NPV of c is negative using r˜, and is positive
using rˆ.
For general cashflows, multiple solutions to the equation defining the
internal rate of return may exit. Interestingly, both Arrow and Pratt took
interest in finding simple conditions that would rule out this possibility (Arrow
and Levhari, 1969; Pratt and Hammond, 1979). Lemma A.12 generalizes the
result of Norstrøm (1972) who had shown that investment cashflows have a
unique positive IRR in the discrete setting.
Proof. Define the function f(α) ∶= ∑
n
e−αtnxn. Observe that f (⋅) is continuous,
and satisfies f (0) > 0 and f (α) < 0 for large values of α. Hence, continuity
implies the existence of a solution. Lemma A.11 implies its uniqueness, and
the second part of the claim.
Lemma A.13. If T satisfies translation invariance, homogeneity and local
consistency, then for all u, w, 0 < ST (i, t) = RT (i, t) <∞.
Proof. Local consistency requires that
∀i ∀t ∃λ > 0 ∀δ > 0 ∃ > 0 RT (i, t) − δ < λ < ST (i, t) + δ,
which implies that
∀i ∀t ∃λ > 0 RT (i, t) ≤ λ ≤ ST (i, t).
Since for any i, t, and  > 0 the set {c∣ c ∈ Ct,, c is rejected by i} is non-
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empty, there exists a sequence of cashflows {cn} such that for each n, cn ∶=(xni , tni ) is rejected, cn ∈ Ct, 1
n
and T (cn) < (1 + 1n) ⋅ S1/nT (i, t). For small
δ > 0 , let c′n ∶= (xni , (ti − t1) (1 − δ)) for each n. For n large enough, c′n
are all accepted since T (c′n) = (1 − δ)k T (cn) < S1/nT (i, t) and c′n is in Ct, 1n .
But this implies that RT (i, t) > (1 − δ)k ST (i, t) since c′n are almost always
accepted and lim
n→∞T (c′n) = (1 − δ)k limn→∞T (cn) = (1 − δ)k SQ(i, t). Since δ was
arbitrarily small, this implies RT (i, t) ≥ ST (i, t). So, putting the results
together, gives
∀i ∀t ∃λ > 0 λ ≤ ST (i, t) ≤ RT (i, t) ≤ λ,
which completes the proof.
Proof. (of the theorem) For the first part, in one direction, if ri(t) > rj(t′) then
there exists a small ′ > 0 such that for all x, y ∈ (−′, ′) ri(t+x) > rj(t+ y).2
For a sequence of cashflows with small support and IRR of ri(t)+rj(t′)2 their
translations which start at t′ are almost always accepted, and the translations
which starts at t are almost always rejected. The same applies to these
translated cashflows with times tni replaced by (1−δ) (tni − t). By Lemma A.13,
homogeneity and translation invariance this implies that RT (i, t) < RT (j, t′).
In the other direction, assume RT (i, t) < RT (j, t′). From Lemma A.13
0 < RT (i, t) < RT (j, t′) < ∞. Consider a sequence of cashflows {cn} with
tnN < 1n , tn1 = 0 and T (cn) = 2RT (i,t)+RT (j,t′)3 . For small δ, let {c′n} be a
sequence of cashflows such that t
′n
i = tni ⋅ (1 − δ). The translations of both{cn} and {c′n} which start at t’ are almost always accepted by j and both
2The proof follows closely the proof of Theorem 1.3, which provides more details.
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the translations that start at t are almost always rejected by i. This, in turn,
implies that ri(t) > rj(t′) using the previous Lemmata.
The second part follows from the first part and from Lemma A.13.
A.1.12 Propositions 1.10 and 1.11
Proof. (Proposition 1.10) Note that ∀i, t AD(i, t) = ri(t). The conclusion
follows from Lemma A.12.
Proof. (Proposition 1.11) Follows from Lemma A.11.
A.1.13 Theorem 1.15
Proof. To prove (i) I first identify one such index. The construction draws
upon the findings of previous sections. First, denote by C1 the class of
investment cashflows with ∣tN − t1∣ = 1. Restricting attention to this class of
cashflows, I define a function from C1 to G, the class of gambles, T ∶ C1 → G,
T (c) = ⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣1, e
1
D(c)
1 + e 1D(c) ;−1, 11 + e 1D(c)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
Observe that QAS (T (⋅)) ≡ D(⋅). Now, given a cashflow c = (xn, tn)Nn=1, let
αc ∶= ∣tN − t1∣. Given t, define cˆt ∶= (xn, t + 1αc (tn − t))Nn=1. By construction,
cˆt is a member of C1. This allows defining a new index Z ∶ C → R+ in the
following way:
Z (c) ∶= QFH (αc ⋅ T (cˆt)) .
Z is homogeneous and translation invariant since QFH is homogeneous, andT was constructed to assure these properties.
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Noting that for c ∈ Ct,
∣D(c) −Z (c)∣ = ∣QAS (αc ⋅ T (cˆt)) −QFH (αc ⋅ T (cˆt))∣ ≤ 2αc ≤ 2,
one observes that RZ (⋅, ⋅) = RD (⋅, ⋅) and SZ (⋅, ⋅) = SD (⋅, ⋅), so if D is locally
consistent so is Z.
D satisfies all the requirements of the theorem (proved later on) and
the coefficient of local aversion to D equals to r. Since the relation at least
as averse to D-delay induces the same order as r, the same applies to Z-
delay, as 0 < AD <∞. This implies that for a > 0 combinations of the form
Wa (⋅) = Z (⋅)+a ∣D (⋅) −Z (⋅)∣ also satisfy the requirements of (i). To see that
D ≠ Z, it is enough to consider a cashflow c with αc = 1 and D (c) = 1. For
this cashflow Z(c) ≈ 1.26. Together with the fact that Z and D are uniformly
close on small domains, the fact that the coefficient of local aversion to Z
equals to r (which is positive and finite) implies that the same holds for Wa,
which completes the proof of this part.
(ii) Follows from example A.1.
Example A.1. Consider W1 (⋅) and a cashflow c with αc = 1 for which
D(c) = 1. This implies that Z(c) ≈ 1.26, hence W1(c) < 1.6. Now consider
another cashflow, c′, with αc′ = 1, which first order time dominates c and
has D(c′) =  for a small .3 Since Z(c) ≥ 1 from the properties of QFH
and T , W1(c′) > 1.6. Therefore, while c′ first order time dominates c,
W1 (c) <W1 (c′).
3This could be achieved by increasing xN .
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A.1.14 Theorem 1.16
Proof. I provide the proof for the case k = 1, but the generalization is simple.
First, I check that D satisfies the axioms. Homogeneity is clearly satisfied as
∑
n
e−rtnxn = 0 ⇐⇒ ert∑
n
e−rtnxn = 0 ⇐⇒
∑
n
e−r(tn−t)xn = 0 ⇐⇒ ∑
n
e− rλ ⋅λ(tn−t)xn = 0 (∀t ∀λ > 0) .
Translation invariance is also satisfied as
∑
n
e−rtnxn = 0 ⇐⇒ ert∑
n
e−rtnxn = 0 (∀t) .
For local consistency, I use the smoothness of ri(⋅) to deduce that for
every t and small  > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that if s ∈ (t − δ, t + δ) then
ri(t) −  < ri(s) < ri(t) + . This fact, together with Lemmata A.11 and A.12,
implies that 0 < SD(i, t) = RD(i, t) <∞ and that AD(i, t) = ri(t), hence the
axiom is satisfied.
To see that global consistency is satisfied, first note that i is at least as
averse to D-delay as j if and only if sup
t
rj(t) ≤ inf
t
ri(t). Consider an agent
that discounts at the constant rate ν, with sup rj(t) ≤ ν ≤ inf ri(t). Label
this agent ν. Lemma A.11 implies that ν accepts any cashflow accepted by
i, Lemma A.12 implies that he also accepts cashflows with higher IRR, and
another application of Lemma A.11 implies that j accepts these cashflows.
I now turn to show that the only indices that satisfy the five axioms are
positive multiples of D. This is done in two steps. In the first step, I show
that indices that satisfy the axioms agree with the order induced by D. Then,
I show that they are also multiples of this index.
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For the first step, assume by way of contradiction that there exists another
index, Q, that satisfies the axioms but does not agree with D on the ordering
of two cashflows at some given time points. There are three possibilities:
1. Q(c) > Q(c′) and D(c) <D(c′) for cashflows c and c′.
2. Q(c) > Q(c′) and D(c) =D(c′) for cashflows c and c′.
3. Q(c) = Q(c′) and D(c) <D(c′) for cashflows c and c′.
There is no loss of generality in treating just the first case. To see this,
note that the second and third cases imply the existence of an example of
the first type. Such example in obtained by breaking the tie in the correct
direction, using translation invariance and homogeneity, while preserving the
strict inequality.
To obtain a contradiction, choose r1 and r2 such that
D(c) < 1
r2
< 1
r1
<D(c′),
and consider two agents that discount with the constant rates r1 and r2, and
are labeled accordingly r1 and r2 (with a slight abuse of notation). Using
Lemma A.12 both r1 and r2 accept c and rejects c′. Theorem 1.14 and
Lemma A.13 imply that r1 ≺
Q
r2. But this means that Q violates global
consistency, as r2, the impatient agent, accepts c, the Q-delayed cashflow,
but r1 does not accept c′ which is less Q-delayed. Thus, Q and D must agree
on the ordering of any two cashflows at any given time point.
For the second step, choose an arbitrary cashflow c0 = (xn, tn)Nn=1 and an
index that satisfies the axioms, T . For any cashflow c, there exists a positive
number λ > 0 such that T ((xn, t1 + λ ⋅ (tn − t1))Nn=1) = T (c). The first step
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implies thatD ((xn, t1 + λ ⋅ (tn − t1))Nn=1) =D (c). ButD ((xn, t1 + λ ⋅ (tn − t1))Nn=1) =
λ ⋅D (c0), and also T ((xn, t1 + λ ⋅ (tn − t1))Nn=1) = λ ⋅ T (c0). Altogether this
means that T (c) = T (c0)D(c0)D (c) for every c.
A.1.15 Theorem 1.17
Proof. First, observe that for any agent with constant discount rate, it must
be the case that the agent is globally at least as averse to T -delay as himself,
by reflexivity and the invariance of the sign of the NPV of translations of a
cashflow when the discount rate is constant. Now consider two cashflows c and
c′ with D(c) >D(c′). Consider i with ri ≡ 2D(c)+D(c′) . i accepts c′ and rejects
c, implying that T (c) ≥ T (c′), since otherwise strong global consistency will
be violated (the violation would be the fact that i is globally at least as averse
to T -delay as itself, i accepts c′ with T (c′) > T (c), but rejects c).
Next, I claim that if D(c) >D(c′), but T (c) = T (c′), then there exists a
cashflow c such that D(c) > D(c′), but T (c) < T (c′) in contradiction to
the above result. To see this note that from monotonicity of T , for any small
 > 0, given c = (xi, ti)Ni=1, a cashflow c = (xi + , ti)Ni=1 has T (c) < T (c), and
from continuity of D, for small enough , D(c) >D(c′).
Finally, I claim that if D(c) =D(c′), but T (c) > T (c′), then there exists
a cashflow c such that D(c) <D(c′), but T (c) > T (c′). To see this, apply
the same argument from the previous paragraph, only this time use the
continuity of T and the monotonicity of D.
The upshot of the above discussion is that D(c) > D(c′) ⇐⇒ T (c) >
T (c′) as required.
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A.1.16 Theorem 1.20
Proof. (i) The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1.1. First, note that
if {an = (µn, αn) ∈ A 1
n
}∞
n=1 are accepted it must be the case that µn Ð→n→∞ 0.
To see this, assume by way of contradiction that there is a sub-sequence of
such transactions where the price does not converge to 0, without loss of
generality an = (µn, αn), and lim
n→∞µn = µˆ ∈ (0,∞]. Let µ ∶= min{µˆ,1}. Then,
there exits N such that for all n > N ln ∶= (µ2 , αn) is accepted. Lemma 2 of
Cabrales et al. (2014) proves that as 1n approaches 0, so does the scale of the
optimal investment ∥bn∥. Therefore, for 1n small enough, w − µ2 + bnk is in a
small environment of w − µ2 < w for all k, a contradiction.
For the second step, from the discussion above it follows that for 1n small
enough, w − µn + bnk is in a δ-environment of w for all k, if a = (µ,α) ∈ A
is accepted. ρu(w) is continuous, and so for every γ > 0 there exists a δ > 0
small enough such that x ∈ (w − δ,w + δ) implies ∣ρu(x) − ρu(w)∣ < γ.
For the final step, choose a small positive number η, and consider the
CARA agents with absolute risk aversion coefficients ρu(w)+η and ρu(w)−η >
0. For a small enough environment of w, I,
ρu(w) − η ≤ inf
x∈Iρu(x) ≤ supx∈I ρu(x) ≤ ρu(w) + η.
This, in turn, implies, using Theorem 3 of Cabrales et al. (2014) and a
slightly modified version of their Theorem 2, that the coefficient of local
taste for A-informativeness of u with wealth w is equal to ρ−1u (w), and that
RA(u,w) = SA(u,w).
(ii) Cabrales et al. (2013) showed that a = (µ,α) is accepted by an agent
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with log utility function if and only if Ie (α) > log ( ww−µ). Using a Taylor
approximation yields
log ( w
w − µ) = log (w) − log (w − µ) ≈ 1wµ + µ22w2 .
As shown above, if an = (µn, αn) ∈ A 1
n
are accepted it must be the case that
µn Ð→
n→∞ 0. It is therefore the case that for n large enough (when posteriors
are close to the prior), an is accepted by agents with log utility function if
Je (an) = Ie(αn)
µn
> 1
w
+O(µn) Ð→
n→∞ 1w = ρlog(w),
and rejected if
Je (an) = Ie(αn)
µn
< 1
w
+O(µn) Ð→
n→∞ 1w = ρlog(w).
For any x ∈ R+, 1x ≡ w ∈ R+ satisfies ρlog (w) = x, and so by properly
translating the log utility function (and changing all but an environment of
the baseline wealth level of the agent), one can use a “sandwich” argument of
the form used above to complete the proof.
A.1.17 Theorem 1.21
Proof. The proof uses the same techniques used above. If ρu(w) > ρv(w′)
then there exists some γ > 0 such that ρu(w) > (1+ γ) ⋅ ρv(w′). Following the
arguments used before, for  > 0 small enough, if u accepts a = (µ,α) ∈ A then
v accepts ((1 + γ2 ) ⋅ µ,α). Together with local consistency and homogeneity
this implies that the coefficient of local taste for Q-informativeness of u at w
is smaller than the coefficient of local taste for Q-informativeness of v at w′,
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and that v at w has at least as much taste for Q-informativeness as u at w′.
4
In the other direction, assume ρu(w) = ρv(w′), and by way of contradiction
assume that the coefficient of local taste for Q-informativeness of u at w
is not equal to the coefficient of local taste for Q-informativeness of v at
w′. Without loss of generality, assume that the coefficient of local taste for
Q-informativeness of u at w is greater than the coefficient of local taste for Q-
informativeness of v at w′ . This means that there exists a sequence {an}∞n=1
of information transactions, such that for every n, an = (µn, αn) satisfies (a)
an ∈ A 1
n
, (b) For some small γ > 0, ((1+γ) ⋅µn, αn) is accepted by u at w, and
(c) an is rejected by v at w′. But this implies that A violates local consistency,
a contradiction, and so the coefficient of local taste for Q-informativeness
of u at w is equal to the coefficient of local taste for Q-informativeness of v
at w′. This, in turn, implies that u at w is has at least as much taste for
Q-informativeness as v at w′ (and vice versa).
A.1.18 Theorem 1.22
Proof. For (i), let δ ∶= 12mini {min{pi,1 − pi}}. Define
B (a) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
A(a) ∥p − qs∥ < δ ∀s
1
µk
⋅ f(α) else
for some positive f . Then B satisfies the required properties since for local
transactions (ones with posteriors close to the prior) it is equal to A, and
4For details, see Theorem 1.3.
220
since both A and 1µf(α) are homogeneous and changes in the price do not
change the distance of the posteriors from the prior (and hence the rule that
governs B). Choosing f ≡ 1 (or many other choices) completes the proof of
(ii).
A.1.19 Theorem 1.24
Proof. First, observe that for any CARA utility function u it must be the
case that Q-informativeness is globally at least as attractive for u as it is
for u, by reflexivity and the lack of wealth effects in CARA functions. Now
consider two information transactions, a and a′, with A(a) > A(a′). Consider
u CARA with ρu ≡ A(a)+A(a′)2 . u accepts a and rejects a′, implying that
Q(a) ≥ Q(a), since otherwise strong global consistency will be violated (the
violation would be the fact that Q-informativeness is globally at least as
attractive for u as is for itself, u accepts a with Q(a′) > Q(a), but rejects a′).
Next, I claim that if A(a) > A(a′), but Q(a) = Q(a′), then there exists a
transaction a such that A(a) > A(a′), but Q(a) < Q(a′) in contradiction
to the above result. To see this denote a ∶= (µ + , α), where a = (µ,α), and
note that from monotonicity of Q, for any small  > 0, Q(a) < Q(a′), and
from continuity of A, for small enough , A(a) > A(a′).
Finally, I claim that if A(a) = A(a′), but Q(a) > Q(a′), then there exists
a transaction a such that A(a) < A(a′), but Q(a) > Q(a′). To see this,
apply the same argument from the previous paragraph, only this time use
the continuity of Q and the monotonicity of A.
The upshot of the above discussion is that A(a) > A(a′) ⇐⇒ Q(a) >
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Q(a′) as required.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Proofs
Proof of Remark 3.1. Observe first that any matching that is stable with
respect to (P kw, P−w) and matches woman w to a man must be stable with
respect to P , and that any matching µ˜ that is stable with respect to P with
µ˜(w) ranked ≤ k must be stable with respect to (P kw, P−w). Hence, setting
M1 = {m ∈M ∣ m achievable for w under (P kw, P−w)}
and
M2 = {m ∈M ∣ m achievable for w under P and m ranked ≤ k in w’s list}
we have M1 =M2. By the Gale-Shapley result, µM [P kw, P−w](w) is w ’s least
preferred element of M1, and hence of M2. Should both sets be empty, then
µM [P kw, P−w](w) = w. ◻
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Proof of Proposition 3.1. We introduce Algorithm 1 below and prove that
given the same input, Algorithm 1 and the Divorcing Algorithm generate
the same output, which in each case is the MP-DA outcome described in the
statement of the proposition.
Like the Divorcing Algorithm, Algorithm 1 takes as its input a profile P
of preference lists, a woman w, and a truncation point k ∈ {1, . . . ,N}, and
outputs a matching. Algorithm 1 is adapted from an algorithm due to McVitie
and Wilson, which differs from MP-DA in that the men make offers one at a
time instead of in rounds, but is nevertheless outcome equivalent (McVitie
and Wilson, 1970). Algorithm 1 is identical to McVitie and Wilson’s, except
that we explicitly delay selecting man µM [P ] until absolutely necessary. By
McVitie and Wilson (1970), the algorithm plainly produces µM [P kw, P−w],
the MP-DA outcome when w k-truncates her preference list.
Algorithm 1
• Step 0. Initialization. Identify the least preferred achievable mate for
woman w under (Pw, P−w) and call this man ml. For example, we may
identify this man by running MP-DA, setting ml = µM [Pw, P−w](w).
Iteration over steps 1 and 2. Preferences in these steps are given by(P kw, P−w) .
• Step 1. Pick any single man other than ml who has not exhausted
his preference list. If no such man exists, pick ml. If we have picked
ml, and ml is not single, or if ml has exhausted his preference list,
terminate.
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• Step 2. The man chosen in the previous step makes an offer to the most
preferred woman on his preference list who has not already rejected
him. If this woman finds the man acceptable and prefers him to her
current mate (or if she is single), she holds his offer and divorces her
previous mate (if necessary). Return to step 1.
Let µ1(P, k,w) be the output of Algorithm 1 and recall that µDIV (P, k,w)
is the output of the divorcing algorithm.
To establish outcome equivalence of the algorithms, begin by letting l be
the rank of w’s least preferred achievable mate ml under P.
• If k ≥ l, both algorithms clearly produce µM , the men-optimal matching
under P.
• If k < l, then the algorithms will reach a point where they coincide.
That is, there will be a point where the sequences of single men chosen
coincide, as do the temporary matchings and preference lists.
In Algorithm 1, we claim that (1) at some point, ml will make an offer
to w, which will be rejected. (2) From this point forward, the algorithm
coincides with the Divorcing Algorithm, just after its initialization step.
1. Under MP-DA, when w k-truncates her list, men are (weakly)
worse off than if she reports truthfully (see Gale and Sotomayor
(1985)). This means that in µM [P kw, P−w], ml must be matched
with a candidate worse than w, or possibly with no woman at all.
Hence, in Algorithm 1, ml must have made an offer to w (since
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he makes offers from his list in order of preference), and this offer
must have been rejected.
2. When in Algorithm 1, ml makes his offer to w, no better ranked
man has yet done so. Otherwise, let m′ be the first man ranked
higher than ml to make an offer to w and backtrack to the point in
the algorithm where this offer is made. Note that up to this point,
the path of the algorithm is consistent with w having l-truncated
her preferences, since she has not faced any man ranked k through
l. But this implies that if w l-truncated her list, she would receive
a mate at least as good asm′, notml. This contradicts Proposition
3.1.
By the choice-of-proposer rule in the algorithm, we know that
when ml proposes to w, he must be the only single man who has
not yet exhausted his list. If w accepted ml’s offer, the path of the
algorithm would be consistent with w having l-truncated her list,
and the algorithm would terminate with matching µM . Hence,
by instead rejecting ml, we arrive at exactly the position of the
Divorcing Algorithm, following step 0.
Thereafter, the algorithms coincide, thus yielding identical outcomes. ◻
Proof of the Lemma in Section 3.3.3. For each i and k, define
P i2(k) ≡ {P−w ∣ P−w ∈P2(k), µM [P kw, P−w](w) =mi } .
We wish to show that w finds P i2(k) and Pj2(k) equally probable, for all
k and all i, j ≤ k. We proceed by finding a bijection from P i2(k) to Pj2(k)
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which is probability preserving with respect to w’s beliefs.
For i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we define a mapping fijk ∶ P2(k) → P2(k). Let
fijk(P−w) ≡ P ′−w be given by the following:
1. Switch mi and mj everywhere. Switch the positions of mi and mj in
each woman’s list, and swap mi and mj ’s preference lists (this is like
relabeling).
2. Switch back mi and mj in w’s list.
Notice that this is equivalent to swapping mi and mj in w’s list only, and
then relabeling i and j.1
Suppose P−w ∈ P i2(k). The fact that w finds P −w and P ′−w equally
probable follows directly from the definition of M-symmetry. We will show
that P ′−w ∈ Pj2(k). Note that it is not immediately clear that we even
have P ′−w ∈ P2(k), that is, that under P ′−w, k-truncation still yields an
improvement for w.
We think of the matching as arising from MP-DA. Since P−w ∈P2(k), if
w does not truncate, she will be matched with a man worse than mk. Hence,
during the process of the algorithm, she will not receive an offer from any
man m1, . . . ,mk. Hence, rearranging these men in w’s list will not affect the
outcome, and in particular, swapping mi and mj will not affect the outcome
(the stable matching). Furthermore, since P−w ∈P i2(k) we know that under
P−w, k-truncation leaves w matched with mi. Using proposition 3.1, we know
that during the chain of proposals following an “ex-post” k-truncation by w,
1For the trivial case, i = j, we use the identity mapping.
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the first man to make an offer to w will be mi. Hence, this will still be true
if w swaps the position of mi and mj in her list.
Thus, we have that if w switches mi and mj in her list, k-truncation
will yield an improvement and she will again be matched with mi. But now
relabeling mi and mj (so that w’s list is (m1,m2,m3, . . .)), we have that
P ′−w ∈Pj2(k).
Hence, fijk(⋅) is a bijection from P i2(k) to Pj2(k), which is probabil-
ity preserving with respect to w’s beliefs. This is sufficient to prove the
proposition. ◻
To prove Theorem 4.1, we begin with a lemma demonstrating that even
upon submitting a vanishingly small truncation of one’s list (relative to the
length of one’s full preference list), we still see gains relative to truthful
reporting. We examine the case where a woman’s payoff is given by her
partner rank, and being unmatched is treated as rank N + 1. At the end of
the proof, we show that the result also holds for the more general preferences
described in the statement of the Theorem 4.1.2
Lemma B.1. There exists N∗ such that for every N > N∗, the gain to
woman w from truncating at 7 log2N relative to truthful reporting is strictly
greater than zero. Furthermore, the expected rank of w’s mate is lower
than (better than) her expected mate rank from truthful reporting by at least
1+N
2+logN − 7 log2N − 2.
2Throughout the proofs of Lemma B.1, Lemma B.2, and Theorem 4.1, for any fractional
x ∈ R+, we treat x -truncation as ⌊x⌋-truncation.
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Proof of Lemma 1. First, in the case of no truncation, we know from Pittel
(1989, p. 545) that the expected rank of w ’s husband, Rw(µm) satisfies:
E [Rw] ≥ 1 +N
1 +HN ≥ 1 +N2 + logN ,
where HN = 11 + 12 + . . . + 1N , the N th harmonic number. Let D be the
highest (worst) rank some woman gets under WP-DA when all agents report
their preferences truthfully. Using Theorem 6.1 from Pittel (1992), we observe
that for N large enough,
Pr(D ≤ 7 log2N) ≥ 1 − 1
N
.
Therefore, truncating at 7 log2N ensures an expected rank of at most
7 log2N × (1 − 1N ) + 1N × (N + 1). Hence, the expected gain (in rank) from
truncation, ∆, satisfies:
∆ ≥ 1 +N
2 + logN − 7 log2N − 2.
The right hand side approaches infinity as N grows to infinity, so for N large
enough, ∆ > 0. ◻
In Lemma B.1 we have established that truncating at 7 log2N ensures a gain
(in terms of expected partner rank) relative to truthful revelation that grows
arbitrarily large as N →∞. Note that this gain is an absolute measure. As
measured as a fraction of the expected payoff from truthful revelation, the
gains from truncation go to zero.3
3Recall that as a fraction of N, the expected partner rank for women (as well as for
men) converges to 0 as N grows large.
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It remains to establish that as a fraction of the market size N, the degree of
optimal truncation goes to 0. To do this, we will first show that any truncation
of a constant fraction of one’s list is (asymptotically) outperformed by the
level of truncation found in Lemma B.1.
Lemma B.2. For any fraction α ∈ (0,1),
i) there exists N(α) such that for every N > N(α), a woman’s payoff
from truncating at αN is lower than that from truncating at 7 log2N ;
ii) there exists N∗(α) such that for every N > N∗(α), a woman’s payoff
from truncating at xN is lower than that from truncating at 7 log2N
for every x ∈ [α,1].
Proof of Lemma 2. We begin by proving i) for the case of α = 1 − 1e .
Let ∆¯ be the expected difference between the rank of the mate under trunca-
tion at αN and the rank of the mate under truthful revelation. Let  > 0 be
a small number. Let AN be the event {w gets fewer than (1 − ) logN offers,
or else more than (1+ ) logN , before MP-DA stops}. Let PN = P (AN). We
then have:
∆¯ ≤ PN ×N + (1 − PN) ×Pr{Rank (µM(w)) > (1 − 1e)N ∣¬AN} × N≤ PN ×N + Pr{Rank (µM(w)) > (1 − 1e)N ∣¬AN} × N≤ PN ×N + (1e)(1−) logN ×N.
(B.1.0.1)
Note that truncation may only matter in the event {Rank (µM(w)) > (1 − 1e)N} ,
which is included in the event B = {{Rank (µM(w)) > (1 − 1e)N} ∩ ¬AN} ∪
AN . In the first inequality, we have replaced the conditional benefits from
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truncation, be they positive or negative, with N, and considered the event
B. In the last inequality, we treat offers w receives as independent draws
(and invoke the Principle of Deferred Decisions), when in fact the draws
are “without replacement,” which would yield a lower probability. These
substitutions are all acceptable as we are finding an upper bound on ∆¯.
Using Equation 2.16 from Pittel et al. (2007), we know that there exists
some c > 0 such that for N large enough, PN ≤ exp (−c ⋅ log 13N). Hence,
∆¯ ≤ exp (−c ⋅ log 13N) ×N + (1e)(1−) logN ×N= N
exp(c⋅log 13 N) +N . (B.1.0.2)
We now must show that for large N, N
exp(c⋅log 13 N)+N  ≤ 1+N2+logN −7 log2N−2,
which by Lemma B.1 will imply ∆ ≥ ∆¯.
We have N
exp(c⋅log 13 N) +N  ≤ 2Nexp(c⋅log 13 N) for N large enough, since N  ≤
N
exp(c⋅log 13N) ⇐⇒ 1 ≤ N1−exp(c⋅log 13N) ⇐⇒ c ⋅ log 13N ≤ (1 − ) logN , which
clearly holds for large N.
Hence, it is sufficient to prove that:
2N
exp (c ⋅ log 13 N) ≤ 1 +N2 + logN − 7 log2N − 2.
Since for large N, 7 log2N + 2 < N , it suffices to show that 3N
exp(c⋅log 13 N) ≤
1+N
2+logN , which is implied by 3N+3
exp(c⋅log 13 N) ≤ 1+N2+logN ⇐⇒ 3 ≤ exp(c⋅log
1
3 N)
2+logN .
Observe that
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lim
N→∞
exp(c⋅log 13 N)
2+logN = limx→∞ exp(c⋅x)2+x3 =∞
since c is greater than 0. This completes the proof for the case of (1− 1e)N .
To show that i) holds, we now consider general α ∈ (0, 1). Let r ≡ 11−α >1,
so that 1 − 1r = α. An analogous proof holds with truncation at (1 − 1r )N .
Probability PN will remain unchanged, and in Equation B.1.0.1, instead
of (1e)(1−) logN we have (1r )(1−) logN = (1e)log r⋅(1−) logN = ( 1N )(1−) log r =( 1N )δ(α), where δ(α) ≡ (1 − ) log r = (1 − ) log 11−α > 0. We may then replace
N  with N1−δ(α) in Equation B.1.0.2, and the remaining argument will hold.
To show that ii) holds, observe that the critical appearance of α is in
the inequality N1−δ(α) ≤ N
exp(c⋅log 13N) . For every x > α, we have N1−δ(x) ≤
N1−δ(α). Hence, for any N large enough so that N1−δ(α) ≤ N
exp(c⋅log 13N) , we
have that N1−δ(x) ≤ N
exp(c⋅log 13N) holds as well, demonstrating ii). ◻
Proof of Theorem 4.1. By way of contradiction, assume that lim
N→∞k∗(N)N = 0
does not hold. This implies that there exists a subsequence {Nj} such that
lim
j→∞k∗(Nj)Nj = b > 0, so for Nj large enough, k∗(Nj)Nj > b/2. By Lemma B.2
ii), we know that for large enough Nj , truncating at 7 log2Nj outperforms
truncating at xNj for any x ≥ b/2. But this contradicts the optimality of
the truncations at k∗(Nj), and so concludes the proof for the case when
payoffs are given by partner rank. By applying Corollary 4.2, we see that the
result also holds for any strictly increasing, convex transformation of such
preferences. ◻
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To prove Theorems 3.2 and 3.4, we show that the following lemma holds:
Lemma B.3. Let τ be a profile of strategies where each man reports truthfully
and women play truncation strategies. Let σ∗ be an equilibrium in truncation
strategies, such that every woman in W / {w} truncates more at any state of
the world (in the sense of FOSD) and men report truthfully. Then woman w
is weakly better off under σ∗ than under τ .
Proof of Lemma B.3. Since other women truncate more under σ∗, it is
clear that the payoff to w from the profile (τw, σ∗−w) is weakly higher than
her payoff under τ . Moreover, since σ∗w is a best response to σ∗−w, the payoff
to w from (σ∗w, σ∗−w) is weakly greater than that under (τw, σ∗−w). ◻
Proof of Theorem 3.2. i) is a direct consequence of Lemma B.3. Proofs
for ii) and iii) were given in-text.
Proof of Theorem 4. i) follows from symmetry. ii) is a direct
consequence of Lemma B.3.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. To prove the proposition, we first show that if
under low correlation, we prefer truncating less to more, than under high
correlation we definitely prefer truncating less to more.
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First, observe that
Epα′ [v(k, P˜−w)] = ∑
P−w p
α′(P−w)v(k,P−w)
= ∑
P−w
[(1 − α′)p(P−w) + α′pC(P−w)] v(k,P−w)
= ∑
P−w [(1 − α′)p(P−w) + α1 − α
′
1 − α pC(P−w) + α′ − α1 − α pC(P−w)] v(k,P−w)
= (1 − α′
1 − α )Epα[v(k, P˜−w)] + (α′ − α1 − α )EpC [v(k, P˜−w)].
Now suppose that for k1, k2 ∈ {1, . . . ,N} with k2 > k1, we have
Epα[v(k2, P˜−w)] ≥ Epα[v(k1, P˜−w)]. (B.1.0.3)
Then since
EpC [v(k2, P˜−w)] ≥ EpC [v(k1, P˜−w)],
we must have
Epα′ [v(k2, P˜−w)] ≥ Epα′ [v(k1, P˜−w)]. (B.1.0.4)
If the inequality in (B.1.0.3) is strict, then so too is the inequality in (B.1.0.4).
We can now use this payoff comparative static to sort optimal truncation
points as follows.
By definition, kl(α, p, uw) satisfies
Epα[v(kl(α, p, uw), P˜−w)] > Epα[v(k, P˜−w)] ∀ k < kl(α, p, uw).
From (B.1.0.4), we must then have
Epα′ [v(kl(α, p, uw), P˜−w)] > Epα′ [v(k, P˜−w)] ∀ k < kl(α, p, uw),
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so that kl(α′, p, uw) ≥ kl(α, p, uw).
Similarly, kh(α, p, uw) satisfies
Epα[v(kh(α, p, uw), P˜−w)] ≥ Epα[v(k, P˜−w)] ∀ k < kh(α, p, uw).
From (B.1.0.4), we must then have
Epα′ [v(kh(α, p, uw), P˜−w)] ≥ Epα′ [v(k, P˜−w)] ∀ k < kh(α, p, uw),
so that kh(α′, p, uw) ≥ kh(α, p, uw). ◻
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